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ABSTRACT
My three-paper dissertation is aimed at applying the concepts of bounded ethicality and
ethical fading to accounting fraud. Typical of relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics,
theoretical models are scarce (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, the purpose of Study
1 is to unify disparate theories and ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of
constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the
concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. In addition, the pressure for management to
meet earnings expectations is discussed through the lens of the TUAB as an example of how one
may unknowingly misreport.
Studies 2 and 3 apply the TUAB to investigate how certain contextual factors interact
with egocentric biases to increase the likelihood of ethical fading. Specifically, Study 2 consists
of an experiment exploring how inferior pay among managers interacts with egocentric
perceptions of fairness and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and
fraudulent behavior. Study 3 also utilizes an experimental methodology to examine how the
pressure to meet earnings forecasts interacts with egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative
affect to influence the probability of ethical fading and fraudulent acts.
The results for Study 2 indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to view
this disparity as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no
significant direct effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis
revealed that a person’s risk preference might moderate this relationship. The primary findings of
Study 2 suggest that individuals who experience a higher degree of ethical fading are more likely
to commit fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, seem to be significant
ii

psychological processes that explain how differences in pay may lead to fraud. The primary
finding of Study 3 is that, like Study 2, fraud is more likely to occur as an individual experiences
a higher degree of ethical fading. Furthermore, this study suggests that those who are closest to
meeting an earnings target are the most likely to engage in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the
results failed to find any support that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect
contribute towards his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting. The primary
contributions of this dissertation is that it unifies various theories and ideas from psychology and
behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory (TUAB) that includes the concepts of bounded
ethicality and ethical fading, serves as an initial test of TUAB, and provides evidence that
unethical behavior is not necessarily the result of one consciously forsaking his or her ethics for
some other desired goal (i.e., profit).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Financial statement fraud affects not only organizations, employees, investors, and audit
firms, but society as well. In the most recent survey among its members, the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) reports that the median loss among organizations that have
committed fraud was approximately $1 million (ACFE, 2012). These costs may include legal
expenditures, fines, disgorgements, increased insurance rates, and loss of productivity (Wells,
2010). The losses associated with an organization’s stock value are perhaps more noteworthy.
One estimate indicates that the decrease in the market value of a company’s stock can be
anywhere from 500 to 1000 times the amount of a fraud (Hall, 2005). For example, a $7 million
fraud may result in a $3.5 billion to $7 billion decrease in stock value. Furthermore, an
organization may be subject to the risk of having its stock involuntarily delisted from exchanges.
There are also those costs that are immeasurable. An organization that is involved in financial
statement fraud may adversely affect the morale of its employees, the goodwill of its customers,
and the trust of its suppliers (Wells, 2010). The most significant penalty an organization can pay
for fraud, though, is a decline into bankruptcy that can ultimately lead to the liquidation of the
company.
Accounting fraud is especially harmful to investors in that it makes the capital markets
either, at a minimum, less efficient (Wells, 2010) or, at worst, unstable. For example, the actions
of just WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron together accounted for $460 billion
in shareholder losses (Cotton, 2002). A more difficult cost to estimate, however, is the
diminished confidence in the capital markets when the quality, transparency, integrity, and
reliability of both the financial reporting process and financial information, in general, becomes
1

suspect (Wells, 2010). Mistrust of the capital markets and the financial reporting process on
which it rests impinges upon the integrity of the auditing profession as well.
The reputation of the auditing profession as a whole suffers when firms, through either
obliviousness, negligence, or turning a blind-eye, provided a clean opinion on fraudulent
financial statements. Instances of fraud, especially when several, high profile companies are
accused in a relatively short period, create doubt in the effectiveness of auditors and the audit
process. As such fraud invites government oversight (e.g., the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board) and regulation (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), which can be costly for the
auditing profession in regards to lobbying and/or compliance expenditures. Individual
accounting firms may also endure more direct, tangible costs as result of the fraudulent actions of
their clients. At a minimum, the cost to perform an audit may rise if the firm’s tests for fraud
indicate that procedures that are more extensive should be used due to an increased probability of
its client misrepresenting financial information. More significant, however, are the legal costs a
firm can incur if it provided a clean opinion on financial statements that were, in fact, fraudulent.
The fate of Arthur Anderson is an example of an extreme price an auditing firm can pay for its
dishonest clients.
Financial statement fraud, however, is not just an organizational, employee, investor, or
auditing issue, or even a problem confined with the business realm, it is a societal issue given its
impact on all of the public. At an individual level, accounting fraud can destroy careers, fuel
massive job loss (Wells, 2010), and, in the case of Enron, erase one’s entire retirement savings
(Oppel, 2001). At a societal level, it can negatively impact the nation’s prosperity and economic
growth (Wells, 2010). Thus, given its enormous costs, fraud has received considerable attention
2

among regulators, organizations, audit firms, and researchers. Yet, efforts aimed at deterring
such malfeasance have yielded minimal success.
Incidents of accounting fraud have increased over the past decade
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) despite the considerable legislative measures aimed at its
deterrence, such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). One factor that might
explain the ineffectiveness of these measures is their reliance on basic, yet inaccurate,
assumptions regarding the decision-making that underlies fraudulent behavior. Specifically, that
this behavior is (1) motivated by greed, or some other basic emotion, and (2) the result of a
conscious decision to forsake one’s morals for some other desire good (i.e., satisfying the
person’s greed). However, greed seems to be an overly simplistic explanation in that there are
many “aggressively acquisitive” individuals who do not engage in fraud (Duffield & Grabosky,
2001). Furthermore, in regards to the conceptualization of fraud as a self-interested, intentional
act, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2010) argue that “if self-interest were computed rationally as
an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias would be as simple as
increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46).
Rather than “predatory fraudsters” who enrich themselves by exploiting weak accounting
controls, the evidence suggests that “accidental fraudsters” constitute a larger share of frauds.
The characteristics of an accidental fraudster are that he or she is a decent, law-abiding person
who, under typical circumstances, would have never considered committing fraud (Dorminey,
Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(2012) indicates that most fraudsters fit such a description in that they are trusted employees with
clean employment histories and no prior criminal offenses. Charles Niemeier, the former chief
3

accountant for the SEC’s enforcement division, states that "[p]eople who never intend to do
something wrong end up finding themselves in situations where they are almost forced to
continue to commit fraud once they have started doing this. Otherwise, it will be revealed that
they had used improper accounting in the earlier periods" (quoted from Bazerman, Loewenstein,
& Moore, 2002, p. 100). As such, understanding why managers commit fraud perhaps requires a
more nuanced examination into their psychological processes that drive ethical decision-making.
Diverging from the traditional frameworks (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973; Rest, 1986) that view
ethical decision-making as a rational, linear thought process, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji
(2005) formulated the concept of bounded ethicality. Bounded ethicality is defined as the
“systematic and predictable psychological processes that lead people to engage in ethically
questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel,
Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2010, p. 7). These processes consist of inherent biases
and heuristics that impede a person’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh, Bazerman,
Banaji, 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim
credit are distinct examples of biases that behavioral ethics researchers have identified and used
to portray the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003;
Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological processes operate at a subconscious level (Gino,
Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most sinister characteristic of bounded ethicality is that it allows
the person to violate his or her morals without the awareness that he or she is doing so.
The lack of awareness that one is behaving unethically is accomplished through the
mechanism of ethical fading wherein the person’s psychological constraints fade any moral
considerations from his or her decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Studies
4

suggest that environmental factors such as sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999)
and goal setting (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004) can induce ethical fading in an
individual (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). In the accounting ethics literature, Murphy and Dacin
(2011) argue that contextual elements such as the pressure to meet analyst expectations may
influence managers to engage in financial statement fraud without the consideration that they are
behaving unethically. As such, research with the goal of identifying the contextual factors that
lead to ethical fading, as well as the psychological processes that trigger this operation, can
contribute towards implementing measures that are more effective at deterring accounting fraud.
This dissertation is aimed at applying the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical
fading to accounting fraud. However, common to relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics,
theoretical models are nebulous and thus not well-defined (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
As such, the purpose of Study 1 (Chapter 2) is to unify disparate theories and ideas from
psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended
Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading.
Studies 2 and 3 (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) apply TUAB (Chapter 2) to investigate how
certain contextual factors interact with egocentric biases to increase the likelihood of ethical
fading. Specifically, Study 2 consists of an experiment exploring how unequal pay among
managers provokes egocentric perceptions of fairness and envy which, in turn, increases the
likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Study 3 also utilizes an
experimental methodology to examine how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts trigger
egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect to influence the probability of ethical
fading and fraud. If bounded ethicality and ethical fading help to explain accounting fraud, then
5

research such as this can have significant implications as to how regulators, executives, and
auditors address this problem. What follows are brief overviews of the three studies as well as a
discussion regarding the overall contributions of this dissertation.

Overview of Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 is to unify disparate theories and ideas from psychology and
behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral
Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. The
pressure for management to meet earnings expectations is discussed through the lens of TUAB
as an example of how one may unknowingly engage in unethical behavior.
In sum, TUAB (Chapter 2) states that quasi-static and task-specific factors can trigger
certain biases and heuristics. Provoking those biases related to preserving one’s self-image, in
particular, can lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli that favor a preferred outcome
(Messick & Sentis, 1983). These effortless and automatic evaluations are so primitive that they
may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). Furthermore, the
triggering of these biases can produce negative affect, for which the person will be motivated to
pacify these emotions quickly and without utilizing a deliberate thought process (Kahneman,
2011). Thus, if engaging in a questionable behavior eliminates any negative affect, then the
individual’s affect-laden intuition will suggest that such behavior is “good” or “appropriate” in
that it is the most emotionally satisfying. At this point, the person is likely to rely on an “affect
heuristic” wherein the negative emotions serve as the basis for his or her decision. The individual
is then likely to perform an act of substitution wherein a difficult question (what is the ethical or
6

proper action?) is replaced with an easier one (would this decision make me feel better?). Ethical
fading has now occurred since the moral implications of the alternative decisions are not
considered, thus increasing the probability that the person behaves unethically.
Study 1 also discusses TUAB’s (Chapter 2) potential to predict and/or explain immoral
behavior across the different functional areas of accounting research. In regards to Financial
Accounting research, TUAB (Chapter 2) may explain how disclosures and ambiguity in the
reporting standards (e.g., principle-based guidelines) can actually encourage unethical behavior.
With respect to the AIS area, the TUAB (Chapter 2) can be utilized to address whether
information systems foster an environment of instrumental rationality. That is, a focus on the
process for completing a task in the most effective and efficient way without any consideration
of the ethical implications of engaging in that process. The TUAB (Chapter 2) can also be used
to explain how and why auditors sometimes forfeit their professional responsibilities and accede
to their clients’ demands. In addition, TUAB (Chapter 2) may help explain how and why
taxpayers and tax practitioners are willing to engage in behaviors related to tax avoidance and
tax fraud. Finally, in regards to the Management Accounting area, TUAB (Chapter 2) may help
explain a range of deviant behaviors such as the misappropriation of assets, bribery, and transfer
price manipulation and can be used to explore the ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to
budgeting and performance measurement such as dishonesty in budget reporting, the creation of
budgetary slack, biased performance evaluation, and performance measurement manipulation.
The primary contribution of Study 1 is that it unifies various theories and ideas from
psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory that includes the concepts of
bounded ethicality and ethical fading. Furthermore, Study 1 contributes to the ethics and
7

accounting literatures by introducing a model that makes a distinction between intentional and
unintentional behavior by allowing for the systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s
ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors that exacerbate those errors.
This study also offers potential contributions to auditors, management, and regulators.
An understanding of how certain contextual factors contribute towards bounded ethicality
may result in improved fraud detection in the auditing profession. In addition, knowledge of
those inherent biases that impair ethical decision-making can improve auditors’ defense against
ethical fading, making them less likely to relinquish their professional responsibilities and accede
to their clients’ demands. Furthermore, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, TUAB
(Chapter 2) suggests that auditors should reconsider the substantial weight they attach to a
manager’s attitude and character when evaluating fraud risk. In regards to managers and
organizations, knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow companies to implement controls that
are more effective at preventing ethical fading. In addition, familiarity with those process that
constrain ethical decision-making can help psychologically prepare CEOs and CFOs for when
they are confronted with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud or some other type of
unethical behavior. Finally, Study 1 suggests that regulators acknowledge the difference between
intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the environmental factors that drive such bias,
if they are to draft laws and regulations that are more effective at deterring fraud or other types of
unethical behavior.
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Overview of Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 is to examine how a particular contextual factor, inferior pay
among managers, provokes egocentric perceptions of unfairness and envy to influence the
likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Researchers have started to
investigate CEO reactions to their pay relative to others in the same labor market (Fong, 2010).
Fong (2010), citing Porac, Wade, and Pollack (1999), explains that “the complex causes of
organizational outcomes can motivate, or even necessitate, social comparisons by CEOs and thus
they could recognize the going labor market rate for their services and possible deviations from
such rates” (p. 1099). As such, an executive whose compensation is relatively lower than other
CEOs may perceive this as a threat to his or her competency given that pay structure is
considered to be reflection of one’s importance and managerial abilities (March, 1984). This
perceived threat may motivate the manager to behave in ways that can lead to higher pay (Fong,
2010).
Gino and Pierce (2009) contend that envy towards wealthy targets increases the
likelihood that a person will engage in unethical behavior to reduce any inequality resulting from
those differences in wealth. The results of their study suggest that abundant wealth creates
perceptions of inequity in individuals who function in environments where such abundance is
present. Moreover, Gino and Pierce’s (2009) findings indicate that those perceptions drive
feelings of envy, which, in turn, provokes unethical behavior. Their theoretical argument, and its
empirical support, can be explained by the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading.
Furthermore, Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that their findings can be generalized to fraudulent
behavior. Thus, given that average CEO pay continues to skyrocket, logic would dictate that
9

managers who earn less than their peers may be more likely to succumb to ethical fading and, as
a result, commit fraud.
Study 2 utilizes TUAB (Chapter 2) to predict that a manager who compares his or her pay
to a higher-paid referent will view the discrepancy as more unfair as opposed to a manager who
compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this
perception will create a feeling of envy, which will subsequently increase the probability of
ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is paid less. The hypotheses
were tested using a 1 x 2, between-participants design wherein the participants were asked to sell
assets of given values (ranging from excellent to poor) to a computerized buyer. The
manipulated variable was pay rate, where one group (high-pay rate) earned more money from
each successful transaction than the other (low-pay rate). Before each attempted sale, the
participants had the option to change (i.e., misrepresent) the asset’s value from what was initially
provided. Intrinsically, there existed an incentive for the participant to misrepresent low quality
assets as high since selling assets disclosed at higher qualities would have resulted in larger
payouts. The participants’ egocentric perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy, ethical fading,
and rate of misrepresentation were measured during the experiment.
The findings indicate that a person who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to perceive
this disparity as unfair, which leads to a feeling of envy. Envy, however, had no significant direct
effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, but a supplemental analysis suggests that one’s
risk preference may moderate this relationship. The primary results of this study, although
somewhat mixed, suggest that individuals who cede to ethical fading are more likely to engage in
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fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, are significant psychological
processes that explain how differences in compensation can induce fraud.
The main contributions of Study 2 are that it both provides initial support of TUAB
(Chapter 2) and identifies a contextual factor that can impair one’s ability to act ethically. In
addition, Study 2 presents evidence that the decision to engage in fraud is not necessarily the
result of one consciously forsaking his or her morals for some other desired goal (e.g., profit).
Finally, the supplemental analysis in this study suggests that future research using TUAB
(Chapter 2) should consider how individual characteristics (e.g., personality traits) might affect
the processes proposed in the model.

Overview of Study 3
The purpose of Study 3 is to examine how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts may
trigger psychological processes that, in turn, influence the likelihood of a manager engaging in
ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Wyatt (2004) argues that the ambiguous nature of some
FASB standards allow for “gaming the system” (p. 52). Supporting this claim, Xu, Taylor, and
Dugan’s (2007) review of the earnings management literature states that managers do, in fact,
“take advantage of the accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate accruals through
accounting choices and estimates” (p. 195). Given the line drawn between “clever earnings
management” and outright fraud is not necessarily distinct, a manager can become too aggressive
in meeting earnings targets and, according to Murphy and Dacin (2011), commit fraud without
the awareness that he or she is behaving unethically. Why some managers may unknowingly
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commit fraud in order to meet earnings expectations can perhaps be attributed to the effects of
bounded ethicality and ethical fading.
Study 3 utilizes TUAB (Chapter 2) to hypothesize that a manager who falls below an
earnings target will engineer the egocentric perspective that he or she did not reach the goal
because of unfair circumstances. In addition, Study 3 predicts that this egocentric perspective
will generate a general negative affect, which will subsequently increase the likelihood of ethical
fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below earnings targets. Finally,
this study hypothesizes that an individual who is close to, yet still below, a target is more likely
to commit fraud than either one who has already surpassed it or one who is more distant from
that goal. Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task similar to Study 2 were conducted to
test the predictions. In both experiments, participants were advised that they could earn a bonus
if a particular earnings target was reached based on their performance in the asset-selling task. In
Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the participant, who was given one of three
earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), had reached his or her respective goal before the final
round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3 design where the independent, manipulated variable
was the participant’s proximity to the earnings target (i.e., reached, near, or far) after the
penultimate round of the asset-selling task. The participants’ egocentric perceptions, negative
affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or observed across the two
experiments.
Similar to Study 2, the primary findings of this study, albeit mixed, suggest that fraud is
more likely to occur as an individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading. Furthermore,
the results from Study 3 indicate that those people who are closest to meeting an earnings target
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possess the highest probability of engaging in fraudulent behavior. However, the results of this
study did not support the predictions that an individual’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and
negative affect influence his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting.
The main contributions of Study 3 are that it identifies a psychological process suggested
by bounded ethicality that constrains one’s ability to make an ethical decision in addition to an
important contextual element that triggers this process. That is, the pressure to meet earnings
targets can influence a manager to engage in fraudulent behavior through the mechanism of
ethical fading. As such, Study 3 provides additional evidence that the decision to commit fraud is
not necessarily a deliberate trade-off between ethics and some other desired goal.

Overall Contributions
The dissertation provides three important contributions to the accounting and ethics
literatures. The first contribution is that it consolidates disparate, but related, theories and
concepts from psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory (TUAB) that
includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. As discussed in Study 1, TUAB
(Chapter 2) has the potential to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different
functional areas of accounting research. Furthermore, this dissertation extends the work of
Murphy and Dacin’s (2011) framework that identifies the psychological pathways an individual
may follow when making the decision to engage in fraud. They contend that contextual factors
(e.g., the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts) may compel a manager to unintentionally engage
in fraudulent behavior. This dissertation offers a more detailed understanding of this
phenomenon through its inclusion of the bounded ethicality and ethical fading concepts. The
13

second contribution of this dissertation is that it serves as an initial test of, and support for,
TUAB. In particular, it provides evidence that, through the mechanism of ethical fading,
unethical behavior is not necessarily the result of one consciously forsaking his or her ethics for
some other desired goal (i.e., profit). Finally, this dissertation identifies some of the
psychological processes suggested by bounded ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an
ethical decision as well as two important contextual factors (i.e., pay inequities and earnings
targets) that provokes those processes.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY OF UNINTENDED AMORAL BEHAVIOR: THE EFFECT OF
BOUNDED ETHICALITY ON MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER SYSTEM
1 AND SYSTEM 2 THINKING (STUDY 1)
Introduction
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) note that unethical behavior within organizations
appears to be on the rise despite a considerable amount of effort, time, and money expended to
discourage such conduct. Instances of financial statement fraud support this general observation.
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in order to restore the public’s trust in
capital markets that had eroded because of an outbreak of fraud in the late 1990s and early
2000s. SOX, with deterring and preventing fraud as its chief objectives, sought to enhance
regulations regarding internal controls, financial disclosure, corporate governance, and auditor
independence. As such, this legislation initiated profound changes to the U.S. financial reporting
system, especially with respect to management’s responsibility over financial reporting.
A provision embedded within SOX requires both the CEO and CFO to certify that the
company’s financial statements and disclosures accurately represent the economic condition of
their organization and imposes severe criminal penalties and fines for those who knowingly signoff on fraudulent information. However, despite SOX’s rigorous rules, penalties, and fines, along
with the other concerted endeavors to improve corporate behavior, incidents of financial
statement fraud seem to be rising, worldwide. PricewaterhouseCoopers’s latest biennial report on
global economic crime shows the percentage of surveyed participants (members within an
organization) who experienced accounting fraud within a twelve-month period has increased
from 10 percent in 2003 to 24 percent in 2011 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). One possible
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reason that explains SOX’s inability to curtail fraud is the law’s reliance on a flawed assumption
about unethical behavior in general. That is, unethical behavior is a result of one intentionally
sacrificing his or her ethics for some other desired goal (e.g., meeting analysts’ expectations).
The psychological explanation for fraud, at first, appears simple. That is, greed motivates
a dishonest individual to misreport. However, this seems to be too simplistic of an explanation as
there are many dishonest and “aggressively acquisitive” people who are law abiding and never
commit fraud (Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). Understanding why managers engage in fraud may
require a more nuanced investigation into the manager’s psychological processes that are
involved in decision-making. In particular, those inherent biases and heuristics aimed at
preserving one’s sense of self-worth that, when activated, may constrain his or her ability to
make an ethical decision. As such, the purpose of this chapter is to unify disparate theories and
ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of
Unintended Amoral Behavior (hereafter, TUAB), that explains how certain psychological
processes may direct a person to unintentionally engage in fraudulent financial reporting through
ethical fading, a mechanism that strips ethical considerations from decision-making (Tenbrunsel
& Messick, 2004).
Rather than the “predator” fraudster who is greedy and opportunistic, evidence indicates
that fraud is usually perpetrated by the “accidental fraudster.” The accidental fraudster is one
who is generally considered a decent, law-abiding citizen that, under normal circumstances,
would have never contemplated engaging in accounting fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher,
& Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, (ACFE, 2012) reveals
that most fraudsters fit this description in that they are typically trusted employees who are first20

time offenders and have clean employment histories. Anecdotally, Charles Niemeier, former
chief accountant for the enforcement division of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), stated that "[p]eople who never intend to do something wrong end up finding themselves
in situations where they are almost forced to continue to commit fraud once they have started
doing this. Otherwise, it will be revealed that they had used improper accounting in the earlier
periods" (quoted from Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002, p. 100). These comments
suggest that initial acts of fraud may be unintentional. However, SOX, as well as most laws,
definitions, and concepts regarding fraud, assume that such behavior is intentional. An
understating of the psychological mechanisms that limit one's ethical decision-making, referred
to as bounded ethicality, may thus offer potential contributions to auditors, management,
regulators, and researchers in regards to how each address fraudulent financial reporting.
With respect to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual
factors contribute towards bounded ethicality may result in improved fraud detection. In
addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, TUAB suggests that auditors might
reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s character and attitude when
conducting fraud risk assessments. In regards to organizations and managers, knowledge of
bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud controls aimed at mitigating
the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore, understanding one’s own biases
and heuristics may help CEOs and CFOs be more psychologically prepared when confronted
with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud. This chapter suggests to regulators that
recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors
that drive such bias, is needed to establish more effective fraud deterrents. Finally, this chapter
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contributes to the ethics and accounting literatures by introducing a model that distinguishes
between intentional and unintentional behavior by considering the systematic, psychological
errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors
that exacerbate those errors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs and describes
a model of bounded ethicality in addition to providing background information on the current
gaps in accounting research. Section 3 articulates TUAB’s implications to the accounting
literature by discussing future avenues of research that may utilize this theory. Finally, Section 4
provides a detailed examination of the chapter’s contributions.

Background and Theoretical Model
Cressey’s (1950, 1953) Fraud Triangle assists with understanding the accidental fraudster
(Dorminey et al., 2012). Initially proposed to explain embezzlement, this framework was later
expanded by both researchers and regulators to include fraudulent financial reporting
(Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley, 2013). According to the Fraud Triangle, three
conditions are typically present when fraud occurs. First, the individual has an incentive or
perceives a pressure to commit fraud. The second condition is that weak internal controls (which
include management’s ability to override controls) must be present to provide the opportunity for
one to engage in the act. Finally, the individual must be able to either rationalize the fraud to be
consistent with his or her moral principles or possess some attitude, ethical principle, or character
trait that allows that person to knowingly and intentionally commit a fraudulent act (Ramos,
2003).
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The Fraud Triangle has also been utilized by researchers as both theoretical support (e.g.,
Murphy, 2012) and a means of organizing the literature related to fraud (e.g., Trompeter et al.,
2013). Much of the accounting research, however, has focused on the incentives/pressures and
opportunities elements of the Fraud Triangle while the rationalization component has received
the least amount of consideration (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, & Velury, 2008; Murphy & Dacin,
2011; Trompeter et al., 2013; Wells, 2004). As such, there is a dearth of research regarding the
psychological processes that enable a manager to justify fraudulent action. In addition, we have
limited knowledge of how contextual factors, such as semi-static environmental influences (e.g.,
one’s corporate culture) and situation-specific considerations (e.g., time pressure), interact to
affect how a person rationalizes. Recent research on bounded ethicality and ethical fading
provides a foundation for explaining how psychological processes, specifically, common biases
and heuristics, can limit one’s ability to recognize a situation as having ethical implications, thus
allowing that person to act against his or her moral code.
Embedded in laws such as SOX is the common supposition that unethical behavior is the
result of bad actors consciously engaging in self-interested behavior at the expense of doing what
is right. However, Messick and Bazerman (1996) argue against the perspective that executive
ethics is primarily based on explicit tradeoffs between moral standards and profit. That is, ethical
decision-making is not necessarily a rational, linear thought process as it is described in Rest’s
(1986) or Kohlberg’s (1973) models. Rather, they contend that efforts to improve ethical
decision-making are better aimed at understanding our psychological tendencies and, as
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008) claim, the research examining the roles played by emotions,
the subconscious, and intuition in our decisions highlights the incompleteness of rationalist
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models. Furthermore, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2010) state that “if self-interest were
computed rationally as an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias
would be as simple as increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46). In contrast to the
traditional frameworks of ethics, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) proposed the concept of
bounded ethicality.
Bounded ethicality refers to “systematic and predictable psychological processes” which
allow one to engage in unethical behavior that is inconsistent with his or her moral standards
(Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman 2010, p. 7). These processes include
systemic errors, specifically, self-serving biases and heuristics, which inhibit one’s ability to
make an ethical decision (Chugh et al. 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism,
and a tendency to overclaim credit are all specific examples of biases that researchers in
behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making
(Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological tendencies operate
at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded
ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her awareness of doing
so. This is accomplished through the mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological
constraints fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel &
Messick, 2004). Bounded ethicality and ethical fading may offer a considerable degree of
explanatory power with respect to decision-making in a fraud context. However, theoretical
models are typically scarce in relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics (Tenbrunsel &
Smith-Crowe, 2008).
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Research in psychology suggests that people, in general, value ethical behavior (Gino et
al, 2011). As such, individuals are compelled to view and present themselves as moral and
honest (Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1998) because of both the rewards to the self
(i.e., maintains psychological well-being and a sense of self-worth) and the benefits derived from
having a reputation of high moral character (Baston, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, & Wilson,
1997). Most people, however, believe themselves to be more ethical than their peers
(Tenbrunsel, 1998), overestimate the degree to which they will engage in behaviors that are
socially acceptable in the future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), and perceive their own questionable
actions as less objectionable than others performing similar actions (Valdesolo & DeSteno,
2007). Furthermore, research indicates that individuals have a propensity to exhibit “moral
hypocrisy” wherein they present themselves as ethical, even while acting in a manner that
conflicts with their views of morality (Baston, et al., 1997). Thus, an interesting question exists
regarding how people are able to engage in behavior they would otherwise find unacceptable, or
even reprehensible, while maintaining the belief that they are moral and honest. An
understanding of two concepts from behavioral ethics and psychology, bounded ethicality and
ethical fading, is an important step in addressing this question. However, in order to have a more
fundamental understanding of these concepts, the “want” versus “should-self” distinction should
first be examined.

“Want-self” versus “Should-self” Distinction
Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (1998) proposed the “want-self” versus
“should-self” distinction as a framework for understanding intrapersonal conflict (Tenbrunsel et
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al., 2010). The “should-self” is characterized as rational, thoughtful, and “cool-headed,” and is
believed to embody our ethical intentions and beliefs that we should act in accordance with our
moral principles (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). Conversely, the emotional, impulsive, and “hot
headed” “want-self” is conceived as an expression of one’s self-interested desires and needs
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). There exists a temporal element in the conflict between the “wantselves” and “should-selves” in that the “self” which dominates a person’s thoughts varies as that
individual proceeds through the stages of predicting his or her behavior (the prediction phase),
engaging in a behavior (the action phase), and then recollecting on the behavior performed (the
recollection phase) (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). The “want-self” versus “should-self”
distinction is represented in Figure 1.

The Prediction Phase
When an individual is making predictions about his or her future behavior, the “shouldself” is believed to be in control (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). The abstract nature of anticipating
how one will behave in a particular scenario allows the individual to rationally and deliberatively
evaluate alternative actions and choose the behavior that is most consistent with his or her
general attitude and moral principles. Essentially, during the prediction phase, people recognize
how they should act (i.e., according to their respective moral principles) and believe that they
will behave ethically if found in a situation similar to a particular hypothetical scenario
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Research, however, has demonstrated that individuals are
prone to commit forecast errors when predicting behavior (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011;
Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003).
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When making predictions, there are several factors, which limit a person’s ability to
predict accurately his or her ethical behavior in a particular situation. One such factor is that
individuals often fail to consider what their motivations will be during the action phase and, as a
result, will commit attribution errors in their predictions (Diekmann et al., 2003). That is, people
believe that their general dispositions will dictate future behavior while failing to consider the
situational influences that may actually motivate their behavior. Trope and Lieberman (2003)
illustrate the attribution bias that may be exhibited when predicting one’s behavior by utilizing
an example where an individual decides whether to donate blood. When a person is asked to
donate blood at a future date, that individual’s general attitude, or disposition, towards giving
blood will be the dominant influence on his or her decision to volunteer. However, when the day
arrives for that person to make the donation, situation-specific factors such as the location and
time of the collection are more likely to influence his or her behavior. Another factor which leads
to forecast errors, as discussed by Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, and Griffin (2000), is
that an individual’s predictions of his or her behavior are more of a reflection of that person’s
hopes and desires rather than a realistic understanding of the self. Furthermore, Epley and
Dunning (2000) argue that one’s predictions about ethical behavior tend to be overly optimistic
and motivated by self-aggrandizement. Finally, predicting how one will behave in a given
scenario takes place in a relatively “consequence-free” environment wherein the individual does
not incur any real costs (i.e., social repercussions) from the choices he or she makes (Bazerman
& Tenbrunsel, 2011). These factors help explain why there is a disparity between one’s
predictions of ethical behavior and his or her actual behavior in the action phase.
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The Action Phase
When the time comes for the individual to make a decision, one’s rational “should-self”
yields to his or her impulsive, emotional “want-self” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). At this stage, the
individual is no longer afforded the opportunity to think abstractly or in general terms as he or
she is confronted with the concrete realities of the situation. The contextual factors, or pressures,
of the situation are interpreted through “systematic and predictable psychological processes”
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) which “fade” consideration of the ethical implications resulting from
one’s decision or behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). As such, the person’s thoughts
regarding what he or she wants to do replace those of how one should act (Bazerman &
Tenbrunsel, 2011), essentially giving that individual a “psychological license” to behave in a
self-interested manner. Thus, one’s probability of engaging in an unethical behavior increases
when the “want-self” is given free reign. Bounded ethicality and ethical fading, as discussed later
in this section, may help explain why the “want-self” yields to “should-self” during the action
phase.

The Recollection Phase
As the person moves beyond the action phase, the pressures present at the time of the
behavior have diminished and that individual may return to thinking in abstract and general
terms. As such, the “should-self” reasserts control when one is reflecting upon his or her
behavior during the recollection phase (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). During this phase, or at
least once the person is past the action phase, an unethical behavior may become the new
standard if it represents just a slight deviation from one’s typical, perhaps moral, behavior. This
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is because the difference between the unethical behavior and one’s normal behavior is
unnoticeable (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).1 As such, the person may continue without any
adjustment to his or her behavior. However, if confronted with the idea that one might have
behaved unethically, cognitive dissonance may occur (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith,
1959) as there will be an inconsistency between the person’s unethical behavior and his or her
self-image as an ethical individual.
Cognitive dissonance may produce unpleasant feelings such as guilt (Bandura, 1991,
1999; Sykes & Matza, 1957) that in turn will motivate the individual to change either his or her
behavior or attitude to reduce any negative affect (Bandura, 1991, 1999; Festinger, 1957; Sykes
& Matza, 1957). As it is typically easier to change one’s beliefs rather than actions that have
already occurred (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), the individual is likely to utilize a particular
rationalization, moral disengagement, or neutralization technique to make the unethical behavior
acceptable in his or her mind.2 For example, research by Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2010)
indicates that individuals working in an environment that is permissive towards cheating will
minimize the degree to which they see cheating as a moral issue (e.g., adopt the attitude that
everyone cheats). Essentially, this act of changing one’s standards of ethical behavior allows the
person to preserve his or her self-image as a moral person while behaving in ways that violate his
or her personal code of ethics (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011).

1

In fact, a deviation between an unethical behavior and one’s normal behavior may be so slight that the person does

not feel motivated to reflect upon that particular unethical action.
2

See Murphy & Dacin (2011) for a discussion regarding the various types of rationalization, moral disengagement,

and neutralization techniques that are used to justify one’s behavior, especially acts of fraud.
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Summary of “Want-self” versus “Should-self” Distinction
The “want-self” versus “should-self” framework offers an initial, temporal explanation
as to how an individual may act in ways that violate his or her own moral code while preserving
a self-image as an ethical person. In the action phase of this framework, it is posited that
unethical behavior may occur when contextual stimuli, or pressures, interact with certain
psychological processes to fade the consideration of ethical implications at the time of the
decision (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), thus allowing “want-self” to assume control
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). A question remains, however, as to how this interaction leads to ethical
fading. Research on bounded ethicality (Bazerman, 2011; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) may provide a
structure for addressing this question.

Bounded Ethicality
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010, p. 7).3 These psychological processes include inherent
biases and heuristics, which inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh et al., 2005).
Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim credit are all
specific examples of biases that researchers in behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of
3

Bounded ethicality is derived from Simon’s (1983) concept of bounded rationality, which states that human

rationality is constrained and thus limited, by both contextual features and the individual’s computational abilities.
Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) applied Simon’s (1983) concept of boundedness, which was extend by Thaler
(1996), to ethical decision making.
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bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji et al., 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these
psychological processes operate at a subconscious level (Gino et al., 2011), the most insidious
aspect of bounded ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her
awareness of doing so. A theoretical model as to how bounded ethicality may influence ethical
fading during the action phase is represented by Figure 2. What follows is an explanation of how
bounded ethicality can lead to an unethical decision, as well as the critical role that ethical fading
plays in this process.

Contextual Stimuli/Pressures
Kern and Chugh (2009) demonstrate that contextual factors such as time pressure, for
example, can have an impact on one’s ethical behavior. Additionally, studies involving the
priming effect suggest that even unnoticed stimuli may significantly affect one’s thoughts and
actions (Kahneman, 2011). Despite the substantial influence that contextual stimuli may have on
behavior, however, most individuals underestimate the degree to which these factors can
influence their actions (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). One explanation for this
underestimation is that individuals, in general, view their respective moral identities as static and
constantly active.
Wade-Benzoni, Li, Thompson, and Bazerman (2007) argue that although there are core
traits of an individual that are static and thus generally unresponsive to changes, there are many
other attributes which may become salient given the context of the situation or the individual’s
motivated state. Therefore, one’s moral identity may be more of a “working self-concept” that is
based on his or her social experiences rather than a static view of the self. In addition, Aquino,
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Freeman, Reed II, Lim, and Felps (2009) argue that environmental factors can effectively
“neutralize” one’s moral identity. For example, Murphy and Dacin (2011) point to a company
that condones unethical behavior as one such factor that can overwhelm an individual’s
predisposition not to commit financial statement fraud. Combining these arguments suggests that
an individual’s moral identity is neither static nor always active, and that contextual factors may
have a significant influence on such an identity. By translating these concepts into the
terminology of bounded ethicality, I argue that semi-static environmental factors such as one’s
corporate culture interact with other situational or task-specific factors to provoke certain biases
and heuristics. In turn, the elicitation of these biases and heuristics results in the individual
evaluating and interpreting the contextual stimuli not through a rigid moral lens, but in a manner
free of moral considerations and influenced by the specific details of that context. What follows
are explanations as to how particular biases and heuristics can lead to unethical behavior under
two distinct systems of decision-making (see Figure 2).

Unethical Behavior under System 1 Thinking
Kahneman (2011) describes decision-making as having two distinct modes of cognitive
processing, labeled System 1 and System 2 thinking. The primary function of System 1 is to
construct links among ideas of contexts, events, actions, and consequences that frequently
coincide. These associations create a working model that facilitates one’s understanding of his or
her environment, establishes a narrative for the events of that individual’s life, and develops
expectations for the future. Kahneman (2011) characterizes System 1 thinking as automatic,
intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. That is, System 1 evaluates contextual stimuli
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“automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control”
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). In contrast, System 2 is deliberative, capable of reasoning, and
associated with self-control. The primary function of System 2 thinking is to monitor the
continuous intuitions, intentions, impressions, and feelings intimated by System 1. Essentially,
one’s intuitions regarding a particular scenario are a product of the primitive evaluations carried
out by System 1. However, these intuitions are subject to the systematic errors, or cognitive
biases and heuristics, that are embedded within System 1 and activated under specified
conditions (Kahneman, 2011).

Biases and Heuristics
Caruso, Epley, and Bazerman (2006) argue that an individual’s perspective must
necessarily affect his or her interpretation of environmental stimuli since the world can only be
experienced through one’s own senses. As such, research indicates that an individual is often not
able to interpret information in an unbiased way, even when it is so desired (Babcock &
Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). This interpretation, and the
subsequent weighting, of environmental stimuli are especially subject to biases related to
egocentrism.
Egocentric biases are intended to maintain a person’s sense of self-worth such as the need
to see him or herself as moral, competent, and deserving (Chugh et al., 2005). In a dilemma
where a person’s self-worth is threatened, an individual is more motivated to avoid negative
perceptions of the self (e.g. “I am not competent”) rather than pursue positive ones (e.g., “I am
moral”) (Kahneman, 2011). As such, the need to maintain one’s self-worth can often lead to a
33

skewed interpretation of stimuli that favors the individual’s preference for a particular outcome
(Messick & Sentis, 1983) or results in the perception that the most beneficial outcome to him or
her is the most “fair,” or both (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As discussed in Bazerman &
Tenbrunsel (2011), an individual first determines his or her preference, based on self-interest, for
a particular outcome and then legitimizes that preference by redefining the characteristics (i.e.,
the importance of those characteristics) which influence his or her perspective of fairness
(Messick & Sentis, 1979; Messick & Sentis, 1983). This is consistent with Kunda’s (1990)
Theory of Motivated Reasoning, which posits that individuals can be unknowingly biased toward
reaching a preferred outcome.
Since one automatically interprets information egocentrically (Epley & Caruso, 2004),
that is, evaluates contextual stimuli on the basis of how those factors affect one’s sense of selfworth, objective assessments of a situation may be challenging (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006). As
discussed in Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman (2006), an individual will search for evidence that
justifies his or her action which effectuates a preferred, self-interested outcome while evaluating
more critically, or completely discounting, evidence that does not support the selection of that
desired action (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky,
Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). In addition, evidence
supporting the individual’s desired action is often weighted more than that which does not
(Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Messick & Sentis, 1979). Furthermore,
because these automatic and primitive evaluations happen so quickly and effortlessly, a person’s
perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).
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Affect-laden Intuition
Not only are contextual stimuli interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they may
also elicit an emotional reaction in a person (Slovic, 1999). If the stimuli produce negative affect,
then the individual will be motivated to reduce those unpleasant feelings without engaging in
more deliberative thinking (Kahneman, 2011). As such, visceral responses tend to dominate at
the time a decision is made (Loewenstein, 1996). In addition to the incentive to swiftly resolve
any negative affect, Murphy and Dacin (2011) argue that the individual may rely on his or her
“affect-laden moral intuition” (i.e., a “gut feeling”) to determine whether a potentially unethical
action to address a particular situation is acceptable. However, whereas Murphy and Dacin
(2011) postulate that one will utilize affect-laden intuition to guide behavior once he or she is
aware the potential act in question is fraudulent, I contend it is affect-laden intuition which may
prevent one from recognizing the potential act of fraud as unethical.
Haidt (2011) asserts that moral judgment is often rendered by quick intuition. This may
be due to the “affect heuristic,” which refers to how one’s intuitions, formed by the automatic
and rapid emotions that precede cognition, are used as a basis to guide the person’s decisions and
subsequent behaviors (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane, Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson,
2000). Kahneman (2011) contends that the affect heuristic is an instance of substitution. That is,
System 1 answers a more difficult question (e.g., does this particular decision have ethical
implications?) by automatically substituting and answering an easier one (e.g., how do I feel
about this decision as opposed to its alternatives?). Thus, how the person feels with respect to
each alternative decision will determine whether he or she engages in ethical fading and, as a
result, unethical behavior.
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Ethical Fading and Unethical Behavior
Kahneman (2011) states that individuals are overconfident in (i.e., biased towards) their
intuitions derived from automatic cognitive processes such as the affect heuristic. A person’s
behavior, therefore, is not necessarily the result of a conscious, reasoned decision to forsake his
or her ethics in order to satisfy some other desire. Rather, one’s behavior in an ethical dilemma is
more “emotion driven” that is subject to the biased and automatic cognitive processes of System
1 thinking. Accordingly, if a potential unethical act may relieve any negative affect experienced
in a particular dilemma, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest that such
an act is “good” or, at least, appropriate, in that it is the most emotionally appealing. This desire
to assuage visceral impulses can lead to ethical fading wherein the “moral colors of an ethical
decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick,
2004, p. 224), thus increasing the probability that one engages in unethical behavior without that
individual’s awareness that he or she is doing so. An application of bounded ethicality and
ethical fading to a dilemma involving a manager failing to meet analysts’ expectations can help
synthesize these concepts and illustrate their role in influencing unethical behavior under System
1 thinking. Before applying these concepts, however, a brief discussion is necessary to
differentiate ethical fading from other similar terms.
In the ethics literature, ethical fading has yet to be clearly distinguished from other
related concepts such as ethical sensitivity, moral disengagement, neutralization, and
rationalization. Hunt and Vitell (1992) characterize ethical sensitivity as an individual trait that
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enables one to recognize a situation as having ethical implications.4 As such, ethical sensitivity
may be related to ethical fading in that one who is more aware of the moral implications of
situation may be less inclined to fade ethically.
With respect to moral disengagement, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, and Mayer (2012)
argue that Bandura (2002) views this concept as a personal characteristic wherein the propensity
to employ mechanisms of disengagement varies across people. Murphy and Dacin (2011) view
neutralization and rationalization as different terms that describe the same construct as moral
disengagement. That is, a mechanism which allows one to change his or her perception of either
a situation or action, or both, in order to justify any potential or past behavior. One may infer
from this conceptualization that utilizing one’s ability to disengage (or neutralize or rationalize)
is a conscious strategy employed by the decision maker. Ethical fading, in contrast, is the result
of a subconscious processes. Thus, there is not a “conscious” decision to fade the implications
from one’s decision.
Whether moral disengagement is an antecedent to (e.g., Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer,
2008), or is a consequence of (e.g., Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011), unethical behavior is still an
empirical question. Haidt (2001), however, contends that emotional reactions drive one’s
judgments and only afterwards does the person engage in reasoning that is more deliberate to
justify his or her reactions. As such, if moral disengagement is a consequence, then ethical fading
may explain the process that leads to an unethical act while disengagement describes how the
individual “copes” with that behavior. Conversely, if it is an antecedent, then ethical fading may
perhaps be a competing explanation for unethical behavior.
4

The term “moral awareness” is one that is used synonymously with ethical sensitivity.
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Example of Unethical Behavior under System 1 Thinking.
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) state that executives often depend on System 1 thinking
given both the demands of their position and the hectic atmosphere in which they operate.
Murphy and Dacin (2011) discuss how one such demand, the importance placed on management
to meet analysts’ forecasts, can motivate an individual to act unintentionally in an unethical
manner in order to achieve a particular goal. The effects of bounded ethicality and ethical fading
under System 1 thinking can explain why some managers may unwittingly engage in
unscrupulous behavior, that is, financial statement fraud, to meet these analysts’ expectations.
Xu, Taylor, and Dugan’s (2007) review of the real earnings management literature
suggests that managers “take advantage of the accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate
accruals through accounting choices and estimates” (p. 195). Furthermore, Burgstahler and
Eames (2006) provide evidence that managers avoid issuing earnings statements that are below
analysts’ expectations. This is accomplished by both upwardly managing reported earnings and
downwardly managing the expectations of analysts. Thus, as argued by Murphy and Dacin
(2011), management appears preoccupied with meeting analysts’ estimates and will take
advantage of nebulous accounting standards (i.e., manage earnings) in order to reach these goals.
However, as the line between “clever earnings management” and outright fraud is sometimes
indistinct, a manager can be too aggressive in meeting these targets and commit financial
statement fraud without the awareness that he or she is acting unethically. In terms of bounded
ethicality, this is likely due to a semi-static environmental factor (i.e., the pressure to meet
analysts’ expectations) provoking particular biases and heuristics which, in turn, fade any
consideration of the ethical implications in one’s decision.
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As previously discussed, egocentric biases, such as one’s need to see himself or herself as
moral, competent, and deserving, function to maintain an individual’s sense of self-worth
(Chugh et al., 2005). These biases can be exaggerated under conditions of uncertainty (Bazerman
& Tenbrunsel, 2011), which the interpretation of accounting standards can sometimes produce.
As such, one’s sense of both competency and deservingness as an executive may feel threatened
if his or her company is unlikely to meet analysts’ expectations. However, if the CEO is able to
push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP and achieve these targets, that manager is
likely to prefer such an option because of the desire to uphold his or her sense of self-worth.
Consequently, the manager will subconsciously search and place more emphasis on the evidence
which supports the option to violate GAAP while evaluating more critically, or completely
discounting, the evidence which does not support that option. The pressure to achieve analysts’
targets may not only result in the individual interpreting the contextual stimuli in a biased,
egocentric manner which favors the decision to push beyond the boundaries of GAAP, but it can
also encourage risk-seeking behavior.
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) maintains that outcomes that
exceed a reference point are considered psychological gains and those below are losses.
Correspondingly, analysts’ estimates serve as a natural reference point (i.e., the status quo) for
the management of public corporations (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). As such, the chance of not
meeting forecasts, along with the forfeiture of benefits (e.g., stock options) that are normally
associated with reaching such goals, is going to register as a psychological loss for a CEO.
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) further posits that people respond to
relative, rather than absolute, changes in wealth and that individuals are loss averse (i.e., losses
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loom larger than gains). Kahneman (2011) claims that loss aversion is embedded within System
1 thinking and encourages risk seeking when an individual is faced with two “bad” options
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). That is, when given the option between a guaranteed loss of
status and income (staying with the boundaries of GAAP and not meeting analysts’ estimates)
and a riskier option (violating GAAP to meet earnings forecasts), an individual will choose the
latter (Moore et al., 2006; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004). Finally, in addition to
inducing risk-seeking behavior, experiencing a loss by not meeting analysts’ targets may also
evoke strong, negative emotions (Kahneman, 2011).
Extending Kahneman’s (2001) thinking to a managerial setting I would expect that, along
with the unpleasant emotion prompted by a potential loss, the threat to a manager’s sense of selfworth will elicit negative affect. That is, not achieving the critical goal of meeting forecasts
suggests to the manager that he or she is not suited for an executive position. This creates an
uncomfortable conflict within the individual (i.e., cognitive dissonance) since the person has the
psychological need to see him or herself as competent, “good” at that particular job, intelligent,
and so forth. Additionally, the manager may deem the situation of not meeting analysts’ targets
as “unfair” since he or she deserves the benefits (e.g., stock options) that are associated with
reaching such goals, especially given the amount of work that an executive position requires. The
manager will be motivated to reduce the negative feelings created from both the sense of loss and
the attacks on his or her ego and will, as a result, rely on an affect-laden moral intuition to
determine whether violating GAAP is acceptable.
The manager is likely to depend on an affect heuristic where the negative emotions
produced by not meeting analysts’ forecasts serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. Thus,
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the executive automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?)
with an easier one (how does choosing this particular option make me feel?). At this point,
ethical fading has transpired and the manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests that contravening
GAAP, in which the evidence supporting this option has been skewed in its favor, is appropriate
as it will relieve the negative emotions experienced in this scenario. However, if the manager has
ambiguous or conflicting intuitions about this decision, then he or she may utilize a more
deliberate reasoning approach (Murphy & Dacin, 2011) that is consistent with System 2
thinking.

Unethical Behavior under System 2 Thinking.
Kahneman (2011) states that System 2, as opposed to the impulsive and intuitive nature
of System 1, is cautious, deliberative, capable of reasoning, and associated with self-control. One
of the main tasks of System 2 thinking is to monitor the continuous intuitions, intentions,
impressions, and feelings suggested by System 1. Additionally, System 2 has the ability to exert
control in difficult situations (i.e., instances of cognitive strain), such as when one’s intuitions are
unclear or conflicting, and expend the additional energy required for logical analysis, expression
of judgments, and making choices. System 2 is thus considered the final authority in decisionmaking as it is able to resist the suggestions of System 1. Although one is more likely to behave
ethically if he or she is able to utilize System 2 (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), this mode of
thought shouldn’t be considered a perfect model of rationality (Kahneman, 2011) given both its
operational limitations that are a result of the structuration between the two systems to divide
cognitive labor and its dependence on biased knowledge used to frame the situation.
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Typically, System 2 operates without putting forth much effort and passively accepts the
suggestions of System 1 with little or no modification (Kahneman, 2011). The division of labor
between Systems 1 and 2 is structured for the sake of optimizing cognitive performance while
minimizing effort (Kahneman, 2011). Addressing the ethical implications of a dilemma requires
the deliberate reasoning of System 2, however, but its indolence for the sake of cognitive
efficiency prevents such analyses. Kahneman (2011) also states that questioning one’s intuitions
is uncomfortable, which helps reinforce the inertness of System 2. Yet, despite its general
“laziness,” System 2 will put forth effort when prompted to do so by System 1 (Kahneman,
2011).
Traditional models of ethical decision-making such as Rest’s (1986) assert that moral
reasoning precedes moral judgment (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Conversely, Haidt (2001)
argues that it is emotional reactions that drive one’s judgments and only afterwards does the
person engage in more deliberate reasoning to justify his or her reactions (Bazerman &
Tenbrunsel, 2011). Thus, rationalizing the emotions generated in System 1 is a characteristic of
System 2, making it more of an “apologist” for the affect-laden intuitions of System 1 rather than
a critic of them (Kahneman, 2011). Accordingly, if one’s affect-laden intuition is unambiguously
leading that person towards an unethical decision, then System 2 is not likely to engage and will
passively endorse the option. However, if the individual’s intuition is unclear or conflicting, then
he or she is inclined to utilize the reasoning capabilities of System 2. A problem exists, though,
in that System 2 depends on System 1’s egocentric interpretation of the contextual stimuli to
conduct its analyses.
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As discussed earlier, under System 1 thinking, an individual will search for evidence that
justifies pursuing a preferred outcome while assessing more critically, or completely discounting,
evidence that does not support the selection of that desired action (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman,
2006). In addition, evidence supporting the individual’s preferred option is often given more
weight than that which does not (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Messick
& Sentis, 1979). Since these automatic and crude evaluations happen so quickly and effortlessly,
a person’s perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).
The end result is that one subconsciously excludes relevant and important information while
including and overweighting that which is irrelevant or simply not as important, (referred to as
“bounded awareness”), thus distorting the type of decision the person thinks he or she is making
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Consequently, System 2’s reliance on biased information may
allow the individual to frame his or her decision as an “economic” or “legal” dilemma rather than
one that has ethical implications.

Reasoning Utilizing a Non-ethical Decision Frame
Neale, Huber, and Northcraft (1987) argue that both task-responsive and contextual
stimuli can frame a person’s decision in systematic and predictable ways. As such, various
“mixtures” of contextual, situational, and task-specific factors may result in different decision
frames that, in turn, bring about different responses. Pillutla and Chen (1999) demonstrated the
framing of a social dilemma influences ones’ tendency to cooperate in that situation. In their
study, individuals were less cooperative when presented with a dilemma framed in economic
rather than one framed in non-economic terms, despite both dilemmas having the same payoffs
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(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In addition, problems interpreted as threats or crises may elicit
different responses than those interpreted as opportunities (Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2008).
Both the argument posited by Neale et al. (1987) and the research by Pillutla and Chen (1999)
seem to be consistent with the logic of appropriateness framework.
The logic of appropriateness framework states that a person first identifies what type of
decision he or she perceives to be making and that judgment will in turn determine behaviors,
norms, and expectations (Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). A personal
anecdote from Messick (1999, p. 11-12) helps elucidate the logic of appropriateness framework:
“In the mid-1970s my family and I lived in Bergen, Norway. During the Easter
school break, we joined most Norwegians in going to the mountains for crosscountry skiing. We stayed in a communal cabin in the mountains in western
Norway with six other families. Each family had its own bedrooms, but we shared
the kitchen facilities and dining area. The atmosphere was friendly and
cooperative.
A couple of days before the end of our stay, an announcement was made that
there would be a ping-pong tournament for the residents of the cabin. It would be
a single elimination tournament, handicapped so that children under 14 got a 10point bonus when playing against an adult, and women got a 10-point bonus when
playing against an adult man. A schedule was presented so that every person
knew whom they were to play, winners knew whom they were to play when they
won, and so on.
At the end of the first day of play, I discovered that I was in the final match to be
played the following morning. I was to play a 14 year-old girl. I also discovered
that all of the other adults had lost to children early in the tournament. I was the
only one who had moved forward. I realized then, of course, that this tournament
was designed and intended to have a child as the winner. All of the adults (save
me) understood this. I had a different understanding. My incorrect understanding
was comprehensive. It not only influenced how I played (to win) but also my
expectations of how others would play (to win), my perception of the rules and
norms (everyone will try hard), and my interpretation of outcomes (losers of
matches were not good enough players to overcome the handicap), along with the
attributions these interpretations supported.
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The new interpretation led not only to a different prescription for choice (lose if
you are an adult, especially if you are a man), but also to new expectations about
how others would act (adults will lose), what the rules and norms were (kids
should win, but should not be told that they are being allowed to win), and how I
interpreted the play of the others, especially the men in the cabin (there is nothing
to be learned about skill level from the matches). The skill attributions I had made
from the other vantage point were almost surely incorrect.”
In applying the logic of appropriateness framework to ethical decision-making, one may infer
that the type of decision frame an individual adopts will determine whether he or she recognizes
the situation as having ethical implications (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). That is, people
who view a particular situation as an ethical dilemma (an ethical frame) are morally aware and as
a result will frame the decision as one that has ethical implications. However, those who do not
see the situation as an ethical dilemma (e.g., an economic or legal frame) are not morally aware
and will thus not frame the decision as having ethical consequences. Research by Tenbrunsel and
Messick (1999) demonstrates how interpretations of contextual factors, in the form of adopting
either an ethical or non-ethical decision frame, may influence one’s behavior.
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) investigated how sanctioning systems affect cooperative
behavior in dilemma situations. In two of the three experiments, participants were asked to
assume the role of a manufacturer in a toxic-gas emitting industry and make a decision to adhere
to (cooperate), or defect from, an agreement which would voluntarily reduce their company’s
emissions. The results show that participants were more likely to adopt a non-ethical decision
frame (i.e., an economic frame) in the presence of a sanctioning system, which was designed to
deter defection from the agreement, than those participants not operating under such a system.
Furthermore, the participants under a weak sanctioning system were more likely to defect than
those under a stronger system or those who faced no sanctions at all. Thus, a participant’s
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decision to defect or cooperate depended on both how the participants framed the decision
(ethical vs. economic) and the strength of the sanctioning system. Tenbrunsel and Messick
(1999) proposed a two-stage, “signal processing” model to help explain their results (Tenbrunsel
& Smith-Crowe, 2008).
According to Tenbrunsel & Messick’s (1999) signal processing model, an environmental
factor such as the presence of a sanctioning system has both signaling and processing effects.
That is, the sanctioning system signals to the individual the type of decision he or she is to make.
Based on that signal, an individual adopts a particular decision frame that influences “the unique
processing that occurs within that frame” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 564). Applying
this model to explain Tenbrunsel and Messick’s (1999) results, the presence of a sanctioning
system signaled to the participant that he or she was making a business decision whereupon a
cost-benefit process was to be utilized. Participants under the strong sanctioning system
calculated the potential costs of defection as too high and were thus more likely to cooperate than
those individuals in the weak sanctions manipulation who estimated that the benefits of defection
outweighed the costs. Conversely, as social dilemmas typically give rise to both economic and
ethical considerations (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), the participants not operating under a
system of sanctions were able to focus more on the ethical implications of defecting or
cooperating since their attention was not specifically cued to the economic consequences of their
actions.5 As such, these participants were more likely to adopt an ethical frame and thus process

5

With respect to the non-ethical decision frame, an argument can be made that considerations regarding the ethical

implications of alternative decision are not completely absent from an individual’s decision-making process.
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their decision utilizing a “cooperative” heuristic (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Essentially, one
may infer that the adoption of an ethical decision frame encourages one to consider the ethical
implications of alternative decisions whereas the utilization of a non-ethical frame may lead to a
fading of those considerations.

The Role of Self-Deception and Ethical Fading
Although one’s affect-laden moral intuition may be ambiguous as to whether a potential
unethical act is acceptable, the motivation to reduce any negative affronts to the individual’s selfworth will remain. As such, the person may resort to self-deception. Tenbrunsel and Messick
(2004) propose that self-deception is a key element, which explains the relationship between
environmental cues and how one construes a particular situation. They argue, simply, that
contextual stimuli may activate a self-deception mechanism that, in turn, influences the type of
decision frame one adopts. With respect to egocentric biases, if they are provoked, that is, if the
individual’s sense of self-worth is under attack, then he or she may resort to self-deception in
order to maintain a particular self-image (Tenbrunsel, 2005). As the level of self-deception
required by the individual increases the likelihood that the person will adopt an ethical decision
frame decreases, thus lessening the saliency of the situation’s moral dimensions (Tenbrunsel &
Messick, 2004). Ethical fading occurs since an ethical frame is not adopted, thus increasing the
probability that one engages in unethical behavior without that individual’s awareness that he or

Instead, they may simply be “out of focus” because the individual is primarily focused on the self (Bazerman &
Chugh, 2004).
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she is doing so. Returning to the dilemma of a manager not meeting analysts’ forecasts can help
illustrate the effects of decision framing on ethical fading.

Example of Unethical Behavior under System 2 Thinking
If a manager is not expected to meet analysts’ forecasts, then that person will be
motivated to reduce the negative feelings created from both the sense of loss and the damage to
his or her ego. As a result, the manager may rely on an affect-laden moral intuition to determine
whether pushing the limits of GAAP is acceptable. However, if the manager’s intuitions are
ambiguous about this decision (i.e., suggesting that a particular action may in fact violate
GAAP), then he or she will utilize the reasoning ability of System 2 when prompted to do so by
System 1.
The reasoning ability of System 2 may be limited by its reliance on System 1’s biased
processing of contextual stimuli. As previously mentioned, System 1 excludes relevant and
important information while including and overweighting that which is irrelevant or simply not
as important, thus distorting the type of decision the person thinks he or she is making
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). As such, a manager failing to meet analysts’ expectations
results in that person focusing on the attack to his or her self-worth while ignoring other, relevant
information which does not influence one’s self-perception. The distress experienced from this
situation motivates the individual to self-deceive in order to maintain his or her self-image as
competent and deserving. Although the person’s affect-laden intuition may initially suggest that
pushing beyond the boundaries of GAAP is wrong, self-deception (i.e., assuring oneself that he
or she is competent and deserving) allows the individual to frame the decision as an opportunity
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to correct for the “unfairness” of the situation.” Thus, ethical fading is likely to occur as the
individual adopts a non-ethical decision frame.

Implications for Accounting Research
TUAB has the potential to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different
functional areas of accounting research. With respect to Financial Accounting research, TUAB
may explain how disclosures and ambiguity in the reporting standards may actually promote
unethical acts. For example, corporations are required to disclose the processes that underlie their
Level 3 fair value estimates (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2011). Christiansen, Glover
and Wood (2013) argue that even though these estimates possess a significant degree of
uncertainty, auditors are dependent on management’s judgment due to the “unobservable” nature
of the assumptions and inputs that are a part of the valuation process. Research, however, has
shown that disclosure can actually exacerbate bias and can thus have a perverse influence on
behavior (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). As such, disclosure may give a manager the
psychological license to manipulate the inputs of fair value estimates in order to improve the
appearance of his or her company’s financial statements.
The SEC has stated its desire for the adoption of a global set of accounting standards
such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (SEC, 2010). Those who support
this measure contend that adopting a single set of principles-based accounting standards will
benefit the investor because of increased comparability and simplicity in the financial reports.
However, due to the ambiguity inherent in principles-based standards, there are concerns
regarding IFRS. Wade-Benzoni, Li, Thompson, and Bazerman (2007) argue that ambiguity in a
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situation allows people to exaggerate their competence in a particular area. Thus, the move to
principles-based guidelines, especially for revenue recognition, might be a catalyst for unethical
behavior as managers will have leeway in interpreting those rules in a more self-serving manner
than is possible under rule-based guidelines.
In regards to the AIS area, there is a stream of research that examines the ethicality of
implementing various types of information systems (e.g., Sutton, Arnold, & Arnold, 1995,
Dillard, Ruchala, & Yuthus, 2005). Dillard et al. (2005, p. 108), in particular, argue that
enterprise resources planning systems (ERPs) are “the physical manifestation of instrumental
rationality.” That is, ERPs promote a focus on the process for completing a task in the most
effective and efficient way without any consideration of the ethical implications of engaging in
that process. Considering the ubiquity of information systems across all sizes and types of
organizations, whether these systems foster an environment of instrumental rationality is an
important ethical question for which TUAB can be utilized.
Some academics argue that conflicts of interest are pervasive in auditing given the
current structural characteristics of that profession (e.g., Bazerman, Morgan, & Loewenstein,
1997; Moore et al., 2006). Moore et al. (2006) contend that these characteristics (e.g., the client
is who pays the auditor, auditors accepting positions from ex-clients, and so forth) both promote
motivated reasoning and exacerbate self-serving biases in auditors whereupon they become more
likely to acquiesce to their clients demands or perhaps even ignore any questionable behavior
thereof. In his summary of the literature that examines conflicts of interest in auditing, Nelson
(2005) concludes that the experimental research supports the notion that conflicts of interest do
seem to affect decisions in audit settings. In particular, research has shown that social pressures
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(e.g., Moore et al., 2010) and incentives (Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996) can influence an
auditor’s decision with respect to reporting. Thus, in regards to the Auditing research area,
TUAB can be used to explain how and why auditors sometimes negate their professional
judgment and accede to their clients’ demands.
There is considerable research in the Tax area that has examined factors related to
behaviors such as tax compliance (e.g., Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; Bobek, Roberts, & Sweeney,
2007; Davis, Hecht, Perkins, 2003), tax avoidance (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010) and
tax fraud (e.g., Lennox, Lisowsky, & Pittman, 2013). TUAB may help explain how and why
taxpayers, both at the individual and organizational level, are willing to engage in these
behaviors or push the boundaries of tax law. Furthermore, research in the Tax area has
investigated the ethical decision-making of tax practitioners (e.g., Burns & Kiecker, 1995). The
willingness for some accountants to establish illegal and quasi-legal tax shelters on behalf of
their clients, for example, can perhaps be explained by TUAB in addition to other “aggressive”
tax-related behaviors.
With respect to the Management Accounting area, TUAB may help explain a range of
deviant behaviors. In particular, TUAB can be applied to explain types of frauds, apart from
financial statement fraud, such as the misappropriation of assets (e.g., Chen & Sandino, 2012),
bribery (e.g., Christensen, 2015), and transfer price manipulation (e.g., Mehafdi, 2000).
Furthermore, TUAB can be utilized to address ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to
budgeting and performance measurement such as dishonesty in budget reporting (e.g., Church,
Hannan, and Kuang, 2012), the creation of budgetary slack (e.g., Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp,
2006), biased performance evaluation (e.g., Bol & Smith, 2011), and performance measurement
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manipulation (Demski, 1998). Finally, TUAB can be used to explore issues related to corporate
social responsibility disclosure (e.g., Roberts, 1992). As previously mentioned, research suggests
that disclosure can actually provoke bias which, in turn, can have a perverse influence on
behavior (Cain et al., 2005). Thus, TUAB can explain how social responsibility disclosure may
actually give managers the psychological license to engage in undesirable corporate actions such
as the exploitation of third-world labor, for example.
Research is needed to assess TUAB’s explanatory power regarding the behaviors of
professional accountants and managers listed above. In particular, research should focus on both
exploring the relationship between ethical fading and unethical behaviors and identifying the
psychological operations (i.e., biases and emotions) that lead to ethical fading across various
accounting contexts. It is reasonable to postulate that ethical fading can result from an array of
biases and emotions that vary across situations due to factors that are specific to particular
contexts. Finally, research should examine how individual characteristics (e.g., the dark triad)
and organizational characteristics (e.g., corporate culture) affect the psychological processes as
described in TUAB.

Contributions
The primary contribution of this chapter is that it unifies disparate theories and ideas from
psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a testable theory that includes the
concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) contend that
traditional models of ethical decision-making such as Rest (1986) and Kohlberg (1973) are built
on a faulty supposition that judgments are based on a rational, linear thought-process, thus
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making those models incomplete. Specifically, these models assume that (1) awareness is
necessary for the decision to have ethical implications, (2) reasoning will determine an
individual’s judgment (moral judgment), (3) and moral intention is necessary for one to
understand his or her action (moral intention). Research from psychology and behavioral ethics,
however, suggests that individuals often (1) lack moral awareness, (2) judge before utilizing
moral reasoning, and (3) misjudge moral intention (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011).
Consequently, this research, which examines how emotions, the subconscious, and intuition
affect decision-making, highlights the limitations of rationalist models (Tenbrunsel & SmithCrowe, 2008). In regards to the accounting literature, Bazerman et al. (2006) are critical of
researchers in this discipline, especially those who utilize the “tools of economics,” for not being
concerned with the distinction between an act of conscious corruption and an error resulting from
unintentional bias.6 Thus, this chapter contributes to the ethics and accounting literatures by
introducing a testable model that differentiates between intentional and unintentional behavior by
considering the systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical
decision, as well as the contextual factors that exacerbate those errors.
This chapter also contributes to the academic literature by extending the work of Murphy
and Dacin (2011). Murphy and Dacin (2011) developed a framework that identifies the
psychological pathways an individual may follow when making the decision to engage in fraud.
Within this framework, they acknowledge that contextual factors (i.e., obedience to authority,

6

For example, Bazerman et al. (2006) point to models of auditor independence (e.g., Antle, 1984; DeAngelo, 1981;

Simunic, 1984) which assume that the auditor makes a deliberate, conscious decision to either conduct an unbiased
audit or collude with the client’s managers.
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organizational culture, the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts) may drive an individual to
commit unintentional fraud. As such, this chapter provides a more detailed understanding of this
phenomenon by its incorporation of the bounded ethicality and ethical fading concepts.
TUAB also offers potential contributions to auditors, management, and regulators. An
understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may have potential implications for the
auditing profession in that it can increase an auditor’s sensitivity to both the contextual factors
that can lead to unintentional financial statement manipulation and his or her own susceptibility
to systematic errors when dealing with clients. Research indicates that auditors attach substantial
weight to management’s character and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments
(Heiman-Hoffman, Morgan, & Patton, 1996). As such, auditors will adjust their decisions based
on their evaluations of management’s integrity (Ayers & Kaplan 1998; Beaulieu 2001; Kizirian,
Mayhew, & Sneathen, 2005; Shaub 1996). However, as discussed in Wilks and Zimbelman
(2004), regulators and practitioners have expressed concern regarding the overreliance on
management's attitude when an auditor’s perception suggests a low risk of fraud. This is a valid
concern given both auditors’ historically low rates of fraud detection (Cullinan & Sutton, 2002)
and their documented deficiencies in testing for such risk as reported by the PCAOB (Trompeter
et al., 2013).7 If most unethical behavior is unintentional (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), and
bounded ethicality and ethical fading thus play significant roles in most accounting fraud, then a
manager’s behavior may not indicate that he or she behaved unethically even if such an act was

7

Among its sample, the ACFE (2012) survey data reveals that accounting fraud was initially discovered by an

external auditor review in only 5.7% of the cases. This percentage is relatively consistent with surveys conducted
before the implementation of SOX (e.g., KPMG, 1998).
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committed. A manager may believe that he or she utilized “clever earnings management”
techniques rather than outright deceptive practices since the line between the two is not
necessarily distinct. An understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may improve an
auditor’s sensitivity to the contextual features, which can compel a manager to unintentionally
engage in unethical behavior. Additionally, an awareness of systematic psychological errors may
heighten skepticism when an auditor’s perception of management’s integrity indicates a lower
fraud risk. As such, knowledge of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may improve an
auditor’s ability to detect fraud.
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2006) discuss that professionals are vulnerable to
the same biases as laypersons or novices and are often unaware of how compromised they are in
conflict of interest situations.8 With respect to auditor independence, the external audit process
inherently contains a conflict of interest since there is tension between pleasing a paying client
and ensuring that client adheres to generally accepted accounting principles (Moore et al., 2006).
As such, Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, and Tanlu (2006) claim that the “clear findings of the
psychological perspective on auditing is that a bias can exist in auditors without their being
aware of it” (p. 45).9 Thus, an understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may also
assist with auditors’ recognition of their psychological limitations when dealing with clients.
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that the demands of an executive position may
intensify the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making. As such, research on bounded

8

Moore et al. (2006) propose a “Theory of Moral Seduction” from which this hypothesis is derived.

9

For example, the results of an experiment utilizing Big 4 auditors suggest that their judgments are biased by client

preference (Moore, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2010).
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ethicality and ethical fading may also benefit management and the companies they represent.
Tenbrunsel et al., (2010) state that most efforts to improve ethics within organizations have
ignored the individual faced with the dilemma and have focused instead on formal systems such
as training and developing a code of ethics. This current “fix-it” approach, they contend, ignores
the psychological processes that may undermine organizational-level interventions. Thus,
knowledge of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, and the contextual factors that influence
these processes, may allow organizations to design superior fraud-deterrence mechanisms.
Finally, understanding their own biases and heuristics may help CEOs and CFOs be more
psychologically prepared when confronted with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud.
An understanding of bounded ethicality may assist legislators in designing laws that are
more effective in influencing the ethicality of organizational actors. Bazerman and Banaji (2004)
argue that the common assumption embedded in laws such as SOX is that unethical behavior is
the result of a bad actor consciously sacrificing his or her ethics. A failure to understand the
psychological constraints on ethical decision-making, as well as the subconscious nature in
which these constraints operate, may limit the effectiveness of legislation aimed at influencing
ethical behavior in organizations. Recognizing the distinction between conscious corruption and
unconscious bias is imperative to the implementation of effective anti-fraud measures as both
drivers of behavior respond to different incentives (Moore et al., 2006). In addition to
recognizing this distinction, researchers have also proposed that the definition of fraud should be
reconsidered.
Bazerman and Banaji (2004) state that the “pervasiveness of what is termed ‘unethical’
must be rethought, and as such the solutions to contemporary ethical scandals may need special
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attention” (p. 111). Concomitantly, Bazerman et al. (2006) assert that accounting academics
should recommend that the definition of fraud be broadened to include any deviations from
accuracy, regardless of the intentionality or awareness of those deviations. Legally, fraud is
distinguished from error in that fraud is defined as an intentional act (Bazerman et al., 2006). As
such, successful prosecution of fraud typically requires demonstrating that the fraudster knew he
or she was in fact misstating the financials in an attempt to deceive auditors, investors, or other
parties. However, if bounded ethicality and ethical fading have considerable explanatory power
with respect to fraudulent behavior, then it is reasonable to ask whether the definition of fraud is
narrow, or even naïve. Expanding the legal definition to include unintentional acts would make
executives more accountable for the harms their organizations create when fraud is committed.
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CHAPTER 3: UNINTENTIONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD IN AN ERA OF
ESCALATING MANAGEMENT PAY: THE ROLE OF EGOCENTRISM, ENVY, AND
ETHICAL FADING (STUDY 2)
Introduction
Despite extensive legislative efforts designed to improve corporate ethics, such as the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), incidents of accounting fraud have increased
over the past decade (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). One possible reason that explains SOX’s
inability to curtail fraud is the law’s assumption that such behavior is intentional. Embedded in
laws such as SOX is the common supposition that unethical behavior is the result of a conscious
decision. However, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2011) argue that “if self-interest were
computed rationally as an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias
would be as simple as increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46). In contrast to the
traditional frameworks (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973; Rest, 1986) that view ethical decision-making as a
rational, linear thought process, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) proposed the concept of
bounded ethicality.
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman 2010, p. 7). These
processes include inherent biases and heuristics that inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical
decision (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism,
and a tendency to overclaim credit are all specific examples of biases that researchers in
behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making
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(Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological tendencies operate
at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded
ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her awareness of doing
so. This is accomplished through the mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological
constraints fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel &
Messick, 2004).
Identifying and examining the psychological operations that lead to ethical fading, as
well as the contextual factor that trigger those operations, can contribute towards implementing
measures that are more effective at deterring and preventing accounting fraud. Research in
behavioral ethics suggests that once such factor, pay inequality, can provoke psychological
processes (i.e., biases and negative emotions) that, in turn, induce ethical fading and thus
increase the likelihood of cheating behavior. In particular, Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that
envy toward wealthy targets, whether individuals or organizations, influences the probability that
a person will engage in unethical behavior to attain similar wealth and reduce inequality resulting
from differences in wealth. The study’s results imply that abundant wealth activates perceptions
of unfairness in those individuals who operate in the wealthy environment. The distress created
from those perceptions drive feelings of envy, which, in turn, induces unethical behavior. Gino
and Pierce (2009) also believe that their results are generalizable to fraudulent behavior. Their
theoretical argument, and its empirical support, can be explained by the concepts of bounded
ethicality and ethical fading. Thus, as the average CEO pay continues to skyrocket, it follows
that managers who earn less than their peers may be more likely to succumb to ethical fading
and, as a result, commit fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular
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contextual factor, inferior pay among managers, provokes egocentric perceptions of unfairness
and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior.
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which
incorporates the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, is drawn from to predict that a
manager who compares his or her pay to a higher-paid referent will perceive the disparity as
more unfair than a manager who compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent. In
addition, it is hypothesized that this perception will trigger a feeling of envy, which, in turn,
increases the probability of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is
paid less. A 1 x 2, between-participants design was used to test these predictions. The experiment
required participants to sell assets of given values (ranging from excellent to poor) to a
computerized buyer. One group (high-pay rate) earned more money on each successful
transaction than the other (low-pay rate). Before each attempted sale, the participants had the
opportunity to change the asset’s value from what was initially provided. Intrinsically, there
existed an incentive for the participant to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that
selling assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in larger payouts. The participants’
egocentric perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy, ethical fading, and rate of misrepresentation
were measured during this experiment.
The results indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to view this
disparity as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no significant
direct effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis revealed that a
person’s risk preference might moderate this relationship. The primary findings of this chapter,
albeit somewhat mixed, suggests that individuals who experience a higher degree of ethical
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fading are more likely to commit fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness,
are significant psychological processes that explain how differences in pay may lead to fraud.
Overall, the main contributions of this chapter is that it both provides initial support of
TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifies a key contextual factor, pay disparity, and its effect on the
psychological processes that constrain one’s ability to act ethically. In addition, it presents
evidence that the decision to commit fraud is not necessarily a conscious trade-off between ethics
and some other desired goal (e.g., profit). Furthermore, supplemental analysis suggests that
future research on TUAB (Chapter 2) should consider how individual characteristics might
influence the processes proposed in the model. This research also provides specific contributions
to the auditing profession, organizations, and regulators.
With respect to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual
factors and psychological processes interact to influence unethical behavior may result in
improved fraud detection. In addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this
research suggests that auditors reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s
character and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. In regards to organizations,
knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow businesses to design superior fraud controls aimed at
mitigating the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore, understanding one’s
own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically prepared when
confronted with the decision to engage in accounting fraud. Finally, this chapter suggests to
regulators that recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias,
and the factors that drive such bias, is needed to establish more effective fraud deterrents.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the TUAB (Chapter 2) and develops hypotheses from that theory. Section 3 explains the
experimental method employed to test those hypotheses along with the manipulation and
measurement of the variables. Section 4 analyzes the statistical results and Section 5 discusses
the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter and offers a discussion of its limitations.

Theory and Hypothesis Development
Most individuals perceive themselves as more ethical than their peers (Tenbrunsel, 1998),
overestimate the extent to which they will engage in behaviors that are socially acceptable in the
future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), and view their own dubious actions as less objectionable than
the comparable conduct of others (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Furthermore, research suggests
that people often display “moral hypocrisy” wherein one presents him or herself as an ethical
person while simultaneously behaving in a manner inconsistent with his or her moral principles
(Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). Recent studies from behavioral
ethics provide insight as to how an individual is able to act against his or her moral standards
while upholding the self-image that he or she is an ethical person. The concept of “bounded
ethicality” emerged from this research to explain the discordance between one’s moral selfimage and his or her ethical behavior.
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010, p. 7). These processes include inherent biases and
heuristics that inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji,
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2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim credit are all
specific examples of biases that researchers in behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of
bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As
these psychological tendencies operate at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman,
2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded ethicality is that it allows the person to behave
unethically without his or her awareness of doing so. This is accomplished through the
mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological constraints, (e.g., the activation of
inherent biases) fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel &
Messick, 2004).
As usual with relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics, theoretical models are
sparse (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Chapter 2 unified disparate theories and
ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory that includes
the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. What follows is an overview of that
theory.

Distinction Between the System 1 and System 2 Components of the TUAB
The TUAB (Chapter 2) incorporates two distinct modes of cognitive processing,
described by Kahneman (2011) as System 1 and System 2 thinking, to explain how unethical
behavior may occur. System 1’s primary function is to create connections among corresponding
ideas of contexts, events, actions, and outcomes (Kahneman, 2011). These links help to establish
a working model that allows one to understand his or her environment, create a narrative for the
experiences of that person’s life, and build future expectations. Kahneman (2011) defines System
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1 thinking as automatic, intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. In other words, System 1
assesses stimuli “automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary
control” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). As such, one’s intuitions of a particular context are essentially
the creation of the primitive evaluations conducted by System 1. These intuitions, however, are
prone to systematic errors (i.e., cognitive biases and heuristics) that are ingrained within System
1 and activated under certain conditions (Kahneman, 2011).
The primary function of System 2 is to monitor the intuitions, intentions, impressions,
and feelings that are continuously suggested by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 thinking,
in contrast to System 1, is more deliberative and capable of reasoning and self-control
(Kahneman, 2011). As such, System 2 is thought to be the final authority in decision-making
because of its capacity to resist the suggestions of System 1. Although an individual who is able
to utilize System 2 thinking when making a decision theoretically increases his or her chances of
acting ethically (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), this mode of cognition should not be viewed as
a perfect model of rationality (Kahneman, 2011). This is because System 2 is “lazy,” meaning
that it typically functions without exerting the effort necessary to weigh the ethical implications
of a decision and, as a result, passively accepts the suggestions of System 1 (Kahneman, 2011).
In addition, when System 2 is prompted to put forth more effort, it will often rationalize the
emotions generated in System 1 and thus act more like an “apologist” for the affect-laden
intuitions of that system rather than a critic (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, a problem exists in
that System 2’s evaluations are dependent on System 1’s biased interpretation of contextual
stimuli.
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Findings from research across psychology (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre,
2007) and accounting (e.g., Farrell, Goh, & White, 2014) support Kahneman’s (2011) dualprocess conceptualization. However, the system of thinking under which the majority of
unethical behavior occurs is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011), though, argue that managers often rely on System 1 given the
hectic demands of their work environment. As such, this chapter tests the System 1 component
of the TUAB (Chapter 2) as an explanation for unethical behavior (i.e., fraud). If System 2
actually explains the majority of unethical actions, then we would expect to see the same
emotions and biases activated in similar contexts. The key difference is that we would expect to
observe more cognitive effort in one’s decision-making under System 2.

Overview of the System 1 Component of the TUAB
TUAB (Chapter 2) argues that, under System 1 thinking, contextual stimuli, both quasistatic factors such as one’s organizational environment and other, situational or task-specific
elements, interact to instigate certain biases and heuristics. Egocentric biases that function to
maintain one’s sense of self-worth are particularly vulnerable to provocation by such stimuli.
The need to protect one’s self-image may result in a distorted interpretation of stimuli which will
favor a preferred outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983) and/or create the perception that the solution
which benefits him or her is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). These
automatic and primitive evaluations happen so rapidly and effortlessly that a person’s
interpretations and perceptions may not feel biased or skewed in any way (Bazerman & Banaji,
2004).
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Not only are contextual stimuli interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they may
also generate an emotional response in a person (Slovic, 1999). TUAB (Chapter, 2) argues, as an
example, that a manager’s sense of competency may feel threatened if he or she is unlikely to
meet a key organizational goal such as meeting analysts’ expectations. If engaging in an
unethical act alleviates any negative emotions experienced in a particular situation, then the
individual’s affect-laden intuition is inclined to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at least,
suitable, in that it is the most emotionally satisfying. The individual is thus likely to depend on
an affect heuristic wherein negative emotions serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. As
such, he or she automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper
action?) with an easier one (how would this particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading has
occurred at this point as the moral implications of each alternative decision are not considered,
thus increasing the likelihood of the person engaging in unethical behavior. Figure 3 represents
TUAB (Chapter, 2). The remainder of this section elaborates upon this model and utilizes it to
make predictions about whether inferior positions of income/wealth increase a manager’s
probability of committing financial statement fraud.

Contextual Stimuli and Biases/Heuristics
Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that his or her environment influences one’s ethical actions.
Semi-static, environmental factors such as reward systems (e.g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978), norms
and culture (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), and codes of conduct (Cressey & Moore,
1983) have been shown to affect ethical conduct within organizations (Gino & Pierce, 2009). In
addition, Kern and Chugh (2009) demonstrate that situational, or task-specific, stimuli such as
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time pressure may influence one’s ethical behavior. TUAB (Chapter 2) contends that both types
of factors interact to elicit particular biases and heuristics. In turn, the provocation of these biases
and heuristics results in the individual evaluating and interpreting the contextual stimuli not
through his or her moral lens, but in a self-interested manner which is context-dependent.
Research suggests that people have difficulty interpreting stimuli in an unbiased way
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). An individual’s
assessment, and the subsequent weighting, of environmental information are governed by
egocentric biases which are designed to maintain the person’s sense of self-worth, such as the
need to see him or herself as moral, competent, and deserving (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji,
2005). The need to preserve one’s self-worth can lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli
which supports the individual’s preference for a particular outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983)
and/or results in the perception that the most beneficial for him or her is the most “fair”
(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As one automatically and effortlessly processes information
egocentrically (Epley & Caruso, 2004), that is, evaluates contextual stimuli on the basis of how
those factors affect the person’s sense of self-worth, his or her perceptions may not feel biased or
distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).

Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth
General Strain Theory posits that the stress from one’s social environment to achieve
material success can motivate an individual to take part in criminal activity (Langton & Piquero,
2007). This stress, and the succeeding inducement towards criminal behavior, is the result of a
social comparisons process. The Self-evaluation Maintenance Model, along with other social
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comparison theories (e.g., Festinger, 1954), suggests that one compares his or her abilities to
others to maintain or improve evaluations of the self (Tesser, 1988). According to Pfeffer and
Langton (1988), research indicates that employees form reactions to the distribution of rewards
or wealth they receive from such comparisons (e.g., Alwin, 1987). Specifically, an individual
will weigh the distribution of resources by considering both the economic utility of his or her
share of rewards or wealth and the social utility generated from the comparisons (Messick &
Sentis, 1985). With respect to executive management, in particular, researchers have started to
investigate CEO reactions to their pay relative to the labor market in which they participate
(Fong, 2010).
Kuhnen & Tymula (2012) argue that prior research by Frank (1984), for example,
demonstrates that people are concerned about social status as defined by their wealth relative to
others. This may be especially true for CEOs. Fong (2010), citing Porac, Wade, and Pollack
(1999), states that “the complex causes of organizational outcomes can motivate, or even
necessitate, social comparisons by CEOs and thus they could recognize the going labor market
rate for their services and possible deviations from such rates” (p. 1099). As such, CEOs will
compare their pay against other CEOs (Fong, 2010) since individuals typically evaluate
themselves against others who possess similar abilities (Goodman, 1974). Compensation
schemes are argued to be important to managers in that they are a reflection of their competence
and importance (March 1984). Thus, an executive whose pay is relatively lower than others in
the same labor market may view this as a threat to his or her competency, thus motivating that
CEO to behave in ways that lead to higher pay (Fong, 2010). This motivation may stem from the
executive’s biased perception of what he or she considers fair compensation.
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Gino and Pierce (2009) contend that researchers have built on Adams’ (1965) equity
theory by demonstrating that people judge the fairness of a given setting by comparing their ratio
of inputs to outcomes with those of referent others. However, Wade-Benzoni and Tost (2009)
cite an extensive body of research demonstrating peoples’ propensity towards “egocentric
interpretations of fairness,” wherein a person’s judgment of fairness is biased in a self-serving
manner despite the belief that his or her judgment is objective (e.g., Diekmann et al., 1997; Epley
& Caruso, 2004; Messick & Sentis, 1979, 1983; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Wade-Benzoni,
Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Furthermore, as discussed in Samnani, Salamon, and Singh
(2013), researchers have found that perceived injustice/unfairness (Cohen-Charash & Mueller
2007; Hershcovis et al., 2007; Jones 2009) is related to counterproductive work behaviors.
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager will
compare his or her earnings to others in the same labor market. If his or her earnings are
relatively lower, then this process of social comparison is a contextual stimulus that may threaten
the manager’s own feelings of competency. In turn, the manager will egocentrically interpret
stimuli in a way that reassures his or her managerial abilities. That is, the manager will
manufacture the perception that the lower pay is a result of an unfair situation rather than his or
her inferior competency. As such, the first hypothesis is stated as:
H1: A manager who compares his or her earnings to a higher-paid referent will
perceive the disparity as more unfair than a manager who compares his or
her earnings to a lower-paid referent
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Biases/Heuristics and Affect-laden Intuition
TUAB (Chapter 2) postulates that provoking egocentric biases also triggers negative
affect in addition to distorting one’s perceptions of stimuli. When an individual’s sense of selfworth is threatened, he or she will be motivated to diminish any negative emotion quickly
without engaging in a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, as visceral impulses
typically dominate during decision-making (Loewenstein, 1996), the individual may rely on his
or her “affect-laden intuition” (i.e., gut feeling) to evaluate whether a potentially unethical
behavior is appropriate in a given situation (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). As such, one might employ
an “affect heuristic,” a mental shortcut whereupon the person’s intuition, formed by the quick
and automatic emotions that precede cognition, serves as a basis to inform his or her behaviors
and/or decisions (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane, Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).

Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth
As discussed in Blanchflower and Oswald (2011), the idea that one’s subjective wellbeing is dependent on relative factors like income dates back to Duesenberry’s (1949) “relativeincome hypothesis” and continues through modern research such as Clark and Senik (2010) and
Layard (2010). Consistent with this idea is relative deprivation theory, which suggests that an
individual will feel less happy as his or her earnings fall in comparison to a particular referent
(Clark & Oswald, 1996). Empirically, Frank (1999, 2007) has demonstrated that ones’ relative
wealth standing, as opposed to absolute net worth, is a stronger predictor of his or her well-being
and Clark and Oswald (1996), for example, found an inverse relationship between U.K. workers’
reported level of satisfaction and their comparison wage rates. As discussed above, one who
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earns less than a particular referent will egocentrically interpret this situation as unfair and will
react negatively (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). Envy, along with unhappiness, is a probable
reaction to a person’s inferior position of income/wealth.
Smith and Kim (2007) define envy as “as an unpleasant, often painful emotion
characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a
desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons” (p. 46). Nickerson and Zenger
(2008) state that “varying perspectives on social comparison and disparity perceptions are
consistent with the notion that individuals are envious of salient referents perceived to receive
superior income relative to their contributions” (p. 1434). Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007)
explain that envy occurs in social comparisons when Person A recognizes that Person B has an
object or trait (e.g., material or personal) that Person A desires but does possess, and that object
or trait is important to Person A’s self-concept. Specifically, Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007)
continue, the feeling of envy threatens one’s self-perception since it is an acknowledgement of
his or her inferiority relative to another. Furthermore, the “comparison component” of envy is
related with behaviors intended to improve one’s position. A similar argument is applicable to
the reactionary behaviors of executive management to income/wealth inequalities. Goel and
Thakor (2010), for example, support their claim that higher-earning CEOs who increase their pay
through mergers and acquisitions induce envy among lower-earning CEOs, who, in turn, are
motivated to increase their salaries through acquisitions.
Translating these ideas into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager will
compare his or her pay to others in the same labor market. If his or her earnings are lower, then
this process of social comparison may serve as a contextual stimulus that endangers the
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manager’s own sense of self-worth. Thus, the manager will egocentrically interpret stimuli in a
way which manufactures the perception that his or her lower pay is a result of an unfair situation
rather than his or her own inferiority. In addition to egocentrically interpreting this situation as
unfair, the threat to the manager’s sense of self-worth is also expected to elicit negative affect,
specifically, envy. As such, the second hypothesis is stated as:
H2: Perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of
envy.
Affect-laden Intuition, Ethical Fading, and Unethical Behavior
As discussed earlier, an individual faced with a dilemma will be motivated to reduce any
negative affect without engaging in a slow, effortful thinking process (Kahneman, 2011). As
such, visceral responses tend to dominate during decision-making (Loewenstein, 1996). The
individual, as a result, will both rely on his or her affect-laden moral intuition to determine
whether a potentially unethical action is acceptable and employ an affect heuristic to guide the
decision-making process.
Haidt (2001) contends that quick intuition often precedes moral judgment. This may be
due to the affect heuristic. Kahneman (2011) argues that the affect heuristic is an instance of
substitution where a more cognitively taxing question (e.g., what is the most ethical decision?)
with an easier one (e.g., how would engaging in this action make me feel?). As such, how the
individual feels towards the decision alternatives will determine whether ethical fading will
occur (Chapter 2).
Kahneman (2011) maintains that people are overconfident in their intuitions formed from
automatic processes such as the affect heuristic. Thus, as reasoned from TUAB (Chapter 2) a
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conscious, reasoned decision to forsake one’s ethics is not necessarily driving his or her
unethical behavior. Instead, a person’s behavior in an ethical dilemma is more of an “emotional
reflex” that is governed by biased and automatic cognitive processes. Consequently, if an
unethical act may relieve any negative affect experienced in a particular dilemma, then the
individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at least,
appropriate, in that it is the most emotionally attractive (Chapter 2). The desire to appease
visceral impulses may result in ethical fading wherein the “moral colors of an ethical decision
fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p.
224). Finally, TUAB (Chapter 2) postulates that the fading of ethical considerations in a dilemma
increases the probability of one engaging in unethical behavior without the person’s awareness
that he or she is doing so.

Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth
Gino and Pierce (2009) state that feelings of envy lower one’s job-related esteem which,
in turn, motivates the person to rectify the situation. As such, envy can have a significant
influence on an individual’s ethical behavior. Supporting this claim, Gino and Pierce (2009)
discuss research that suggests one’s feelings of envy may lead to deception, decreased
cooperation, and overt hostility (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997; Duffy & Shaw, 2000;
Feather, 1989, 1991; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002). However,
research indicates that some form of ethical fading may play a key role in the link between envy
and unethical behavior. Samnani et al.’s (2013) findings suggest that moral disengagement, a
concept related to ethical fading, moderates the relationship between negative affect and
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counterproductive work behaviors. 10 Additionally, a multilevel study of student teams indicates
that envy has an indirect effect on social undermining through moral disengagement (Duffy,
Scott, Shaw, Tepper & Aquino, 2012).
Applying TUAB (Chapter 2), a manager who earns less than referent others will be
motivated to reduce the envy created from social comparisons. As such, the manager will rely on
his or her affect-laden moral intuition to determine whether a potentially unethical act is suitable
and will utilize an affect heuristic to guide the decision making-process. The manager will then
automatically substitute a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier
one (how would engaging in this behavior make me feel?). At this point, ethical fading has
occurred since the manager is no longer considering the ethical implications of his or her
decision. Thus, the third hypothesis is stated as:
H3: Feelings of envy are positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading.
There is a dearth of empirical research on ethical fading since it is a relatively new
concept. However, studies on moral disengagement support the hypothesized link between
ethical fading and unethical behavior. For example, Deter, Treviño, and Sweitzer’s (2008) results

10

The distinction between moral disengagement and ethical fading has yet to be established to the best of the

author’s knowledge. However, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer (2011) argue that Bandura (2002)
conceptualizes moral disengagement as an individual trait wherein the propensity to employ mechanisms of
disengagement vary across people. One may infer from this conceptualization that morally disengaging in an ethical
scenario is a conscious strategy employed by the decision maker. Ethical fading, in contrast, is the effect of a
subconscious process governed by biases inherent in all individuals. As such, there is not “conscious” decision to
fade the implications from one’s decision.
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suggest a positive relationship between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making. In
addition, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Klebe, Baker, and Mayer (2012) utilized experimental and
field procedures to examine the effect of moral disengagement on various types of unethical
conduct within organizations. Moore et al. (2012) found that one’s propensity towards moral
disengagement was a strong predictor of unethical behavior, such as the decision to engage in
fraud, and more relevant than other antecedents of unethical behavior that are related to
individual differences.
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager who
earns less than referent others will employ an affect heuristic where the envy produced by social
comparisons of pay/wealth serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. Thus, the manager will
automatically substitute a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier
one (how does choosing this particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading, at this point, has
transpired whereupon the manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests the action that alleviates the
envy experienced in this particular scenario is the most appropriate, including behavior
considered unethical. When confronted with the opportunity to raise his or her compensation
(i.e., acquire bonuses and/or stock options by meeting company goals) by engaging in financial
statement fraud, a relatively lower-paid manager, as opposed to a higher-paid manager, is more
likely to push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP. This is because contravening GAAP
would be the most emotionally appealing action since it adjusts for the manager’s perceived
unfairness of his or her inferior pay, eases his or her feeling of envy, and upholds his or her sense
of self-worth. As such, TUAB predicts the following:
H4: Ethical fading is positively related to the likelihood of engaging in unethical
behavior (i.e., fraud).
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H5: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is
mediated by perceived unfairness.
H6: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is
mediated by episodic envy.
H7: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is
mediated by ethical fading.

Methods
The hypotheses were tested utilizing a 1 x 2 between-participants design. Random
assignment directed the participants into one of two conditions consisting of a low-pay group
(LPG) and a high-pay group (HPG). The experiment is a modified version of the procedure
employed in Schwartz and Wallin (2002) where the participant’s task, across all groups, is to sell
an “asset” to a computerized buyer. In brief, the participants had to decide how to disclose the
quality of the asset and determine its price before selling it to the buyer. Participants retained a
percentage of the money received for the price at which an asset was sold. As such, there existed
an incentive for the participants to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that selling
assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in a larger payout for them.

Experimental Procedure
What follows is a detailed explanation of the experimental procedure. The participants
interfaced with a computer for all aspects of the experiments, except when receiving their cash
payout from the experimenter. Figure 4 shows the chronological order of the procedure.
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Step 1: Role assignment and instructions regarding experiment
The experiment began with the participants being informed that they had been assigned
the role of sellers with corresponding identification numbers. The study administrator then asked
the participants what role they were assigned while shuffling through two sets of color-coded
instructions. The purpose of this action was to intimate that other role assignments, such as a
buyer, were possible.11 The instructions were then read aloud by the study administrator. First,
the participants were advised to raise their hand if they had any questions regarding the
instructions. The instructions then stated that the task, for 25 rounds, is to sell the assets to
potential buyers. Next, the participants were told that they would be provided with information
regarding the names, qualities, and value-ranges of assets to be sold to potential buyers. For
example, the participants may be given an Epsilon asset of average quality with an assessed
value between 400 to 500 Credits.12 In addition, they were notified that determining an asset’s
quality and value-range is subjective.
With respect to the asset-selling task, the instructions stated that the participants must
determine both the price of the asset and how to disclose its quality before they are matched with
a buyer. For example, if the participant is given an Epsilon asset of average quality with a value
between 400 to 500 Credits, then he or she could change its “average quality” designation to

11

An open-ended question was asked regarding the participants’ opinions as to where the sellers were located. Of

the 75 individuals who participated, only 5 suggested that the buyers were part of a computer program. These
participants’ responses were included in the analysis since the difference in the results between including and
excluding their data was insignificant.
12

A Credit is a fictional currency.
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“above average” if he or she feels that the assessment was inaccurate. The value-range of the
asset moved in conjunction with any changes to the asset quality. As such, changing an asset of
“average quality” to “above average” in the example above would have shifted the value-range
from 400 to 500 Credits to 450 to 550 Credits. The participants were then instructed that they
must determine a price, within the value-range, at which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits).
Finally, the participants were advised that the others taking part in this study did not have access
to any information regarding their decisions about pricing an asset and disclosing its quality.
The participants were subsequently advised that their offers could be declined. Next, the
participants were told that the buyer could purchase an audit for any transaction immediately
following the sale of an asset. Specifically, the instructions stated that all transactions could be
subjected to an audit with variable success rates of detection. For example, the probability of a
successful detection for a “poor quality” asset disclosed as “excellent quality” was higher than
that same asset disclosed as “average quality.” Furthermore, the participants were informed that
a successful audit, that is, one that detected a misrepresentation of quality, would result in a fine
of 1000 Credits in addition to the relinquishment of any Credits gained from the previous
transaction.
The participants were then advised that they would be prompted to answer a question
after the instructions are read and the response to this question could determine their rate of pay
for the experiment. Next, the participants were informed that they would be asked to complete a
survey after the 13th round of transactions and finish a “word completion” exercise after the final
round, for which additional Credits could be earned. The participants were also notified that any
Credits earned from both the asset-selling task (minus any assessed penalties) and the word
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completion exercise would be converted to US dollars and paid out upon completion of the
experiment. The conversion rate of Credits to US dollars was not provided, but the participants
were informed that the rate is positive.13 The participants were then told that they would be asked
to write down their identification numbers, place them into an envelopes, and bring those
envelopes to the experimenter for payment at the end of the study. Finally, the participants were
asked to confirm that they understand the task and click the “Begin Task” link on the computer
screen. A list of the instructions is located in Appendix C.

Step 2: Group assignment and manipulation check
Following the instructions, the participants were asked to select their preference for one
of two given images (i.e., patterns of lines with no extrinsic meaning) and advised that this
decision may play a role in determining their pay rate, and thus their potentials earnings, for the
experiment. Before selecting one of the two images, however, the participants were prompted to
click a box acknowledging that they understand the possible link between his or her preference
and pay rate. The actual assignment to conditions was random. The participants were then routed
to a new screen that provided their group assignment, which was either to the LPG or HPG. In
addition, the participants were notified of their pay rate for the experiment. That is, for each
successful transaction, those in the LPG would receive 25 percent of an asset’s sales price
whereas those in the HPG would collect 50 percent. Finally, the participants were prompted to
answer a manipulation question regarding their group assignment and rate of pay.

13

The conversion rate was 1 Credit equals 0.005 US Dollars.
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Step 3: Asset quality information
The task of selling assets began as the participants were given information regarding the
asset. In particular, they were provided its name, quality, and value range.14 For each round, the
asset’s information was the same for all participants. In addition, there was a disclaimer stating
that determining the asset’s actual quality and value-range is subjective. Furthermore, there was
a header at the top of the screen showing the current round, the total amount of Credits the
participant had earned, and the participant’s identification number and group assignment. This
header was constant throughout the asset-selling task. Another icon showing the date, time, and
the number of “buyers” online (a random number between 700 and 799) was also shown at the
top of the screen throughout the asset-selling task.

Step 4: Disclosing and pricing of asset
Next, the participants had to decide how to disclose the value of the asset to a potential
buyer and determine its price. Once finished, the participants were prompted to enter “the
marketplace” to sell their asset.

14

Each asset is named after a letter in the Greek alphabet (e.g., “Epsilon”). The letters Alpha, Beta, and Omega are

not used as they may imply a position within a hierarchy or a value in relation to another. There are five quality
designations, which are “poor,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,” and “excellent.”
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Step 5: Sale of asset
Once in the marketplace, the participants were told that Buyer X, with the X representing
a random letter and three-digit number, either purchased or declined to buy the asset. The buyer
was an algorithm within Qualtrics set to where each transaction has an 80 percent probability of
success and, accordingly, a 20 percent chance of failure. It is important to note, however, that the
participants were not told the buyer was an algorithm. In fact, no information was provided about
the buyers. The intent with limiting the participants’ information regarding the buyer, along with
establishing the possibility of an unsuccessful sale, was to create the impression that the sellers
were transacting with a human counterpart. After each successful transaction, the participants’
balances were updated to reflect the Credits received from the sale of the asset.

Step 6: Audit of transaction
An algorithm determined whether an audit was conducted and, if so, its success in
detecting a misrepresentation of an asset’s quality. The chance of an audit occurring was 25
percent regardless of whether, and to what degree, the participants misrepresented their assets.
However, if an audit transpired, then the degree to which the participant misreported the asset’s
quality determined the likelihood of a successful detection. Specifically, the probability of
detection increased by a constant 20 percent for each level of quality reported beyond that which
was given. For example, if the participant was given an asset of poor quality and an audit
followed its sale, then he or she would have faced a 20, 40, 60, or 80 percent probability of
detection had the asset been disclosed as below average, average, above average, or excellent,
respectively. Whether or not an audit did occur and, if so, its results were communicated to the
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participants. The participants were informed about both the penalty (1000 Credits) they must pay
and the loss of Credits from the previous transaction if an audit effectively detected a
misrepresentation. Finally, the round ended after the participants’ earnings were updated to
reflect any assessed penalty. Steps 3 through 6 were repeated for another 12 rounds.

Step 7: Zodiac and Personality Survey
After the 13th round of transactions, the participants were informed that their accumulated
Credits thus far place them in the top (HPG) or bottom tier (LPG) of earners, respectively.15
Next, the computer prompted the participants to complete a variation of the Zodiac and
Personality Survey utilized by Gino and Pierce (2009). This survey asked personality and
demographic questions as a means of obfuscating the measures related to the participants’
feelings of envy, egocentric perceptions of unfairness, and ethical fading. The survey’s questions
that were not related to envy, perceptions of fairness, and ethical fading are modified versions of
those found in the Big Five personality instrument from John and Srivastava (1999). Consistent
with Gino and Pierce (2009), the instructions provided basic information about the Zodiac and
stated that research shows a relationship between one’s judgments and his or her sign. Finally,
the participants were asked to indicate their Zodiac sign and then answer questions related to
their personalities, preferences, and emotions. The Zodiac and Personality Survey is located in
Appendix D.

15

The prompt that the participants were given was independent of their actual performance. Those in the HPG were

advised that they were in the high-tier of earners whereas those in the LPG were told that they were in the lower-tier.
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Step 8: Resume the sale of assets
Steps 3 through 6 are repeated for the remaining 12 rounds (rounds 14 through 25).

Step 9: Word completion task
After the 25th and final round of transactions, the participants were instructed to finish a
word completion task. The word completion task was employed to measure ethical fading.
Consistent with prior studies (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Shu, Mazar, Gino,
Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012), the participants were provided with a list of eight word fragments,
five of which could have been completed using words related to ethics. For example, the
participants could have finished the fragment “TR_ _ _” with the word “trust.” However, the
participants may also have used a neutral word such as “trunk.” The participants were advised to
fill in the blanks using the first word that came to their mind and that no one answer was correct.
In addition, the participants were informed that they would be awarded an additional 250 Credits
for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented individually for which the
participants were provided with only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The word completion
task is listed in Appendix E.

Step 10: Demographic data
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants responded to a questionnaire
that captures demographic data such as gender, major, GPA, and the number of account-related
courses each participant has taken. The demographic questionnaire is listed in Appendix F.
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Step 11: Experiment ends and the participant is paid
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants were advised that the
experiment had ended. The participants were then instructed to write down their selling numbers,
place them into envelopes, and bring those envelopes to the experimenter for payment. Finally,
the experimenter translated the earned Credits into US dollars and the participants were paid.

Manipulated Variable
There was one manipulated variable, pay rate. Random assignment directed each
participant into one of two conditions consisting of a low-pay group (LPG) and a high-pay group
(HPG). Participants were informed of both their group assignment and respective pay rate after
responding to a prompt asking them to choose between one of two images consisting of different
line patterns. Those in the HPG received 50 percent of an asset’s sales price whereas those in the
LPG collected 25 percent. After the 13th round of selling assets, the participants in both the HPG
and LPG were informed that their accumulated Credits thus far place them in either the top or
bottom tier of earners, respectively.

Measured Variables
There were four measured variables in this study, which are perceptions of unfairness,
episodic envy, ethical fading, and fraud (misrepresentation).
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Perceptions of unfairness
Perceived unfairness was captured using a modified version of Smith, Parrott, Ozer, and
Moniz’s (1994) Objective Injustice Beliefs Scale. The four items that comprise the scale are as
follows:
1. “An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the
higher tier of earnings do not deserve those earnings.”
2. “Anyone would agree the people in the higher tier of earnings had an advantage
that was unfairly obtained.”
3. “The people in the higher tier of earnings achieved their advantage through unjust
actions or unjust procedures.”
4. “An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the
higher tier of earnings are there mostly due to luck.”
The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A higher score
indicates the participant perceived the situation as more unfair.
Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007) utilized a similar version of the Objective Injustice
Beliefs scale. They argue that Smith et al.’s (1994) scale was developed explicitly to measure
unfairness in situations involving envy. In addition, this scale operationalizes the “monistic
view” of fairness (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001) in that it examines overall unfairness
perceptions rather than a specific type (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). The items measuring
overall unfairness perceptions were embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey.

Episodic envy
Episodic envy was measured using a modified version of the scale developed in CohenCharash (2009). The seven items that constitute the measurement are as follows:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

“I feel envious now.”
“I feel bitter now.”
“I feel irritated now.”
“I feel resentful now.”
“I lack some things others here have.”
“I feel resentment toward those here who have more than I do.”
“Others here have more things going better for him/her than I do.”

The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A higher score
indicates the participant was experiencing a higher degree of envy.
Gino and Pierce (2009) utilized a similar measurement of episodic envy. Cohen-Charash
(2009) argues that episodic envy is composed of both a “feeling” component and a “comparison”
component. As such, Cohen-Charash (2009) developed and validated the episodic envy measure
across three studies. Questions 1 through 4 capture the feeling component of envy whereas
questions 5 through 7 represent its comparison component. The items measuring envy are
embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey.

Ethical fading
There were two separate ethical fading measurements. The first is a modified version of
the one-item scale utilized in Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and Sousa (2013). An additional
two measures were added for the purpose of creating a more robust measurement. The questions
are as follows:
1. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily economic decisions.”
2. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily financial decisions.”
3. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily business decisions.”
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The items were rated on the degree to which an individual agrees or disagrees with the scenarios,
with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Kouchaki et al.’s (2013)
adapted this measure from Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) to capture how one frames his or her
decision to lie in a deception game. If a person sees the decisions in this task as primarily
economic in nature (i.e., adopts an economics frame), then it conceptually follows that ethical
considerations have faded from his or her decision-making. As such, higher scores represent a
higher degree of ethical fading. This first measure of ethical fading was contained within the
Zodiac and Personality Survey.
Ethical fading was also measured by the participants’ performances in a word completion
task. The participant was given a list of eight word fragments, five of which might have been
completed using words related to ethics. The participants were prompted to fill in the blanks
using the first word that came to their minds and that no one answer is correct. In addition, the
participants were informed that they would be awarded an additional 250 Credits for any
completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented separately and the participants were
allowed only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The eight words used in this experiment were
as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

“M O _ _ _”
“V I _ _ _ _”
“E T _ _ _ _ _”
“H O _ _ _ _”
“T R _ _ _”
“R A _ _ _”
“C H _ _ _ _”
“B I _ _ _”
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Word fragments 1 through 5 are words that can be completed using either an ethics-related word
(e.g., “MORAL,” “VIRTUE,” “ETHICAL,” “HONEST,” and “TRUST”) or a neutral term (e.g.,
“MURAL,” “VIOLET,” “ETERNAL,” “HOUSES,” and “TRACK”). Fragments 6, 7, and 8,
however, cannot be completed with an ethics-related word. A higher degree of ethical fading was
represented by fewer uses of ethics-related words.
Several studies have utilized word completion tasks to measure “moral awareness” (e.g.,
Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Gino et al., 2011; and Shu et al., 2012). Gino et al. (2011) argue that
the ethical implications of a situation are not salient when a person’s moral awareness is
impaired. This is due to the individual’s difficulty in accessing the ethical decision-making script
necessary to act honestly in situations involving the opportunity to cheat for money. As such,
ethical constructs are less likely to be prominent in one’s mind when an ethical decision-making
script is inaccessible. As reviewed in Gino and Bazerman (2009), research suggests that word
completion exercises measure implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving,
Schacter, & Stark, 1982). Thus, such exercises may function as an implicit measure of a person’s
ability to retrieve ethical concepts.

Fraud
The participant’s decision to misrepresent the quality of the asset served as a proxy for
his or her willingness to engage in fraudulent behavior. Fraud was measured by the frequency at
which the participant misrepresented an asset in rounds fourteen through eighteen. The reason
these particular rounds were used is because they follow the Zodiac and Personality Survey,
which itself occurs immediately after the participant was informed that his or her accumulated
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Credits thus far place them in the top (HPG) or bottom tier (LPG) of earners, respectively.
Considering that emotions fade, the rounds immediately following the survey are when the
feelings of the participant with respect to his or her earnings are the most intense.

Control Variable
Gender was included as a control variable in this study. The reviews of the ethical
decision-making literature indicate that the relationship between gender and ethical behavior is
mixed (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As
discussed in Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), some studies suggest that women make more
ethical judgments (e.g., Reiss & Mitra, 1998), some, albeit fewer in number, show men making
more ethical determinations (e.g., Weeks, Moore, McKinney, & Longenecker, 1999), and the
others find no gender differences with respect to ethical decision-making (e.g.,
Abdolmohammadi, Read, & Scarbrough, 2003). O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) conclude that
the more recent literature has consistently failed to demonstrate any gender variations. However,
they, along with Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), state that females tend to be more ethical
than males when differences are found. Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) believe that gender
does have an influence on ethical decision-making and argue that the inconsistent findings across
studies may be the result of the differences between the contexts of those studies. As such,
gender could have an impact on the decision to engage in fraud, especially when considering that
men comprise the biggest percentage of those who commit fraud (ACFE, 2012).
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Results
First Analysis
Participants
The participants were recruited from several upper-level, undergraduate business courses
(e.g., Financial Management, Legal Environment of Business, and other core business classes) at
a public university in the northeast United States. A total of 75 students participated in the
experiment, which was carried out over two separate sessions. The participants, on average,
spent 23 minutes completing the experiment and were paid a total of $6.15, which included a flat
fee of $3 that was independent of their performance. The demographic data in Table 1 show that
the sample consisted of 48 males (64.0 percent) and 27 females (36.0 percent). Several business
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as either accounting or
marketing students (28.0 percent and 20.0 percent, respectively). Finally, 57 students (76.0
percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above.

Manipulation check
After the participant’s assignment to either one of the two conditions (LPG or HPG), he
or she was prompted to answer a manipulation check question regarding his or her group
assignment. Specifically, the question asked the participant to which pay group he or she had
been assigned based on his or her choice of pattern. All 75 participants passed the manipulation
check.
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Hypotheses testing
H1 predicts that a person who is paid less will see this disparity in pay as more unfair
than one who is paid more. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG), Perceived Unfairness as the
outcome/dependent variable, and Gender as the lone covariate (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 =
male). Since higher scores on the Perceived Unfairness questions indicate that the participant
viewed the situation (i.e., the pay disparity) as more unfair, the LPG was expected to have a
higher mean on this measure than the HPG. The results listed in Table 2 (Panel A) reveal that the
LPG’s mean score for the Perceived Unfairness measure (Mean = 2.61, SD = 0.73) was higher
than that of the HPG (Mean = 2.45, SD = 0.83). However, the results in Table 2 (Panel B) show
that this difference was insignificant (p = .28). Thus, H1 is not supported.
The remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the PROCESS add-in to SPSS.
PROCESS is a statistical method that allows testing for “path analysis–based moderation and
mediation analysis as well as their integration in the form of a conditional process model”
(Hayes, 2013, p. 419). In particular, PROCESS has the ability to test serial multiple mediator
models such as the theoretical framework in this chapter. In addition to its capacity to calculate
the direct and indirect effects in mediation models, PROCESS can estimate unstandardized
model coefficients, standards errors, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals utilizing either
OLS regression (for continuous outcomes) or maximum likelihood logistic regression (for
dichotomous outcomes) (Hayes, 2013).
H2 posits that perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of
envy. That is, one is expected to experience a higher degree of episodic envy if he or she views a
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situation as more unfair than another. PROCESS was used to test this hypothesis with Group
(Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG) as the predictor/independent variable, FCL5 (number of frauds
committed in rounds 14 through 18) as the outcome/dependent variable, PU (perceived
unfairness) as the first mediating variable, EE (episodic envy) as the second mediating variable,
EFQ (ethical fading questions) as the third mediating variable, and Gender (gender, coded as 0 =
female, 1 = male) as the single covariate. Similar to the interpretation of the PU measure, higher
scores on the EE measure indicate a greater degree of episodic envy. As such, a positive
coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 3 (Panel A) indicate that when EE is designated
as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive (coeff. = 0.31) and significant (p <
.05). Therefore, H2 is supported.
H3 postulates that feelings of envy because of pay disparity are positively related to the
likelihood of ethical fading. More specifically, a person is expected to be less likely to consider
the ethical implications of his or her decision if he or she is experiencing a greater degree of
episodic envy than another. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the
EFQ questions suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results in Table 3 (Panel B) show
that the relationship between EE and EFQ is positive (coeff. = 0.03), but not significant (p =
.85), when EFQ is designated as the outcome variable. Thus, H3 is not supported.
Ethical fading was also measured by the participant’s performance on a word completion
task (labeled EFW). As such, a second analysis was conducted substituting EFQ for EFW. Since
the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s relationship with EE is
expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results listed on Table 4 (Panel A) do reflect a
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negative (coeff. = -0.06), but insignificant (p = .56), relationship. Thus, H3 is still not supported
when EFW is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure.
H4 states that there is a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical
behavior. In other words, one who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to
be more likely to engage in fraud. As FCL5 captures the number of frauds the participant
committed in rounds 14 through 18, its relationship with EFQ is expected to produce a positive
coefficient. The results from Table 3 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship between EFQ and
FCL5 is positive (coeff. = 0.25), but insignificant (p = .22), when FCL5 is specified as the
outcome variable. Thus, H4 is not supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure.
When EFW is substituted for EFQ as presented in Table 4 (Panel B), the relationship between
fraud and ethical fading is still not significant (p = .73). Although not hypothesized, it is
interesting to note that Gend has a significant relationship with FLC5 (p < .05). The positive
coefficient (coeff. = .81) indicates that men were more likely to misrepresent than women, which
is consistent with the research that suggests women are more ethical when gender differences are
present (see O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
H5 predicts that perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical behavior. In more precise terms, a person who compares his or her pay to a higher-paid
individual is anticipated to view the disparity as more unfair than one who compares his or her
earnings to a lower-paid referent, thus increasing the probability of that individual engaging
fraudulent behavior holding episodic envy and ethical fading constant. The results reported in
Table 5 (Panel A) show that the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior
(FCL5) through perceived unfairness (PU) is not statistically significant with the bootstrapped
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confidence intervals ranging from a low of -.0096 to a high of .2515.16 Thus, H5 is not supported
when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. When EFW is utilized as the ethical fading
measure, the indirect effect (lower-level confidence interval = -.0122, upper-level confidence
interval = .2485) is still not significant as can be seen in Table 6 (Panel A).
H6 postulates that episodic envy mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical conduct. That is, the individual receiving less pay is expected to experience a more
intense feeling of episodic envy and thus more likely to engage in fraud holding perceived
unfairness and ethical fading constant. Table 5 (Panel B) indicates that, when EFQ is used as the
ethical fading measure, the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5)
through episodic envy (EE) is not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence
interval = -.1555, upper-level confidence interval = .2222). H6 is therefore not supported. When
EFW is designated as the ethical fading measure, as shown in Table 6 (Panel B), the indirect
effect is still not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence interval = -.0619,
upper-level confidence interval = .0974).
H7 states that ethical fading mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical action. Specifically, when holding perceived unfairness and episodic envy constant,
one who is paid less is predicted to experience a higher degree of ethical fading, which, in turn,
makes him or her more likely to commit fraud. The results in Table 5 (Panel C) show that the
indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through ethical fading

16

Since the bootstrapped confidence intervals straddle zero, the indirect effects are not statistically significant

(Hayes, 2013). The bootstrap analysis is bias-corrected and based on 10,000 samples. In addition, the intervals and
are set to a confidence level of 90 percent.
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(EPQ) is not statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a
low of -.0126 to a high of .2921. Thus, H6 is not supported when EFQ is specified as the ethical
fading measure. The indirect effect is still not statistically significant from zero (lower-level
confidence interval = -.0567, upper-level confidence interval = .0182) when EFW is designated
as the ethical fading measure, as can be seen in Table 6 (Panel C).

Second Analysis

Participants
A secondary analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified
themselves as accounting majors were removed. Martinov-Bennie & Mladenovic (2015) state
that educators and professionals believe that ethical decision-making should be an essential
component of an accounting student’s education, especially given the corporate scandals of the
early 2000s (e.g., Enron), and thus support the inclusion of ethics-related materials into
accounting curricula. They also discuss research that supports the idea that accounting students’
ethical judgments can be positively affected by interventions such as exposure to the AICPA’s
code of ethics (e.g., Green & Weber, 1997) and the completion of a stand-alone ethics course
(e.g., Cloninger & Selvarajan, 2010). As such, one could argue that the emphasis on ethics in
their curricula results in accounting students being more ethically sensitive, and thus more likely
to behave ethically, than other business students whose respective curriculum does not have this
emphasis.
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Research by Clikeman and Henning (2000) and Sweeney and Costello (2009) support the
argument that accounting majors are more pre-disposed to act ethically than other business
majors. Clikeman and Henning (2000) show that senior accounting students were more strongly
opposed to questionable acts of earnings management than senior students from other business
majors. More recently, Sweeney and Costello (2009) found that the ethical intentions and
judgments of accounting students were significantly higher than those of non-accounting
students across various scenarios. Clikeman and Henning’s (2000) argument for the
“socialization” aspect of accounting education may explain these results. That is, accounting
students are socialized to give “priority to financial statement users' needs, while students
majoring in other business disciplines come to identify more closely with the goals of corporate
managers” (Clikeman and Henning, 2000, p. 1). This argument is similar to Shaub’s (1994)
claim that accounting curricula stresses a rule-based approach that is rooted in ethics. Thus, in
light of the empirical evidence that supports the notion that accounting students are more
inclined to act behave ethically than non-accounting students, the 21 participants (28 percent)
who identified themselves as accounting majors were culled from the analysis.
The participants in this analysis, on average, spent 20 minutes completing the experiment
and were paid a total of $6.21, which included a flat fee of $3 that was independent of their
performance. The demographic data in Table 7 show that the sample consisted of 36 males (66.7
percent) and 18 females (33.3 percent). Several business majors were represented, with most of
the participants identifying as either marketing or finance students (27.8 percent and 16.7
percent, respectively). Finally, 39 students (72.2 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or
above.
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Hypothesis testing
H1 predicts that a person who is paid less will see this disparity in pay as more unfair
than one who is paid more. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG), Perceived Unfairness as the
outcome/dependent variable, and Gender as the lone covariate (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 =
male). Since higher scores on the Perceived Unfairness questions indicate that the participant
viewed the situation (i.e., the pay disparity) as more unfair, the LPG was expected to have a
higher mean on this measure than the HPG. The results listed in Table 8(Panel A) reveal that the
LPG’s mean score for the Perceived Unfairness measure (Mean = 2.81, SD = 0.63) was higher
than that of the HPG (Mean = 2.38, SD = 0.80). The results in Table 8 (Panel B) also show that
this difference was significant (p < .05). Thus, H1 is supported.
Similar to the first analysis, the remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the
PROCESS add-in to SPSS wherein Group (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG) was the designated
predictor/independent variable, FCL5 (number of frauds committed in rounds 14 through 18) the
outcome/dependent variable, PU (perceived unfairness) the first mediating variable, EE (episodic
envy) the second mediating variable, EFQ (ethical fading questions) the third mediating variable,
and Gender (gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) the single covariate. H2 posits that
perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of envy. As with the
interpretation of the PU measure, higher scores on the EE measure indicate a greater degree of
episodic envy. As such, a positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 9 (Panel A)
indicate that when EE is designated as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive
(coeff. = 0.34) and significant (p < .05). Therefore, H2 is supported.
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H3 postulates that feelings of envy because of pay disparity are positively related to the
likelihood of ethical fading. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the
EFG questions suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results in Table 9 (Panel B) show
that the relationship between EE and EFQ is positive (coeff. = 0.34), but not significant (p =
.30), when EFQ is designated as the outcome variable. Thus, H3 is not supported.
As with the first analysis, an alternate measure of ethical fading, EFW, was substituted
for EFQ. Since the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s
relationship with EE is expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results listed on Table 10
(Panel A) do reflect a negative (coeff. = -0.64), but not significant (p = .55), relationship. Thus,
H3 is still not supported when EFW is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure.
H4 states that there is a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical
behavior. In other words, one who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to
be more likely to engage in fraud. As FCL5 captures the number of frauds the participant
committed in rounds 14 through 18, its relationship with EFQ is expected to produce a positive
coefficient. The results from Table 9 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship between EFQ and
FCL5 is positive (coeff. = 0.56) and significant (p < .05) when FCL5 is specified as the outcome
variable. Thus, H4 is supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. However, when
EFW is substituted for EFQ as presented in Table 10 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud
and ethical fading is not significant (p = .92). Again, it is worth noting that Gend has a
significant relationship with FLC5 (p < .01), with the positive coefficient (coeff. = 1.00)
suggesting that men were more likely to misrepresent than women.
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H5 predicts that perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical behavior. The results reported in Table 11 (Panel A) show that the indirect effect of
pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through perceived unfairness (PU) is
statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a low of .0280 to
a high of .8793.17 Thus, H5 is supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. When
EFW is utilized as the ethical fading measure, however, the indirect effect (lower-level
confidence interval = -.0201, upper-level confidence interval = .5535) is not significant as can be
seen in Table 12 (Panel A).
H6 postulates that episodic envy mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical conduct. That is, the individual receiving less pay is expected to experience a more
intense feeling of episodic envy and thus more likely to engage in fraud holding perceived
unfairness and ethical fading constant. Table 11 (Panel B) indicates that, when EFQ is used as
the ethical fading measure, the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior
(FCL5) through episodic envy (EE) is not significantly different from zero (lower-level
confidence interval = -.3328, upper-level confidence interval = .0414). H6 is therefore not
supported. When EFW is designated as the ethical fading measure, as shown in Table 12 (Panel
B), the indirect effect is still not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence interval
= -.2814, upper-level confidence interval = .0694).

17

Since the bootstrapped confidence intervals do not straddle zero, the indirect effects are statistically significant

(Hayes, 2013). The bootstrap analysis is bias-corrected and based on 10,000 samples. In addition, the intervals and
are set to a confidence level of 90 percent.
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H7 states that ethical fading mediates the relationship between pay disparity and
unethical action. Specifically, when holding perceived unfairness and episodic envy constant,
one who is paid less is predicted to experience a higher degree of ethical fading, which, in turn,
makes him or her more likely to commit fraud. The results in Table 11 (Panel C) show that the
indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through ethical fading
(EPQ) is statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a low
of .0127 to a high of .6696. Thus, H6 is supported when EFQ is specified as the ethical fading
measure. However, the indirect effect is not statistically significant from zero (lower-level
confidence interval = -.1840, upper-level confidence interval = .2182) when EFW is designated
as the ethical fading measure, as can be seen in Table 12 (Panel C).

Supplemental Analysis
The lack of support for H3 and H6 could mean that key mediating and/or moderating
variables were excluded from the model that, when included, might lead to significant indirect
effects and would thus warrant episodic envy’s inclusion as an essential construct that mediates
the relationship between pay disparity and fraud. Some of these potential mediating and/or
moderating variables could be individual attributes that research has suggested as important to
the decision-making process such as one’s creativity (e.g., Bierly, Kolodinsky, & Charette,
2009), emotional intelligence (e.g., Deshpande, 2009), and religiosity (e.g., Tang & Chiu, 2003).
Another individual characteristic of potential significance could be one’s preference for risk.
Most of the research in the ethical decision-making literature has focused on the
individual’s perceptions of risks associated with alternative actions or situations (e.g., Cherry &
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Fraedrich, 2002). As such, there is paucity of research that directly examines the influence of an
individuals’ preference for risk on his or her ethical decision-making in a business context,
especially his or her behavior related to misreporting. However, the impact of risk preference on
decision-making, in general, has been studied extensively in the psychology and management
literatures (e.g., Hung & Tangpong, 2012) and it should be expected to affect one’s ethical
decisions in a business scenario. In particular, logic would dictate that one who is risk averse is
less likely to experience ethical fading, and thus less likely to engage in fraud, than a person who
is more risk seeking. Thus, risk preference could be a key variable that moderates that
relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading.
To test the possible moderating effect of risk preference on the relationship between
episodic envy and ethical fading, a PROCESS analysis was conducted using the sample of 54
participants from the second analysis that specified episodic envy (EE) as the predictor, risk
preference (RP) as the mediator, EFQ (ethical fading questions) as the outcome, and Gender
(Gend) as the single covariate. The risk preference measure comes from a question in the Zodiac
and Personality that asks the participant’s general attitude towards risk. That question, “I enjoy
taking risks,” is rated on the degree to which an individual agrees or disagrees with this
statement, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Thus, higher
scores indicate the person is more risk seeking whereas lower scores suggest an aversion to risk.
The results from the PROCESS analysis listed in Table 13 reflect that the effect of the
interaction between risk preference (RP) and episodic envy (EE) on ethical fading (EFQ) is
marginally significant (p = .06). As such, these results suggest that one’s preference for risk has a
moderating effect on the relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading. More
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specifically, Figure 5 shows that when episodic envy is high, those who are more risk neutral
and risk seeking are more likely to experience ethical fading. When episodic envy is low,
however, these differences among risk preferences are more muted. Thus, whether one ethically
fades in response to episodic envy seems to be dependent on the individual’s risk preference.

Discussion
Results from the first analysis indicate that perceptions of unfairness are positively
related to feelings of envy. None of the other hypothesized relationships were supported,
however. A second analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified themselves
as accounting students were extracted from the sample. Consistent with prior literature, the
substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the “socialization” aspect
of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other business majors with respect
to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000;
Sweeney & Costello, 2009). As such, removing accounting students from the sample pool was
appropriate.
The findings from the second analysis imply that an individual paid at a lower rate is
more likely to perceive his or her situation as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy.
Although this feeling of envy had no significant effect on ethical fading, a supplemental analysis
using the sample without the accounting students indicates that a person’s preference for risk
may moderate this relationship. That is when envy is high, those who are more risk neutral and
risk seeking, as opposed to risk averse, are more likely to experience ethical fading. Furthermore,
the findings from the second analysis suggests that those who experience a higher degree of
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ethical fading are more likely to engage in fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived
unfairness, appear to be significant processes that explain how disparities in pay may lead to
fraud.
There are three items to consider when interpreting the results. First, ethical fading was
only significant as a predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when it
was measured utilizing questions about the participant’s framing of the decision (EPQ) rather
than his or her responses to a word completion exercise (EFW). Since ethical fading is a
relatively new construct, more research is needed regarding how to best measure it. The second
consideration should be that, in the supplemental analysis, the moderating effect of risk
preference on the relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading was tested independently
from the overall model. When included in the model, the significance of one’s risk preference as
a moderator may be reduced. Further theorization should be considered to understand the
potential relationships among envy, individual characteristics such as risk preference, and ethical
fading. The third, and final, consideration when interpreting these findings is the substantial
change in the results when those participants who identified themselves as accounting students
were removed from the sample. More research is needed to explore whether the inclusion of
ethics related material in their curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical
fading.

Conclusion
Financial statement fraud has received considerable attention among researchers,
regulators, audit firms, and organizations since the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early
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2000s. Despite extensive organizational and legislative efforts aimed at its deterrence, however,
financial misrepresentation appears to be on the rise (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The
simplistic explanations offered as to one’s motivation for engaging in fraud and the nature of
unethical acts itself may explain the failure to curtail incidents of misreporting thus far. That is,
fraud is believed to be an intentional act by a manager who has sacrificed his or her ethics for
personal gain. Contrary to this conceptualization, the demographic and anecdotal evidence
supports the idea that most fraudsters are the “accidental” type who did not intend to act
unethically yet somehow became entangled in a vicious cycle of concealing their actions (e.g.,
ACFE, 2012). As such, understanding financial statement fraud may require a more nuanced
investigation into the psychological processes underlying a manager’s decision-making.
Murphy and Dacin (2011) argue that environmental factors such as the pressure to meet
earnings expectations of analysts may induce managers to commit fraud without knowing they
are behaving unethically. This lack of awareness is perhaps the result of ethical fading, a
mechanism where one’s inherent psychological constraints, such as biases or heuristics, fade any
moral considerations from the decision-making process. Thus, research with the objective of
identifying the psychological processes that lead to ethical fading, as well as the contextual
factors that trigger those operations, can contribute towards implementing measures that are
more effective at deterring and preventing accounting fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to
investigate how a particular contextual factor, pay disparity among managers, influences
egocentric perceptions of unfairness and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical
fading and fraudulent behavior.
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Based on the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2) it is predicted that a
manager who compares his or her pay to one that is paid more will perceive this disparity as
more unfair than a manager who compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this perception will produce feelings of envy, which in turn
increases the likelihood of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is
paid less. A 1 x 2, between-participants design, with pay rate as the manipulation, was utilized to
test these predictions. The experiment required the participant to sell assets of given values to a
computerized buyer whereupon he or she had the opportunity to misrepresent the quality of those
assets prior to each transaction. The participants’ perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy,
ethical fading, and rate of misrepresentation were measured during this experiment.
The results suggest that a person paid at a lower rate is more likely to view this disparity
as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no significant direct effect
on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis indicates that one’s preference
for risk may moderate this relationship. Furthermore, the primary findings of this chapter
indicate that those who experience a higher degree of ethical fading are more likely to engage in
fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, seem to be significant processes
that explain how disparities in pay may lead to fraud. Ethical fading, however, was only
significant as a predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when one
type of measure was used.
As with any research, this chapter is not without its limitations. The first limitation of this
chapter is that the above outlined results only held when accounting students were removed from
the sample. The substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the
120

“socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other
business majors with respect to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making, which is
consistent with other studies (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009).
Further inquiry is needed to determine whether the inclusion of ethics related material in their
curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical fading.
The second limitation is that the sample is comprised exclusively of upper-level business
students. The generalizability of the results generated from student samples has been
controversial in that the studies examining the ethical decision-making of students compared to
those of professionals has been mixed. One could argue that the education, experience, and
socialization of professionals provide them with the cognitive tools and the motivation to behave
more ethically than students. Conversely, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that the
psychological processes that inhibit ethical behavior are “ordinary” since they “affect even very
honest and smart people, including managers, executives, and other professionals” (p. 45).
Nevertheless, business students as a suitable proxy for experienced workers is an unresolved
question that requires further empirical research.
The third limitation of this chapter is that the ethical fading was only significant as a
predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when it was measured using
questions about how the participant framed his or her decisions rather than his or her responses
to a word completion exercise that has been used successfully in psychology studies. Two
explanations that address the difference in the results produced by the two measures can be
offered. The first reason is that business student may have not yet developed the language skills
that are demanded by a word completion exercise. The second, and perhaps more legitimate
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reason for the difference, is that the word completion exercise was completed after the 25th round
of selling assets as opposed to the alternate ethical fading measure which was closer in time to
the questions regarding the participant’s perceptions of unfairness and feelings of envy. As with
any new construct, how to best measure ethical fading is still unresolved and requires further
research.
The final limitation is that the moderating effect of risk preference on the relationship
between episodic envy and ethical fading was analyzed apart from the overall model given the
constraints of the data. When included in the model, the significance of one’s risk preference as a
moderator may become muted. As such, additional theoretical consideration that includes risk
preference is required to assess its suitability for incorporation into the TUAB (Chapter 2).
Furthermore, future tests of the model may also try to incorporate other individual attributes that
possibly have mediating or moderating effects.
There are two key contributions of this chapter. First, this research identifies some of the
psychological processes suggested by bounded ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an
ethical decision as well as an important contextual factor that provokes those processes. Second,
and probably most importantly, this chapter offers evidence that the decision to commit fraud is
not necessarily a conscious compromise of one’s ethics for some other desired goal (e.g., profit).
In addition, this research may also provide specific contributions to the auditing profession,
organizations, regulators, and research.
Regarding the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors
and psychological processes can lead to unethical behavior may result in improved fraud
detection. Furthermore, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this research suggests
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that auditors might re-evaluate the considerable weight they attach to management’s character
and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. With respect to organizations, an
understanding of bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud controls
aimed at mitigating the contextual factors that prompt ethical fading. In addition, an awareness of
one’s own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically adept in their
ethical decision-making. This chapter also suggests that regulators recognize the difference
between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that drive such bias, if they
are to establish effective legislation aimed at deterring fraud. Finally, this chapter contributes to
research by both serving as an initial test of the TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifying a key
contextual factor that constrains one’s ability to act ethically.
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CHAPTER 4: CAN THE PRESSURE TO MEET EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS
RESULT IN UNINTENTIONAL FINANCIAL FRAUD? (STUDY 3)
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular contextual factor, the pressure
to meet earnings forecasts, may trigger psychology processes such as biases and negative affect
that, in turn, influence the likelihood of one unknowingly engaging fraudulent behavior. The lack
of awareness that one is behaving unethically is the result of a psychological mechanism of
ethical fading wherein the person’s psychological constraints fade any moral considerations from
the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Research indicates that
environmental factors such as sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) can
significantly influence ethical fading in an individual (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). In the accounting
ethics literature, Murphy and Dacin (2011) contend that the pressure to meet earnings
expectations may influence managers to engage in financial statement fraud without their
awareness that they are behaving unethically.
Fraud has received considerable attention among regulators, organizations, audit firms,
and researchers given its exorbitant costs to society. However, incidents of fraud have increased
over the past decade (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) despite legislative efforts, such as the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), aimed at its deterrence and prevention. A
significant factor as to why these efforts have been ineffective in curtailing fraud might stem
from a basic, yet inaccurate, assumption regarding the ethical decision-making that underlies
such behavior. Greed, or some other basic emotion such as fear, is commonly offered as an
explanation as to why managers commit fraud. This explanation is perhaps too simple, however,

since there are many “aggressively acquisitive” individuals who never engage in this behavior
(Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). Contrary to the notion of “predator” fraudsters who look to enrich
themselves through the exploitation of weak accounting controls, the evidence indicates that
“accidental fraudsters” perpetrate a larger number of frauds. As such, fraud may not be the result
of an individual making the intentional decision to forsake his or her morals for some other
desired goal.
An accidental fraudster is characterized as a decent, law-abiding person who, under
typical circumstances, would have never considered committing fraud (Dorminey, Fleming,
Kranacher, & Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012)
suggest most individuals who commit fraud fit such a description in that they are trusted
employees with clean employment histories and no prior criminal offenses. The former chief
accountant for the SEC’s enforcement division, Charles Niemeier, explained that "[p]eople who
never intend to do something wrong end up finding themselves in situations where they are
almost forced to continue to commit fraud once they have started doing this. Otherwise, it will be
revealed that they had used improper accounting in the earlier periods" (quoted from Bazerman,
Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002, p. 100). Thus, understanding financial statement fraud may
require a more nuanced investigation into the psychological processes that leads to a manager’s
decision.
Wyatt (2004) states that many of the FASB standards contain conceptual impurities that
allow for “gaming the system” (p. 52). Supporting this claim, Xu, Taylor, and Dugan’s (2007)
review of the earnings management literature suggests that managers “take advantage of the
accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate accruals through accounting choices and
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estimates” (p. 195). However, as the line between “clever earnings management” and outright
fraud is not necessarily distinct, a manager can be too aggressive in meeting these targets and
engage in fraud without the awareness that he or she is acting unethically (Murphy & Dacin,
2011). The effects of bounded ethicality and ethical fading can explain why some managers may
unwittingly commit fraud in order to meet earnings expectations.
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which
includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, is utilized to predict that a
manager who falls below earnings forecasts will manufacture the egocentric perspective that
unfair circumstances were the reason the target was not met. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that
this egocentric perspective will elicit negative affect, which in turn increases the probability of
ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below earnings estimates.
Finally, a prediction is made that those who are below, yet close, to an earnings target are more
likely to commit fraud than managers who either have already reached the goal or are further
from it.
Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task were conducted to test the predictions.
Across 25 rounds, participants were required to sell an asset to a computerized buyer whereupon
they could earn money on each successful transaction. Before each attempted sale, however, the
participants had the opportunity to misrepresent the value of their assets in order to sell them at
higher prices. Furthermore, the participants were advised that they could earn a bonus if a certain
earnings target was reached. For Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the
participant, who was given one of three earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), was above or
below his or her respective goal after the penultimate round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3
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design where the independent, manipulated variable was the participant’s “closeness to goal”
(i.e., reached, near, or far) before the final round of selling assets. The participants’ egocentric
perceptions, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or
observed across the two experiments.
The primary findings of this chapter, although somewhat mixed, suggest that fraud is
more likely to occur as an individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading. In addition,
the results indicate that those people who are closest to meeting an earnings target carry the
highest probability of engaging in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the findings did not support the
predictions that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect contribute towards
his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting.
Research with the goal of identifying and examining the contextual factors responsible
for ethical fading, as well as the psychological processes that underlie such an operation, can
contribute towards implementing more effective fraud deterrence measures. As such, one of the
main contributions of this chapter is that it identifies a psychological process suggested by
bounded ethicality that limits one’s ability to make an ethical decision as well as an important
contextual element that triggers those processes. That is, ethical fading may occur in response to
the pressure placed on meeting earnings targets. Correspondingly, this chapter provides evidence
that the decision to commit fraud is not necessarily a conscious trade-off between ethics and
some other desired goal (e.g., profit). This research also provides specific contributions to the
auditing profession, managers/organizations, regulators, and research.
In regards to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors
and psychological processes interact to influence unethical behavior may result in improved
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fraud detection. In addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this research
suggests that auditors reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s character
and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. With respect to organizations and
managers, knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud
controls aimed at mitigating the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore,
understanding one’s own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically
prepared when confronted with the decision to engage in accounting fraud. This chapter also
suggests to regulators that recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and
unintentional bias, and the factors that influence such bias, is perhaps needed to establish more
effective fraud deterrents. Finally, this chapter contributes to research by both serving as a test of
TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifying a key contextual factor that limits one’s ability to act
ethically.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
TUAB (Chapter 2) and develops hypotheses from that theory. Section 3 explains the
experimental methods employed to test those hypotheses along with the manipulation and
measurement of the variables. Section 4 analyzes the statistical results and Section 5 discusses
the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter and offers a discussion of the chapter’s
limitations.

Theory and Hypothesis Development
Individuals typically overestimate the extent to which they will engage in socially
acceptable behaviors in the future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), perceive themselves as more ethical
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than their peers (Tenbrunsel, 1998), and view a questionable act as less objectionable when it is
performed by them as opposed to others (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). In addition, research
indicates that people often display “moral hypocrisy” in that they will present themselves as
moral individuals while simultaneously behaving in a self-interested manner (Batson,
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). The behavioral ethics literature offers a
potential explanation, the concept of bounded ethicality, as to how one can violate his or her own
moral standards while upholding the self-image that he or she is an ethical person.
Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) define bounded ethicality as the “systematic and predictable
psychological processes that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are
inconsistent with their own preferred ethics” (p. 7). These processes are comprised of innate
biases and heuristics that constrain ethical decision-making (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005).
In-group favoritism, a tendency to overclaim credit, and implicit forms of prejudice are specific
examples of biases that influence bounded ethicality (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003;
Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological operations occur at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore,
& Bazerman, 2011), the most pernicious aspect of bounded ethicality is it permits one to behave
unethically without his or her awareness of doing so. This is accomplished through the
mechanism of ethical fading wherein the person’s cognitive biases fade any moral considerations
from decision-making (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).
As usual with relatively new fields such as a behavioral ethics, theoretical frameworks
are not very well defined (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Chapter 2 constructed a
theory, TUAB, which incorporates the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, by
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assembling disparate theories from psychology and behavioral ethics into a coherent whole.
What follows is an overview of that theory.

Distinction between the System 1 and System 2 Components of TUAB
Kahneman (2011) differentiates between two modes of cognitive processing, which he
termed System 1 and System 2 thinking. TUAB (Chapter 2) incorporates this distinction to
explain how one may behave unethically under either system of thinking. What follows is a brief
discussion regarding both the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking and how they
will be utilized in this chapter to make predictions about unethical behavior in relation to
earnings targets.
The primary goal of System 1 is to establish links among corresponding ideas of
contexts, actions, and outcomes (Kahneman, 2011). These connections form a working model
that allows one to make sense of his or her environment, form a narrative for that person’s
experiences, and create future expectations. Kahneman (2011) describes System 1 thinking as
automatic, intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. As such, System 1 assesses stimuli
“automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control”
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). One’s intuitions of a situation therefore, are essentially the product of
the primitive assessments carried out by System 1. These intuitions, however, are subject to
systematic errors (i.e., cognitive biases and heuristics) that are embedded within System 1 and
provoked under certain conditions (Kahneman, 2011).
The fundamental objective of System 2 is to oversee the intuitions, intentions,
impressions, and emotions that are continuously suggested by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011).
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System 2 thinking, in contrast to System 1, is characterized as deliberative and capable of
reasoning and self-control (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, as it possesses the ability to resist
the suggestions of System 1, System 2 is considered the final authority in decision-making and
one who can utilize this mode of thinking can theoretically increase his or her chances of acting
ethically (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). System 2 should not be thought of as a perfect model
of rationality, however, due to its “laziness” (Kahneman, 2011). That is, System 2 typically
functions without exerting the effort required to weigh the ethical implications of a decision
(Kahneman, 2011). System 2, instead, often just passively accepts the suggestions of System 1
and, even when it is prompted to put forth more effort, will usually rationalize the emotions
generated in System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). In addition, System 2 should not be thought of as a
perfect model of rationality even when it is critically evaluating System 1’s intuitions due to its
dependence on that system’s biased interpretation of contextual stimuli.
Kahneman’s (2011) dual-process conceptualization is supported across research from
psychology (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007) and accounting (e.g., Farrell, Goh,
& White, 2014). However, whether the majority of unethical behavior occurs under System 1 or
System 2 is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Bazerman and
Tenbrunsel (2011), however, contend that managers often rely on System 1 given the demands of
their work environment. Thus, this chapter utilizes the System 1 component of TUAB (Chapter
2) to make predictions regarding the relationships among earnings targets, biases, emotions,
ethical fading, and fraud. If most unethical behavior actually does occur under System 2, then we
would expect to observe the same emotions and biases activated as in System 1. The key
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difference is that we would expect to see more cognitive effort in one’s decision-making under
System 2.

Overview of the System 1 Component of TUAB
TUAB (Chapter 2) states that quasi-static factors such as one’s organizational
environment and other situational, or task-specific elements, trigger particular biases and
heuristics. Egocentric biases that function to maintain a person’s sense of self-worth are
particularly vulnerable to such contextual stimuli. The need to preserve one’s self-image may
lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli that favor a preferred outcome (Messick & Sentis,
1983) and/or manufactures the perception that the solution which yields the highest benefits to
him or her is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). These primitive evaluations
occur so rapidly, effortlessly, and automatically that the person’s interpretations of contextual
information may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).
Contextual stimuli are not only interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they can
also elicit an emotional reaction (Slovic, 1999). In circumstances where threats to one’s ego
produce negative affect, the person will be motivated to reduce such emotions quickly without
utilizing a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). As such, if engaging in a questionable
behavior alleviates negative affect, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest
that such an act is “good” or “appropriate” in that it is the most emotionally satisfying option.
Thus, the person is inclined to depend on an “affect heuristic” wherein the negative emotions
experienced serves as the basis for his or her judgment. The individual is then likely to substitute
a more difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier one (would this
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decision make me feel better?). Ethical fading occurs since the moral implications of the
alternative decisions are not given any consideration, thus increasing the probability that the
person behaves unethically. TUAB (Chapter 2) is represented by Figure 3. The remainder of this
section elaborates upon this model and utilizes it to make predictions regarding the effects of not
meeting earnings targets on a manager’s likelihood of committing financial statement fraud.

Contextual Stimuli and Biases/Heuristics
Environmental factors can and do influence a person’s ethical actions (Gino & Pierce,
2009). TUAB (Chapter 2) contends that semi-static factors such as one’s organizational climate
interacts with other task-specific or situational elements, such as time pressure, to provoke
certain biases and heuristics. In turn, the elicitation of these mechanisms results in the person
interpreting contextual stimuli not through his or her moral lens, but in a self-interested manner.
A person’s ethical actions are influenced by the environment in which he or she operates (Gino
& Pierce, 2009)
Research indicates that individuals have difficulty interpreting stimuli in an unbiased
manner (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). One’s
assessments, and the subsequent weighting, of environmental information are governed by
egocentric biases that function to preserve his or her sense of self-worth, such as the need to see
him or herself as competent, moral, and deserving (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). The need
to maintain a high self-worth can distort the processing of stimuli in a way that supports a
person’s preference for a particular outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983) and/or manufactures the
idea that the option yielding the highest benefits is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,
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2008). Since one evaluates information automatically and effortlessly (Epley & Caruso, 2004),
that is, assesses the contextual stimuli on the basis of how those factors affect the person’s selfworth, his or her perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji,
2004).

Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations
Bargh and Chartrand (1999) state that the majority of one’s responses, that is, his or her
judgments, behaviors, and decisions, to the environment are directed by how the person relates
the available information to whatever goal he or she is currently pursuing. However, the
motivation that drives goal or task-directed behavior may also elicit egocentric perspective
taking (Wicklund & Steins, 1996), especially when an individual is making judgments related to
the outcomes derived from such behavior. Beauregard and Dunning (2000) found that
participants who “failed” an experimental task, an ego-threatening event, were more likely to
judge a target's intelligence based on how that target's performance compared with their own
than those individuals who did not fail the task. Furthermore, Libby and Rennekamp’s (2012)
results demonstrate that when an individual performs well, a positive outcome, he or she is likely
to engage in self-attribution wherein he or she gives greater weight to internal factors rather than
external ones as explanations for his or her performance. Evaluations regarding the fairness of
goal outcomes (i.e., goal attainment or goal failure), along with the processes that lead to those
outcomes, are also subject to egocentric interpretations. Supporting this claim, Blanthorne and
Kaplan (2008) note that research across psychology (Epley & Caruso, 2004; Messick & Sentis,
1979), organizational behavior (Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992),
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and accounting (Kachelmeier & Towry, 2002; Kaplan, 2001; Luft & Libby, 1997) indicates that
individuals have a tendency to display egocentric perceptions of fairness and ethics.
Biases can be exaggerated under conditions of uncertainty (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel,
2011), which the interpretation of accounting standards can produce. As such, translating the
above ideas into the terminology of bounded ethicality, the possible failure of not meeting
earnings forecasts serves as a contextual factor that triggers the manager’s egocentric biases
related to self-worth. One’s sense of both competency and deservingness as a manager may feel
threatened if his or her company is unlikely to achieve these targets. However, if a manager is
able to meet earnings expectations by pushing beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP, then
he or she is likely to prefer such an option because of the desire to maintain his or her sense of
self-worth. Accordingly, the manager will subconsciously search and place more emphasis on
the evidence which supports the decision to violate GAAP while evaluating more critically, or
completely discounting, the evidence which does not support that option. Moreover, as a means
to further protect his or her self-worth, the manager will manufacture an egocentric perspective
that he or she was placed at a disadvantage and the “fair” solution is the one that will yield the
deserved benefits associated with meeting earnings targets. Thus, the first hypothesis is stated as:
H1: A manager who falls below earnings expectations will display a higher
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than a
manager that has already met earnings expectations.
Biases/Heuristics and Affect-laden Intuition
Along with distorting a person’s perceptions and interpretations of stimuli, TUAB
(Chapter 2) predicts that provoking egocentric biases related to self-worth will elicit negative
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affect. When experiencing such emotions, the individual is motivated to diminish those feelings
without engaging in a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, since visceral
impulses typically dominate at the time one is making a decision (Loewenstein, 1996), the
person may rely on his or her “affect-laden intuition” (i.e., gut feeling) to determine whether
potentially unethical actions are suitable responses to a dilemma (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Consequently, he or she will utilize an “affect heuristic,” a mental shortcut whereupon the
person’s intuition, formed by the quick and automatic emotions that precede cognition, serves as
the basis to guide his or her behaviors and/or decisions (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane,
Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).

Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) posits that outcomes that exceed a
reference point are considered psychological gains and those below are losses. Experiencing a
loss from falling below a reference point, or target, evokes strong, negative emotions
(Kahneman, 2011). This is consistent with the Unfolding Emotion Episode Theory (Stein,
Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993) which states that a change in the status of a valued goal will trigger
emotional reactions (Cron, Slocum, VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005). Specifically, one who has
expended some amount of effort to achieve a goal of personal importance will experience
positive emotions when that goal is achieved. Conversely, not achieving that goal will elicit
negative emotions. Aarts, Custers, and Holland (2007) point to literature (Carver & Scheier,
1998; Higgins, 1998; Martin & Tesser, 1996) which suggests that failure events, such as goal
disconfirmation, can trigger a variety of distinct, individual-dependent emotional reactions. As
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discussed in Cron et al., (2005), these emotions can range from anger and sadness (Williams,
Donovan, & Dodge, 2000) to general discomfort (Ilgen & Davis, 2000). In addition to the
emotional response when one fails to achieve a target, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) argue
that the person’s emotions are influenced by whether he or she views a particular outcome as
fair. Research from the procedural justice literature supports this claim (e.g., Krehbiel &
Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999).
In terms of bounded ethicality, earnings forecasts serve as a natural reference point for
management (Murphy & Dacin, 2011) and not meeting them, along with the forfeiture of
benefits (e.g., stock options) that are normally associated with reaching such goals, registers as a
psychological loss for a manager. That is, not achieving the critical goal of meeting earnings
targets, the contextual stimuli, suggests to the manager that he or she is not suited for a
management position, thus producing negative affect. Additionally, the manager’s egocentrically
manufactured perspective of having been placed in an unfair situation will elicit a negative
emotional response. Thus, the second hypothesis is stated as:
H2: Egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings
expectations are positively related to the intensity of negative affect.
Affect-laden Intuition, Ethical Fading, and Unethical Behavior
As discussed above, one involved in a dilemma will be motivated to reduce
negative emotions promptly without engaging in a more effortful thought process
(Kahneman, 2011). Thus, visceral responses tend to dominate during decision-making
(Loewenstein, 1996). The individual will correspondingly rely on his or her affect-laden
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moral intuition to determine whether a potentially unethical action is acceptable and
employs an affect heuristic to guide decision-making.
Haidt (2001) argues that quick intuition often comes before moral judgment. This
may be due to one’s reliance on an affect heuristic. Kahneman (2011) states that this
heuristic is an instance of substation whereupon a more cognitively taxing question (what
is the ethical or proper action?) is replaced with a less demanding one (would this
decision make me feel better?). Therefore, how the person feels towards the alternative
decisions will determine whether he or she engages in ethical fading (Chapter 2).
Individuals are overconfident and thus biased toward their intuitions formed from
automatic processes such as the affect heuristic (Kahneman, 2011). As such, TUAB
(Chapter 2) posits that a well-reasoned, conscious decision to forsake one’s ethics is not
what necessarily drives behavior. Rather, a person’s actions in an ethical dilemma seem
more like an “emotional reflex” that is controlled by automatic and biased cognitive
mechanisms. Thus, if a potentially unethical behavior may diminish the negative affect
experienced in a particular dilemma, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is
expected to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at minimum, “suitable,” since it is the
most emotionally attractive. The desire to satisfy visceral impulses may result in ethical
fading, an instance where the “moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues
that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 224). Finally,
TUAB (Chapter 2) claims that the probability of one subconsciously engaging in
unethical behavior increases under instances of ethical fading.
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Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations
Barsky (2008) and Moore (2008) argue that moral disengagement, a concept
related to ethical fading, may be a significant factor in organizational corruption.18
Barsky’s (2008) theoretical model posits that certain attributes of goals and goal-setting
practices can lead to unethical behavior through moral disengagement. Research also
indicates that negative emotions are a significant moderator in the relationships among
stimuli such as goal orientation, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In their
examination regarding the role of negative emotion in moderating goal-priming effects,
Aarts et al. (2007), identify research that suggests affective processes can influence one’s
motivated actions without reaching his or her conscious awareness (Damasio, 1994;
Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Fazio, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Furthermore,
Samnani, Salamon, and Singh’s (2013) results suggest that moral disengagement
moderates the relationship between negative emotions and counterproductive work
behaviors. Finally, a multilevel study of student teams indicates that negative affect (i.e.,

18

The distinction between moral disengagement and ethical fading has yet to be established to the best of my

knowledge. Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer (2011), however, argue that Bandura (2002) conceptualizes
moral disengagement as an individual trait wherein the inclination to use processes of disengagement vary across
people. One can infer from this conceptualization that morally disengaging in an ethical dilemma is a conscious,
deliberate strategy utilized by the decision maker. In contrast, ethical fading is the effect of a subconscious process
determined by biases inherent in everyone. Thus, there is not “conscious” decision to fade the implications from
one’s decision.
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envy) has an indirect effect on social undermining through moral disengagement (Duffy,
Scott, Shaw, Tepper & Aquino, 2012).
Applying TUAB (Chapter 2), a manager is likely to depend on his or her affectladen intuition and thus utilize an affect heuristic wherein the negative emotions
produced by not meeting earnings forecasts serve as the basis to guide his or her decision.
Consequently, the manager automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is ethical
or in accordance with GAAP?) with an easier one (how does choosing this particular
option make me feel?). At this point, ethical fading has transpired. As such, the third
hypothesis is stated as:
H3: Negative affect resulting from not meeting an earnings target is positively
related to the likelihood of ethical fading.
Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that a person’s ethical actions are influenced by his
or her environment. Quasi-static factors such as incentive systems (Flannery & May,
2000; Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Treviño &
Youngblood, 1990), norms and culture (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), and
codes of conduct (Cressey & Moore, 1983; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990; Weaver,
Treviño, & Cochran, 1999) have been identified as organizational elements that affect
ethical behavior within organizations (Gino & Pierce, 2009, Schweitzer, Ordóñez, &
Douma, 2004). In addition, Kern and Chugh’s (2009) results indicate that situational, or
task-specific, features such as time pressure may impel unethical conduct. Recently, the
pernicious effects of organizational goal setting, in particular, have gained some attention
in the management literature (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, and Bazerman, 2009).
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Jensen (2003) claims that cheating and lying are natural consequences that arise
when rewards are linked to the achievement of goals. Correspondingly, Barsky’s (2008)
theoretical model postulates that goal setting can hinder ethical decision-making. The
results of Schweitzer et al. (2004) support the contentions of Jensen (1993) and Barsky
(2008). They found that individuals with unmet goals were more likely to engage in
unethical behavior than those who were only advised to do their best. These results held
even when there was no economic incentive attached to goal achievement. Furthermore,
the findings of Schweitzer et al. (2004) suggest that the proximity to a goal is an
important determinant of one’s behavior. They theorized that a person who is close to, as
opposed to further away from, achieving a goal will incur higher psychological costs (in
terms of negative emotions) if he or she fails to reach that goal and, as a result, is more
inclined to behave unethically. Supporting this notion, Schweitzer et al. (2004)
discovered that individuals who were closer to reaching a goal were more likely to
overstate their performance than those who were more distant. The use of organizational
goal setting has also been associated with falsifying financial reports (Degeorge, Patel, &
Zeckhauser, 1999; Schweitzer et al., 2004).
Kaplan, McElroy, Ravenscroft, and Shrader (2007) argue that the intense focus to
meet earnings targets can lead to dysfunctional conduct, including the manipulation of
recorded earnings (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013). As such, Meyers, Meyers, and
Skinner (2006) state that a manager who is unwilling to report a decline in earnings per
share (EPS) is compelled to engage in aggressive accounting choices, which, in the most
severe cases, results in financial statement fraud. Myers et al. (2006) point to the ex post
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evidence on fraud provided by studies of both SEC enforcement actions and earnings
restatements as support for their claim. In addition, Bell and Carcello’s (2000)
comparison of fraud to non-fraud companies indicates that management’s overemphasis
on meeting earnings estimates increases the probability of fraudulent financial reporting.
Soltani (2013), utilizing a qualitative, comparative analysis of three American (Enron,
WorldCom, and HealthSouth) and three European organizations culpable of fraud
(Parmalat, Royal Ahold, and Vivendi Universal), discovered that the management of
these companies made increasingly aggressive estimates and made aggressive accounting
choices to match those unrealistic analyst targets they helped promote. Finally, Boylan’s
(2012) experimental results show that individuals with higher earnings targets produce
larger errors in estimates of profitability and asset values, even despite financial
incentives to produce the most accurate estimate possible and the absence of such
incentives to manipulate those numbers. Boylan (2012) concludes “earnings targets
affected managers' judgment about amounts to be reported in the financial statements,
and led to sub-conscious biases that produced results causing managers' estimates to be
erroneously correlated with external earnings targets” (p. 209, emphasis in original). This
inference is consistent with Barsky’s (2008) model that theorizes moral disengagement as
a moderating factor between goal setting and unethical behavior such as misreporting.
Since ethical fading is a relatively new concept, there is a dearth of studies
examining this mechanism. However, empirical research on moral disengagement
supports the hypothesized link between ethical fading and unethical behavior. For
example, Deter, Treviño, and Sweitzer’s (2008) results indicate a positive relationship
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between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making. In addition, Moore et al.,
(2012) utilized both experimental and field settings to explore the effect of moral
disengagement on various types of unethical conduct within organizations. Moore et al.
(2012) found that one’s inclination towards moral disengagement is a strong predictor of
unethical behavior, such as the decision to engage in fraud, and more significant than
other antecedents of unethical actions that are related to individual differences.
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager who
falls below earnings forecasts will employ an affect heuristic where negative affect serves as the
basis to guide his or her decision. As such, the manager will automatically substitute a difficult
question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier one (how does choosing this
particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading, at this point, has transpired whereupon the
manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests the act that quells any negative emotion in this
particular scenario is the most appropriate, including behavior considered unethical. When
confronted with the opportunity to meet earnings targets by engaging in financial statement
fraud, a manager is likely to push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP. This is because
contravening GAAP would be the most emotionally appealing action since it adjusts for the
manager’s negative emotions resulting from the perceived unfairness of the situations and the
threatened sense of self-worth. Furthermore, managers who are the closest to meeting an
earnings goal will incur the highest psychological costs (i.e., negative affect) if they fail to reach
that target and will thus be the most likely individuals to engage in fraud. As such, TUAB
predicts the following:
H4: Ethical fading is positively related to the likelihood of engaging in unethical
behavior (i.e., fraud).
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H5: A manager that has not met earnings expectations is more likely to engage in
unethical behavior (i.e., financial statement fraud) than one that has already
met those expectations.
H6: A manager that is close to meeting earnings expectations, but still below that
target, is more likely to engage in unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) than one
that either is further from the target or has already met the target.
Methods
Two experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. Experiment 1 was designed to
test H1 through H5 whereas Experiment 2 was devised to test H6. Both experiments consisted of
modified versions of the procedures employed in Schwartz and Wallin (2002) wherein the
participant’s task, across all groups, was to sell an “asset” to a computerized buyer. In sum, the
participants had to determine both how to disclose the quality of an asset and its price before
each attempted sale. Since the participants would earn money from each successful transaction,
there existed an incentive for them to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that selling
assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in larger payouts. The misrepresentation of
an asset’s quality served as a proxy for one’s willingness to manipulate financial statements.
Furthermore, across both studies, the participants were advised that they could earn a bonus if a
certain earnings goal was attained. For Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the
participant, who was provided one of three earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), was above
or below his or her respective goal after the penultimate round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3
design where the independent, manipulated variable was the participant’s “closeness to goal”
(i.e., reached, near, or far) before the final round of selling assets.
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Experiment 1
Experimental Procedure
What follows is a detailed explanation of the experimental procedure. The participants
interfaced with a computer for all aspects of the experiment except when receiving the task
instructions and collecting their cash payout from the study administrator. Figure 6 shows the
chronological order of the procedure.

Step 1: Role assignment and Instructions Regarding Experiment
The experiment began with informing the participants that they had been assigned the
role of sellers with corresponding identification numbers. The study administrator then asked the
participants what role they had been given while reviewing two sets of color-coded instructions.
The purpose of this action was to intimate that other roles, such as a buyer, were possible.19 The
study administrator then read the instructions aloud to the participants. First, the participants
were asked to raise their hand if there were any questions about the instructions. Next, the
participants were notified they would be provided with information regarding the names,
qualities, and value-ranges of assets to be sold. The instructions then advised the participants that
their task, for 25 rounds, is to sell the assets in an online marketplace.
19

An open-ended question, across both experiments, was asked regarding the participants’ opinions as to where the

sellers were located. Of the 90 individuals who participated in Experiment 1, only 2 suggested that the buyers were
part of a computer program. For Experiment 2, this belief was shared by five of the 82 participants. These
participants’ responses were included in the analysis since the difference in the results between including and
excluding their data was insignificant.
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In regards to selling assets, the instructions stated that the participants must determine
both the price of each asset and how to disclose its quality before entering the marketplace. For
example, if a participant is given an Epsilon asset of average quality with a value between 400 to
500 Credits20, then he or she could change its “average quality” designation to “above average”
if he or she feels that the original estimate was inaccurate. The value-range of the asset moved in
relation with any changes to an asset’s quality. As such, changing an asset of “average quality”
to “above average” in the example above would have shifted the value-range from 400 to 500
Credits to 450 to 550 Credits. The participants were then informed that they must determine a
price, within the value-range, at which to sell each asset (e.g., 550 Credits). Finally, with respect
to the asset-selling task, the participants were advised that the others in this study did not have
access to any information regarding their decisions on pricing and disclosing the assets, that any
offer could be declined, and that more Credits could be earned by selling assets with higher
disclosed values.
Next, the participants were told that an audit, with a variable success rate of detection,
may occur following the sale of each asset. For example, the probability of a successful detection
for a “poor quality” asset disclosed as “excellent quality” was higher than that same asset
disclosed as “average quality.” Furthermore, the participants were informed that a successful
audit, that is, where a misrepresentation is detected, would result in a fine of 2000 Credits and
that they would lose any Credits gained from the previous transaction. The participants were then
advised that they would be awarded a 3,000-Credit bonus if a particular number of earned
Credits is reached. Furthermore, the participants were notified that this target, which will be

20

A Credit is a fictional currency used in both experiments.
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provided to them later in the study, is believed to be reasonable and has been derived so that
most individuals are awarded the bonus.
The participants were subsequently informed that, after the 24th round, they would be
updated on their respective progress towards meeting the earned Credits necessary to receive the
bonus and, following this update, will be asked to complete a survey. The instructions then stated
that the participants would be prompted to engage in a “word completion’ exercise, for which
additional Credits could be earned, after the final round. The participants were also notified that
any Credits earned from both the asset-selling task (minus any assessed penalties) and the word
completion exercise would be converted to US dollars and paid out upon completion of the
experiment. The conversion rate of Credits to US dollars was not provided, but the participants
were told that the rate is positive.21 The participants were then advised that they would be
prompted to write down their identification numbers, place them in envelopes, and bring those
envelopes to the experimenter for payment at the end of the study. Finally, the participants were
asked to confirm that they understand the task and click the “Begin Task” link on the computer
screen. A list of the instructions is located in Appendix A.

Step 2: Group Assignment and Earnings Target
Upon finishing Step 1, the participants were randomly assigned to either the “easy target”
group (ETG), the “moderately difficult target” group (MDTG), or the “difficult target” group
(DTG) and provided with the earnings target (8,000, 12,000, or 16,000 Credits for the ETG,
MDTG, and DTG, respectively) required to receive the bonus.
21

The conversion rate was 1 Credit = 0.0002 US Dollars.
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Step 3: Asset Quality Information
The task of selling assets began as the participants were provided information about the
asset. In particular, they were given an asset’s name, quality, and value range.22 For each round,
the asset’s information was the same for all participants. In addition, there was a disclaimer
stating that determining the asset’s actual quality and value-range is subjective. Furthermore,
there was a header at the top of the screen showing the current round, the total amount of Credits
the participant had earned, his or her identification number and his or her respective earnings
target. This header was constant throughout the asset-selling task. Another icon showing the
date, time, and the number of “buyers” online (a random number between 700 and 799) was also
shown at the top of the screen throughout the asset-selling task.

Step 4: Disclosing and Pricing of Asset
The participants then had to decide how to disclose the value of the asset to the
marketplace. Once finished, the participants were prompted to enter the marketplace to sell their
asset.

22

Each asset is named after a letter in the Greek alphabet (e.g., “Epsilon”). The letters Alpha, Beta, and Omega are

not used as they may imply a position within a hierarchy or a value in relation to another. There are five quality
designations, which are “poor,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,” and “excellent.”
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Step 5: Sale of Asset
Once in the marketplace, the participants were advised that Buyer “X”, with the X
representing a random letter and three-digit number, either purchased or declined to buy the
assets. The buyer was an algorithm with Qualtrics set to where each transaction has an 80
percent probability of success and, accordingly, a 20 percent chance of failure. It is important to
note, however, that the participants were not told the buyer was an algorithm. In fact, no
information was provided about the buyers throughout the experiment. The intent of not
providing buyer information to the participants, along with establishing the possibility of an
unsuccessful sale, was to create the impression that the sellers were transacting with other
individuals. After each successful transaction, the participants’ balances were updated to reflect
the Credits received from any successful transaction.

Step 6: Audit of Transaction
An algorithm determined whether an audit was conducted and, if so, its success in having
detected a misrepresentation of an asset’s quality. The chance of an audit occurring was 25
percent regardless of whether, or to what degree, the participant misrepresented the asset. If an
audit did occur, however, then the degree to which the participant misreported the asset’s quality
determined the probability of a successful detection. Specifically, the probability of detection
increased by a constant 20 percent for each level of quality reported above that which was given.
For example, if an audit occurred in which the participant sold an asset with a “poor quality”
designation, then he or she would have faced a 20, 40, 60, or 80 percent probability of detection
had the asset been disclosed as below average, average, above average, or excellent, respectively.
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Whether or not an audit was conducted and, if so, its results were communicated to the
participants. Furthermore, the participants were informed about any penalties levied (2000
Credits) from any audits that successfully detected a misrepresentation of quality. Finally, the
round ended after the participants’ earnings were updated to reflect any assessed penalty. Steps 3
through 6 were repeated for another 23 rounds.

Step 7: Update of Progress towards Earnings Target
After the 24th round of selling assets, the participants were updated on their respective
progress towards meeting the earnings benchmark required to receive a bonus. The participants
were then provided with the information of the asset to be sold in the final round (25th round).
Finally, the participants were prompted to answer a manipulation check question. This question
required the participants to indicate whether they had met the earnings target required for the
bonus.

Step 8: Zodiac and Personality Survey
The participants were then prompted to complete a variation of the Zodiac and
Personality Survey utilized by Gino and Pierce (2009). This survey asked personality and
demographic questions as a means of obfuscating the measures related to the participants’
egocentric perceptions of fairness, negative affect, and ethical fading. The survey’s questions
that were not related to these measures were modified versions of those found in the Big Five
personality instrument from John and Srivastava (1999). Consistent with Gino and Pierce (2009),
the instructions provided basic information about the Zodiac and stated that research shows a
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relationship between one’s judgments and his or her sign. Finally, the participants were asked to
indicate their Zodiac sign and then answer questions related to their personality, preferences, and
emotions. The Zodiac and Personality Survey is located in Appendix B.

Step 9: Resume the Sale of Assets
Steps 3 through 6 were repeated for the 25th and final round.

Step 10: Word Completion Task
After the 25th round of transactions, the participants were instructed to finish a word
completion task, which served as another measure of ethical fading. Similar to prior studies
(Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012), the
participants were provided with a list of word fragments (a total of eight) of which some (five of
the eight fragments) could be completed using words related to ethics. For example, the
participants could have finished the fragment “E T _ _ _ _ _” with the word “ethical.” However,
the participants could have also use a neutral word, such as “eternal,” to complete the fragment.
The participants were advised to fill in the blanks using the first word that came to their mind
and that no one answer was correct. In addition, the participants were informed that an additional
250 Credits could be earned for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented
individually for which the participants were allowed 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The
word completion task is listed in Appendix C.
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Step 11: Demographic Data
After finishing the word completion task, the participants completed a questionnaire that
captured demographic data such as gender, undergraduate major, GPA, and the number of
accounting-related courses taken thus far. The demographic questionnaire is listed in Appendix
D.

Step 12: Experiment Ends and the Participant is Paid
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants were informed that the
experiment was over. The participants were then instructed to write down their respective
identification numbers, place them into envelopes, and bring those envelopes to the experimenter
for payment. Finally, the experimenter translated the earned Credits into US dollars and the
participants were paid.

Independent Variable
Random assignment directed each participant into either the “easy target” group
(ETG), the “moderately difficult target” group (MDTG), or the “difficult target” group
(DTG). The earnings goal needed to acquire the bonus varied across the three groups,
established at 8,000, 12,000, and 16,000 Credits for the ETG, MDTG, and DTG,
respectively. These benchmarks were derived so that approximately half of the
participants would, based on their “natural” performance, finish below their respective
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earnings target whereas the other half would reach their goal. 23 As such, the independent
variable was whether the participant was above (ATG) or below his or her respective
target (BTG) after the penultimate round of selling assets (Round 24).

Measured Variables
There were four measured variables in this experiment: egocentric perceptions of
fairness, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraud. These four measures along with control
variables are discussed in the following sub-sections.

Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness
Egocentric perceptions of fairness regarding meeting or not meeting the earnings
benchmark was captured using modified versions of the questions used in Gelfand et al. (2002).
Participants were first asked to rate how fair, trustworthy, and honest they had been during the
task. Those three questions are as follows:
1. “Overall, I would rate the fairness of my actions in the marketplace as…”
2. “Overall, I would rate the trustworthiness of my actions in the marketplace as…”
3. “Overall, I would rate the honesty of my actions in the marketplace as…”

The participants were then asked to rate how fair, trustworthy, and honest they believe the other
participants were during the task. Those three questions:
1. “Overall, I would rate the fairness of others’ actions in the marketplace as…”
2. “Overall, I would rate the trustworthiness of others’ actions in the marketplace
as…”
23

The different levels of earnings targets were derived from pilot testing.
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3. “Overall, I would rate the honesty of others’ actions in the marketplace as…”
The scales ranged from 1 (very unfair/untrustworthy/dishonest) to 5 (very
fair/trustworthy/honest). Consistent with Gelfand et al. (2002) and Messick, Bloom, Boldizar,
and Samuelson (1985), an overall measure of self-serving bias is derived by subtracting the
participant’s average estimation of others’ fairness, trustworthiness, and honesty from their own.
Thus, a positive score reflects the degree to which the participant held egocentric perceptions of
fairness. The items measuring perceived fairness were embedded within the Zodiac and
Personality Survey.

Negative Affect
Negative affect was measured using a modified version of the scale utilized in Cron,
Slocum, VandeWalle, Fu (2005). The ten items that constitute the measurement are as follows:
1. “Because of my performance, I feel angry now.”
2. “Because of my performance, I feel frustrated now.”
3. “Because of my performance, I feel guilt now.”
4. “Because of my performance, I feel shame now.”
5. “Because of my performance, I feel sad now.”
6. “Because of my performance, I feel disappointed now.”
7. “Because of my performance, I feel depressed now.”
8. “Because of my performance, I feel worried now.”
9. “Because of my performance, I feel uncomfortable now.”
10. “Because of my performance, I feel fearful now.”
The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scores
across all ten items were averaged. A higher score indicates the participant is experiencing a
higher degree of general, negative affect.
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Cron et al.’s (2005) measure of negative affect is based on a segment from Bagozzi and
Pieters’ (1998) instrument of goal-directed emotional reactions. As discussed in Cron et al.
(2005), this measure has been used in several goal-setting studies (Brown, Cron, & Slocum,
1997; Huy, 2002; Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001; Perugini & Conner, 2000). This measure is argued
to capture appropriate goal-directed emotions (Cron et al, 2005), which focus on “event-based”
and “agent-based” reactions (Huy, 2002). Cron et al. (2005) explain that an event-based emotion
is a reaction to an event, or outcome, that is evaluated based on the implications regarding the
attainment of one’s goal. An agent-based emotion is a response to the actions of an agent, which
can include the self, in the form of a judgment of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. The
items measuring negative affect were embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey.

Ethical Fading
There were two separate ethical fading measurements. The first is a modified version of
the one-item scale employed in Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and Sousa (2013). An additional
two measures were added to create a more robust measurement. The questions are as follows:
1. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily economic decisions.”
2. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily financial decisions.”
3. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine
their price in this task are primarily business decisions.”
The items are rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the situation,
with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Kouchaki et al.’s (2013)
adapted this measure from Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) to capture the participant’s framing of
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his or her decision on whether to lie for money in a deception game. Conceptually, if one sees
the decisions in this task as primarily financial in nature (i.e., adopts an economics frame), then it
follows that ethical considerations have faded from his or her decision-making. Thus, higher
scores represent a higher degree of ethical fading. This first measure of ethical fading was
embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey.
Ethical fading was also measured with the participant’s performance on a word
completion task. The participant was provided with a list of eight word fragments, five of which
may be completed using words related to ethics. The participant was asked to fill in the blanks
using the first word that came to his or her mind and that no single answer was correct. In
addition, the participant was informed that he or she would be awarded an additional 250 Credits
for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented individually for which the
participant was provided with only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The eight words
utilized in this experiment were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

“M O _ _ _”
“V I _ _ _ _”
“E T _ _ _ _ _”
“H O _ _ _ _”
“T R _ _ _”
“R A _ _ _”
“C H _ _ _ _”
“B I _ _ _”

Word fragments 1 through 5 represent words that can be completed using either an ethics-related
word (e.g., “MORAL,” “VIRTUE,” “ETHICAL,” “HONEST,” and “TRUST”) or a neutral term
(e.g., “MOTEL,” “VISION,” “ETERNAL,” “HORSES,” and “TRAIN”). Fragments 6, 7, and 8,
however, cannot be completed with an ethics-related word. A higher degree of ethical fading is
represented by fewer uses of ethics-related words.
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The use of word completion tasks to measure “moral awareness” has been used in several
studies (e.g., Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Gino et al., 2011; and Shu et al., 2012). Gino et al. (2011)
contend that one fails to recognize the ethical component of a situation when his or her moral
awareness is impaired. This failure renders the individual unable to access the ethical decisionmaking script required to act honestly in scenarios where he or she may cheat to earn money.
Thus, ethical constructs are less likely to be salient in a person’s mind when an ethical decisionmaking script is inaccessible. As discussed in Gino and Bazerman (2009), research suggests that
word completion exercises assess implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving,
Schacter, & Stark, 1982). As such, a word completion task where the fragments can be
completed using terms related to ethics may function as an implicit measure of one’s ability to
retrieve ethical concepts.

Fraud
The participant’s decision to misrepresent the quality of the asset in the final round
served as a measurement for his or her willingness to engage in fraudulent behavior. The
potential failure of not reaching the goal in this experiment is structured to elicit the same
theorized biases and negative affect (i.e., pressures) experienced by one who is below meeting
earnings expectations but can meet that target by engaging in financial statement fraud.

Control Variables
There were two control variables utilized in Experiment 1, the number of times the
participant was fined for misrepresentation in the first 24 rounds of selling assets and his or her
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gender. The former’s inclusion was justified on the belief that a participant’s experience with
being fined in the previous 24 rounds might make him or her more risk averse and thus less
likely to engage in fraud in the final round. With respect to gender, there has been an extensive
amount of literature examining its relationship with ethical decision-making, but this research
has produced mixed results (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & SmithCrowe, 2008). However, Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) believe that gender is likely to
have an impact on ethical behavior and argue that these inconsistent findings are possibly the
result of the different experimental settings across the literature. As such, given that men
comprise the biggest percentage of those who commit fraud (ACFE, 2010), it is possible that
one’s gender might have a significant influence on his or her decision to engage in fraudulent
behavior in a goal-setting context.

Experiment 2
The experimental procedure used in Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1,
with one key exception. In Experiment 1, the participants were informed of the Credits they
would need to earn in order to receive a bonus immediately following the instructions. In
Experiment 2, however, the participants were not notified of the Credits required to earn a bonus
until after the 24th round of selling assets. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, the participants were
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, the “close-to-goal” group (CTG), the “farfrom-goal” group (FFG) and the “reached goal” group (RG).24 The participants in the RG were
24

Unlike the first experiment, condition assignment was independent of the participant’s performance in the

previous 24 rounds.
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advised that, after 24 rounds, they had already achieved the earnings necessary to receive the
3000 Credit bonus whereas those in the FFG group were provided with such a distance that,
even if they had misrepresented the asset in the final round to the most extreme degree, they
would have not been able to reach the target. Finally, the participants in the CTG were provided
with a distance that was below the required goal, but could be reached if they misrepresented the
quality of the asset in the final round by two levels (i.e., misrepresent an asset of average quality
as excellent).

Results
Experiment 1
First Analysis
Participants
The participants for Experiment 1 were recruited from several upper-level, undergraduate
business classes (e.g., Financial Management) at a public university in the northeast United
States. Eighty-two students participated in Experiment 1, which was carried out over three
separate sessions. In order to create equal cells, fourteen students removed from the below target
group (BTG) utilizing a random number generator similar to that in Lyubimov, Arnold, and
Sutton (2013). The remaining sixty-eight participants, on average, spent 23 minutes completing
the experiment and were paid a total of $6.07, which included a flat fee of $3 that was
independent of their performance.
The demographic data for Experiment 1 is listed in Table 14. The data reveals that the
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sample consisted of 45 males (66.2 percent) and 23 females (33.8 percent). Several business
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as finance students (19.1
percent). Non-business and accounting majors also made up a significant portion of the sample
(17.6 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively). Finally, 56 students (82.3 percent) reported their
GPA as being at 3.0 or above.

Manipulation check
After the 24th round of selling assets, each participant was prompted to answer a
manipulation check question regarding whether he or she was currently above or below the target
necessary to receive a bonus. All participants passed the manipulation check.

Hypotheses testing
H1 predicts that a person who falls below an earnings target will possess a higher
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than one who meets
those expectations. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG), Egocentric Perceptions
of Fairness as the outcome/dependent variable, and Gender (Gender, coded as 0 =
female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the number of times audited and fined in the first 24
rounds) as the covariates. Since higher scores on the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness
questions indicate that the participant viewed his or her actions as more honest,
trustworthy, and fair, the BTG was expected to have a higher mean on this measure than
the ATG. The results listed in Table 15 (Panel A) reveal that the BTG’s mean score for
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the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness measure (Mean = 0.68, SD = 0.88) was actually
lower than that of the ATG (Mean = 1.07, SD = 0.86), but this difference is statistically
insignificant (p < .51). Thus, H1 is not supported.
H2 through H5 were tested utilizing the PROCESS add-in to SPSS. PROCESS is a
statistical method that allows for “path analysis–based moderation and mediation analysis as well
as their integration in the form of a conditional process model” (Hayes, 2013, p. 419). In
particular, this method allows for testing serial multiple mediator models such as the theoretical
framework used in this chapter. Furthermore, in addition to its ability to calculate the direct and
indirect effects in mediation models, PROCESS can estimate unstandardized model coefficients,
standards errors, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals (Hayes, 2013).
H2 posits that egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings
expectations are positively related to the intensity of negative affect. Again, PROCESS was used
to test this hypothesis with Group (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG) as the predictor/independent
variable, FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) as the
outcome/dependent variable, EPF (egocentric perceptions of fairness) as the first mediating
variable, NA (negative affect) as the second mediating variable, and EFW (ethical fading words)
as the third mediating variable. Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) and Audit0124
(the number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds) were included as covariates.
Similar to the interpretation of the EPF measure, higher scores on the NA measure indicate a
greater degree of negative affect. As such, a positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in
Table 16 (Panel A) indicate that when NA is designated as the outcome variable, its relationship
with EPF is positive (coeff. = 0.33), yet insignificant (p = .75). Therefore, H2 is not supported.

174

H3 postulates that negative affect experienced from not reaching an earnings goal is
positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading. More specifically, a person is expected to be
less likely to consider the ethical implications of his or her decision if he or she is experiencing
negative affect. Since the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s
relationship with NA is expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results in Table 16 (Panel
B) show that the relationship between NA and EFW is negative (coeff. = -0.14), but not
significant (p = .21). Thus, H3 is not supported.
Ethical fading was also captured using a three-item measure embedded within the Zodiac
and Personality Survey (labeled EFW). As such, another analysis was conducted substituting
EFW for EFQ. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the EFQ questions
suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results listed on Table 17 (Panel A), however,
reflect a negative (coeff. = -0.03), but not significant (p = .85), relationship. Thus, H3 is still not
supported when EFQ is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure.
H4 predicts a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical behavior. That is,
an individual who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to be more likely to
engage in fraud. As FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) captures
whether the participant committed fraud in the 25th and final round, its relationship with EFW is
expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results from Table 16 (Panel C) reflect that the
relationship between EFW and FLR is negative (coeff. = -1.44), but insignificant (p = .16). When
EFQ is substituted for EFW as presented in Table 17 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud
and ethical fading is still not significant (p = .27).
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H5 posits that one that falls below an earnings target is more likely to engage in fraud
than an individual who has already met his or her respective goal. To test this hypothesis, a
Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted. The results in Table 18 indicate that there was a
significant association between whether an individual was above or below his or her respective
earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and fraudulent behavior in the final
round (χ = 4.22, p < .05). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of those individuals in the BTG
committing fraud in the final round was 6.1 times higher than those in the ATG. Thus, H5 is
supported.

Second Analysis
Participants
A secondary analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified
themselves as accounting majors were removed. Professionals and educators believe that ethical
decision-making should be a core component of an accounting student’s education, especially
given the corporate scandals of the late 1900s and early 2003 (Martinov-Bennie & Mladenovic,
2015). As such, accounting curricula have placed an emphasis on including ethics-related
materials. While there is disagreement regarding whether ethics can be “taught” and, if so, what
are the most effective methods, some research does supports the idea that accounting students’
ethical judgments can be positively influenced by various types of interventions (e.g., Cloninger
& Selvarajan, 2010 & Green & Weber, 1997). Thus, an argument can be made that the focus on
ethics in their curricula results in accounting students being more ethically sensitive, and
therefore more likely to behave ethically, than other business students whose respective
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discipline lacks such an emphasis.
The results from by Clikeman and Henning (2000) and Sweeney and Costello (2009)
support the argument that accounting majors are more inclined to behave ethically in relation to
other business students. Clikeman and Henning’s (2000) findings suggest that senior accounting
students, when compared to other seniors across different business majors, are more opposed to
questionable acts of earnings management. More recently, the results from Sweeney and Costello
(2009) suggest that the ethical intentions and judgments of accounting students are significantly
higher than those of non-accounting students across various scenarios. The “socialization” aspect
of accounting education and its rule-based approach may explain Clikeman and Henning’s
(2000) and Sweeney and Costello’s (2009) results. That is, accounting majors are socialized to
give “priority to financial statement users' needs, while students majoring in other business
disciplines come to identify more closely with the goals of corporate managers” (Clikeman and
Henning, 2000, p. 1). Furthermore, according to Shaub (1994), accounting education emphasizes
a rule-based approach that is grounded in ethics. As such, given the empirical evidence that
supports the notion that accounting students are perhaps more predisposed to act ethically than
non-accounting majors, 12 participants (approximately 15 percent) who identified themselves as
accounting majors were omitted from the analysis.
There remained 30 participants in the below target group (BTG) and 40 in the above
target group (ATG) after the accounting students were removed from the data analysis. Thus, in
order to create equal cells (30 per cell), ten participants were removed from the ATG utilizing a
random number generator similar to that in Lyubimov, Arnold, and Sutton (2013). The
remaining sixty participants, on average, spent 26 minutes completing the experiment and were
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paid a total of $6.04, which included a flat fee of $3 that was independent of their performance.
The demographic data for the secondary analysis is listed in Table 19. The data reveals
that the sample consisted of 37 males (61.7 percent) and 23 females (38.3 percent). Several
business majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as finance students
(21.7 percent). Non-business majors also made up a significant portion of the sample (20
percent). Finally, 46 students (76.7 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above.

Manipulation check
After the 24th round of selling assets, each participant was prompted to answer a
manipulation check question regarding whether he or she was currently above or below the target
necessary to receive a bonus. All participants passed the manipulation check.

Hypotheses testing
H1 predicts that a person who falls below an earnings target will possess a higher
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than one who meets
those expectations. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG), Egocentric Perceptions
of Fairness as the outcome/dependent variable, and Gender (Gender, coded as 0 =
female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the number of times audited and fined in the first 24
rounds) as the covariates. Since higher scores on the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness
questions indicate that the participant viewed his or her actions as more honest,
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trustworthy, and fair, the BTG was expected to have a higher mean on this measure than
the ATG. The results listed in Table 20 (Panel A) reveal that the BTG’s mean score for
the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness measure (Mean = 0.51, SD = 1.08) was actually
lower than that of the ATG (Mean = 1.01, SD = 0.76). However, the results in Table 10
(Panel B) show that this difference is insignificant (p = 0.53). Thus, H1 is not supported.
Similar to the first analysis, the remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the
PROCESS add-in to SPSS wherein Group (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG) was designated as the
predictor/independent variable, FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round)
the outcome/dependent variable, EPF (egocentric perceptions of fairness) the first mediating
variable, NA (negative affect) the second mediating variable, and EFW (ethical fading words) the
third mediating variable. Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the
number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds) were included as covariates. H2
posits that egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings expectations
are positively related to the intensity of negative affect Similar to the interpretation of the EPF
measure, higher scores on the NA measure indicate a greater degree of negative affect. As such, a
positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 21 (Panel A) indicate that when NA is
designated as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive (coeff. = 0.12), yet
insignificant (p = .23). Therefore, H2 is not supported.
H3 postulates that negative affect experienced from not reaching an earnings goal is
positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading. Since the use of more ethics-related words
indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s relationship with NA is expected to produce a negative
coefficient. The results in Table 21 (Panel B) show that the relationship between NA and EFW is
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negative (coeff. = -0.20), but not significant (p = .12). When EFW is replaced with EFQ, the
results listed on Table 22 (Panel A) also show an insignificant (p = .17), relationship. Thus, H3
is not supported when either the EFW or the EFQ is employed as the ethical fading measure.
H4 predicts a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical behavior. As
FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) captures whether the
participant committed fraud in the 25th and final round, its relationship with EFW is expected to
produce a negative coefficient. The results from Table 21 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship
between EFW and FLR is negative (coeff. = 0.56) and marginally significant (p < .09). Thus, H4
is somewhat supported when EFW is used as the ethical fading measure. However, when EFQ is
substituted for EFW as presented in Table 22 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud and
ethical fading is not significant (p = .58).
H5 posits that one that falls below an earnings target is more likely to engage in fraud
than an individual who has already met his or her respective goal. To test this hypothesis, a
Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted. The results in Table 23 indicate that there was a
significant association between whether an individual was above or below his or her respective
earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and fraudulent behavior in the final
round (χ = 7.68, p < .01). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of those individuals in the BTG
committing fraud in the final round was 12.4 times higher than those in the ATG. Thus, H5 is
supported.
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Experiment 2
Participants
A total of 90 students participated in Experiment 2. Accounting students were omitted
from data analysis (a total of 19 participants, 21.1 percent) and a random number generator was
then used to equalize the cells. After equalizing the cells, there was a total of 63 participants (21
per cell) whose data was used in the analysis. The participants in Experiment 2, on average,
spent 21 minutes completing the experiment and were paid a total of $5.97, which included a flat
fee of $3 that was independent of their performance.
The demographic data for Experiment 2 is listed in Table 24. The data reveals that the
sample consisted of 32 males (50.8 percent) and 31 females (49.2 percent). Several business
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as supply-chain management
students (25.4 percent). Marketing majors also made up a significant portion of the sample (22.2
percent). Fifty-one students (80.9 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above. Finally,
the participants, on average, had taken at least two accounting courses (mean = 2.19).

Hypothesis Testing
H6 postulates that an individual who is close, but still below, an earnings target is more
likely to engage in fraud than one that either is further from the goal or has already met that
mark. To test this hypothesis, a Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted utilizing the data from
Experiment 2. The results in Table 25 indicate that there was a significant association between an
individual’s distance to an earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and
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fraudulent behavior in the final round (χ = 6.30, p < .01).25 Based on the odds ratio, the odds of
those individuals in the “close-to-goal” group (CTG) committing fraud in the final round was 4.4
times higher than those in both the “far-from-goal” (FFG) and the “reached goal” (RG) groups.
As such, H6 is supported.

Discussion
Results from the first analysis suggest that individuals who are below an earnings goal
are more inclined to misrepresent than those who have already met that target. None of the other
hypothesized relationships were supported, however. A second analysis was conducted wherein
those participants who identified themselves as accounting students were culled from the sample.
The significant change in the results between the two analyses provides some support to the idea
that the “socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other
business majors with respect to their ethical decision-making and/or moral awareness (e.g.,
Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009). As such, removing accounting students
from the sample pool was appropriate.
Results from the second analysis indicate that fraud is more likely to occur as the
individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading, but this relationship was only
moderately significant. Furthermore, the results indicate that those individuals who are closest to
meeting an earnings target carry the highest probability of fraudulent behavior. The analysis
25

The association between an individual’s distance to an earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets

and fraudulent behavior in the final round was still significant when accounting students were added back into the
sample.
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failed to find any support that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect
contribute towards his or her behavior in the context of goal achievement, however. This lack of
significance for egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect could be the result of a few
factors. One is that, in the context of goal achievement, these constructs are actually insignificant
with respect to their influence on behavior. The second factor that may explain the absence of
significance for egocentrism and negative affect is the possible misspecification of TUAB. In
particular, key mediating and/or moderating variables, especially those related to individual
characteristics, may have been excluded from the model that, when included, could have
significant indirect effects and would thus warrant the inclusion of those constructs into the
model.
Finally, caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. One reason is that
ethical fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was measured utilizing one’s
performance on a word completion exercise (EPW) rather than his or her responses to questions
about how decisions in the asset-selling task were framed (EPQ). As with any new construct,
more research is needed regarding how to best measure ethical fading. Furthermore, one should
be mindful of the substantial change in the results when those participants who identified
themselves as accounting students were removed from the sample. Further study is necessary to
explore whether the incorporation of ethics related material in their curricula makes accounting
students more “immune” to ethical fading.
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Conclusion
Fraud is conceptualized as an intentional act by a manager who was willing to abandon
his or her ethics for personal gain. Furthermore, simplistic explanations are often provided
regarding one’s motivation to initially engage in fraud. The demographic and anecdotal
evidence, however, suggests that the majority of fraudsters are of the “accidental type.” That is,
these fraudsters did not intend to act unethically yet somehow became trapped in a vicious cycle
of unethical actions to conceal their actions. Thus, understanding the motivations for financial
statement fraud and the nature of the act itself may require a more nuanced investigation into the
psychological processes underlying a manager’s decision-making.
Murphy and Dacin (2011) contend that characteristics of the business climate, such as the
pressure to meet earnings expectations, can encourage managers to commit fraud without the
self- awareness that they are behaving unethically. This lack of awareness can possibly be
explained by ethical fading, a mechanism wherein one’s inherent psychological constraints, such
as biases or heuristics, fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process. Thus,
identifying the psychological processes that enable ethical fading, as well as the contextual
influences on those operations, can contribute towards a more robust understanding of
accounting fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular contextual factor,
the pressure to meet earnings forecasts, produces egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative
affect that influence the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior.
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which
includes the concept of ethical fading, is utilized to predict that a manager who is short of
meeting an earnings forecasts will manufacture the egocentric perspective that unfair
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circumstances are to blame for his or her failure in reaching the goal. Furthermore, it is predicted
that this egocentric perspective will produce negative affect, which in turn increases the
probability of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below
earnings estimates. Finally, TUAB (Chapter 2) is used to hypothesize that those who are below,
yet close, to an earnings target are more likely to commit fraud than managers who either have
reached the goal or are far from it.
Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task were conducted to test the predictions.
Across both experiments, the participants were required to sell an asset to a computerized buyer
whereupon they could earn money on each successful transaction. Before each attempted sale,
however, the participants had the opportunity to misrepresent the value of their assets in order to
sell them at higher prices. The participants also had the potential to earn a bonus based on their
performance (Experiment 1) or group assignment (Experiment 2). The participants’ egocentric
perceptions, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or
observed across the two experiments.
The results from the first experiment suggests that fraud is more likely to occur as the
individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading, but this was true for only one measure
of ethical fading (a word-completion exercise). Furthermore, the findings from the second
experiment suggest that individuals who are closest to meeting an earnings goal carry the highest
probability of fraudulent behavior. There was a lack of support that one’s egocentric perceptions
of fairness and negative affect contribute towards his or her ethical behavior, however.
This chapter is not without its limitations. The first being that ethical fading was only
related to misreporting behavior when accounting students were removed from the sample. The
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substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the “socialization” aspect
of their education makes accounting majors somehow “different” from other business majors
with respect to their ethical sensitivity. Further research is needed to determine whether the
inclusion of ethics related material into their curricula makes accounting students more resistant
to ethical fading.
The second limitation of this chapter is that the samples consist of upper-level business
students which, when used as a proxy for professionals and quasi-professionals, has been
controversial. One argument against the use of student samples is that the education, experience,
and socialization of professionals provide them with the cognitive tools and the motivation to
behave more ethically than students. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011), however, argue that the
psychology processes that constrain one’s ability to act in an ethical manner are “ordinary” since
they “affect even very honest and smart people, including managers, executives, and other
professionals” (p. 45). Nevertheless, the research comparing the ethical behavior of business
students to professionals has been mixed. The second limitation of this chapter is that the ethical
fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was measured based on the
participant’s performance on a word-completion task. As with any new construct, how to best
measure ethical fading is still unresolved and requires further research.
The key contribution of this chapter is that it provides support to the idea that ethical
fading is influential in determining whether a person engages in fraud. This finding runs counter
to the common notion that fraud is an intentional sacrifice of one’s ethics for some other desired
goal (e.g., profit). Furthermore, this chapter indicates that the proximity to an earnings target
matters in determining whether one will engage in fraud. That is, those managers who are the
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closest to, yet below, an earnings target are the most likely to engage in fraud. Finally, this
research may also provide specific contributions to the auditing profession, organizations,
regulators, and researchers.
With respect to the audit profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors
that may lead to unethical behavior may result in improved fraud detection. Furthermore,
provided the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this chapter suggests that auditors might
reconsider the substantial value they attach to management’s character and attitude when
conducting their fraud risk assessments. At an organizational level, an understanding of bounded
ethicality and ethical fading might allow for the implementation of fraud controls aimed at
mitigating the contextual factors that can influence unethical behavior. In addition, a manager
who is knowledgeable about common biases and heuristics might be more psychologically
prepared when confronted with an ethical decision. This chapter also suggests that regulators
consider the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that
drive such bias, if they are to establish legislation that is more effective at deterring fraud.
Finally, this chapter contributes to research by both serving as an early test of TUAB (Chapter 2)
and identifying a key contextual factor that limits an individual’s ability to act ethically.
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSION
The three studies in this dissertation apply the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical
fading to explain the decision-making that underlies unethical behavior or accounting fraud, in
particular. Behavioral ethics, from which these concepts emerged, is a relatively new field of
study and as typical with emerging areas of research, the theoretical models are nebulous and
thus not well-specified (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Study 1 combined
disparate, but complimentary, theories and ideas from behavioral ethics and psychology to create
a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of
bounded ethical and ethical fading. Studies 2 and 3 applied TUAB (Chapter 2) to examine how
contextual stimuli affect the psychological operations outlined in TUAB that, in turn, can lead to
fraudulent behavior. Specifically, Study 2 examined how a lower rate-of-pay for managers in
relation to their peers can trigger egocentric biases of unfairness that, in sequence, provoke envy
and ethical fading, which together increase the likelihood of fraudulent behavior in those
managers. Study 3 explored how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts can elicit, in
progression, egocentric perceptions of fairness, a general negative affect, ethical fading, and acts
of fraud in those managers who fall below their expected financial goals. The unique
contributions of each of these studies will now be addressed, followed by brief discussions
regarding the overall contributions of this dissertation and avenues for future research.
The purpose of Study 1 was to develop a theory that combines the concepts of bounded
ethicality and ethical fading. In sum, TUAB (Chapter 2), states that task-specific and quasi-static
environmental factors (e.g., an organization’s culture) can provoke certain, inherent biases and
heuristics. If those biases related to upholding one’s perception of self-worth, in particular, are
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triggered, then the person will interpret the contextual stimuli in a distorted manner to create the
idea that the preferred outcome (i.e., the action that restores his or her sense of self-worth) is the
most “fair.” These evaluations of the stimuli are primitive, that is, effortless and automatic, and
thus do not feel biased in any way. Furthermore, TUAB states (Chapter 2) that in addition to
interpreting contextual information in an egocentric manner, the triggering of biases will, in turn,
elicit negative affect for which the person will be motivated to eliminate quickly and without
utilizing considerable cognitive effort. As such, if an unethical action eliminates any negative
affect from a threatened sense of self-worth, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition will
suggest that such an action is “appropriate” or even “good” since it is the most emotionally
appealing. At this point, the person is engaging in the act of substation where he or she is
replacing a difficult question (e.g., “is this action ethical?”) with an easier one (e.g., “will this
action make me feel better?”). Ethical fading is now occurring, according to TUAB (Chapter 2),
since the individual is no longer considering the moral implications of the alternative actions.
The pressure to meet earnings forecasts is discussed through the lens of TUAB as an example of
how one may unknowingly behave in manner contrary to his or her moral principles.
The primary contribution of Study 1 is that it provides a testable theory that differentiates
between unintentional and intentional immoral behavior through its inclusion of the ethical
fading concept and the noted systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s ability to act
ethically. As discussed in Study 1, TUAB (Chapter 2) has the potential to explain unethical
behavior across the different functional areas of accounting research. With respect to Financial
Accounting research, TUAB (Chapter 2) can explain how disclosures and the ambiguity in
standards can actually exacerbate unethical behavior. In the AIS research area, TUAB (Chapter
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2) can be used to address whether information systems create an environment of instrumental
rationality wherein the focus of establishing the most effective and efficient processes
overshadows any consideration of whether carrying out those processes is ethical. TUAB
(Chapter 2) can also explain why auditors sometimes forfeit their professional responsibilities
and acquiesce to their clients that are pushing beyond the boundaries of law and regulation. In
addition, this theory can explain unethical behavior in the Tax research area such as tax
avoidance and tax compliance. Finally, in regards to the Management Accounting area, TUAB
(Chapter 2) can be utilized to address a host of deviant behaviors such as the misappropriation of
assets, bribery, and transfer pricing manipulation. Furthermore, this theory can be applied to the
ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to budgeting and performance measurement such as
dishonesty in budgeting, the formulation of budgetary slack, biased performance evaluation, and
performance measurement falsification.
The results from Study 2 indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to
view this discrepancy as unfair as opposed to one who is paid at a higher rate, and that this
egocentric view regarding the pay inequity produces a feeling of envy in that person who is paid
less. However, the prediction that an individual who is experiencing a higher degree of envy
would be more likely to fade ethically was unsupported. The supplemental analysis suggests that
one’s preference for risk may moderate the relationship between negative affect (i.e., envy) and
ethical fading. That is, when envy is high, those people who are either risk-neutral or riskseeking are more likely to experience ethical fading as opposed to those who are more riskaverse. Findings from Study 2 also indicate that a person who is experiencing a higher degree of
ethical fading is more likely to misrepresent and that ethical fading, along with perceived
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unfairness, are significant processes that mediate the relationship between pay inequity and
fraudulent behavior.
The main contribution of Study 2 is that it provides initial support of TUAB (Chapter 2)
and identifies a key contextual factor, pay inequality, and its influence on the psychological
processes that constrain ethical decision-making. Furthermore, Study 2 also contributes to the
psychology and behavioral ethics literatures in that it offers evidence that unethical behavior is
not necessarily the result of a person consciously abandoning his or her moral principles. Finally,
the supplemental analysis from this study suggests that individual characteristics (i.e., personality
traits) may have mediating or moderating effects among the relationships outlined in TUAB
(Chapter 2), thus providing research avenues to further specify the theoretical model.
The findings from Study 3 also suggest that one is more likely to misrepresent if he or
she is experiencing a higher degree of ethical fading. The relationship between ethical fading and
misrepresentation in this study, however, was only moderately significant. The results from
Study 3 also suggest that those people who are closest, yet still below, a financial goal are the
most likely to engage in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the findings of this study did not support
the predictions regarding the relationships between egocentric perceptions of fairness and a
generalized, negative affect and between that affect and ethical fading.
The primary contribution of Study 3 is that it also provides some support, although
mixed, that ethical fading is influential in determining whether an individual engages in
fraudulent behavior. Much like Study 2, this result runs counter to the idea that fraudulent
behavior is an intentional act. Study 3 further contributes to the accounting, behavioral ethics,
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and management literatures by identifying an important contextual factor that influences this
process, the pressure to meet earnings forecasts.
Overall, this dissertation provides three important contributions to the accounting,
behavioral ethics, management, and psychology literatures. The first contribution is that it unifies
disparate, but related, theories and concepts from psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a
testable theory (TUAB) that includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading.
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that traditional models of ethical decision-making such
as Rest (1986) and Kohlberg (1973) rely on the tenuous assumption that judgments are based on
a rational, linear thought-process. In particular, they argue that these models assume that (1)
awareness is required for a decision to have ethical implications, (2) reasoning will guide an
individual’s judgment (moral judgment), (3) and moral intention is necessary for one to
understand his or her action (moral intention). Research in psychology and behavioral ethics,
however, suggests that individuals often (1) lack moral awareness, (2) judge before using moral
reasoning, and (3) misjudge moral intention (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). As such, this
research, which allows for the influences of emotions, the subconscious, and intuition in
decision-making, highlights the limitations of rationalist models (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,
2008). This dissertation thus contributes to research by introducing a model that differentiates
between intentional and unintentional behavior by considering the systematic, psychological
errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors
that trigger those errors. In regards to accounting research in particular, TUAB (Chapter 2) can
be applied to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different functional areas of
accounting. Furthermore, this dissertation extends Murphy and Dacin’s (2011) framework that
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identifies the psychological pathways an individual may follow when unintentionally engaging
in fraud.
The second key contribution of this dissertation is that it provides some initial support of
TUAB (Chapter 2). In particular, it offers evidence that unethical behavior (i.e., fraud), through
the mechanism of ethical fading, may not necessarily be the result of an individual consciously
forsaking his or her moral principles for some other desired goal. Finally, with respect to
research, this dissertation identifies some of the psychological processes suggested by bounded
ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (i.e., egocentric perceptions of
unfairness) as well as two important contextual factors (i.e., pay inequities and earnings targets)
that trigger those processes. This research also offers potential contributions to auditors,
management, and regulators.
In regards to the audit profession, auditors may improve their fraud detection capabilities
by understanding how the psychological processes described in TUAB (Chapter 2) (i.e., biases,
emotions, and ethical fading) influence decision-making. This dissertation also suggests that
auditors reconsider the substantial value they attach to management’s character and attitude
when conducting their fraud risk assessments, especially given the subconscious effects of
ethical fading. Furthermore, knowledge of those psychological processes that impede ethical
decision-making may prepare auditors to better defend their position when negotiating with
clients who are pushing beyond the boundaries of law and regulation. At an organizational level,
an awareness of bounded ethicality and ethical fading could lead to the implementation of fraud
controls that are more effective at mitigating the contextual factors that influence unethical
behavior. In addition, a manager who is knowledgeable about common biases and heuristics
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might be more sensitive to the ethical implications of the alternative decisions that he or she
faces. Finally, this dissertation suggests that regulators should acknowledge the difference
between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that drive such bias, if they
are to formulate legislation that is more effective at deterring fraud or other deviant behavior.
More research is required to assess TUAB’s (Chapter 2) explanatory power regarding the
unethical behaviors of professional accountants and managers. Research should focus on both
examining the relationship between ethical fading and unethical behaviors and identifying those
psychological operations (i.e., biases, heuristics and emotions) that cause ethical fading across
various accounting contexts. The results from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that ethical fading can
result from a multitude of biases and emotions that vary across situations due to factors that are
specific to particular contexts.
Research on how to best measure ethical fading is also needed since it is a relatively new
construct. In Study 2, ethical fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was
measured using questions about how the participant framed his or her decisions rather than his or
her responses to a word completion exercise, which has been used successfully in psychological
studies to capture implicit cognitive processes. In Study 3, however, the relationship between
ethical fading and misrepresentation was moderately significant when the word completion
exercise, rather than the framing questions, was used. With respect to Study 2, one explanation
that may explain the difference in the results produced by the two measures is that, in the
experimental procedure, the word completion exercise was much further away from the
questions that addressed the participant’s perceptions of unfairness and feelings of envy than the
alternate ethical fading measure.
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Furthermore, research should explore how individual characteristics (e.g., personality
traits) affect the psychological processes outlined in TUAB (Chapter 2). The results from the
supplemental analysis in Study 2 suggest that one’s risk preference moderates the relationship
between ethical fading and misrepresentation. However, the effect of risk preference on the
relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading was analyzed independently from the
overall model due the constraints of the data. As such, when included in the model, the
significance of an individual’s risk preference as a moderator may become muted as well as the
other relationships as currently defined in TUAB (Chapter 2). Correspondingly, the lack of
significance for egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect in Study 3 could be the
result of key mediating and/or moderating variables that have been excluded from the model
that, when included, could have significant indirect effects and would thus warrant the inclusion
of those constructs into the model. At any rate, identifying the potential moderating and/or
mediating effect of individual characteristics can provide research avenues to further specify the
theoretical model.
Finally, more research is needed to determine whether the inclusion of ethics related
material in their curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical fading.
Fort the most part, the results for Studies 2 and 3 only held when accounting students were culled
form the sample. This substantial changes in the results between analyses suggests that the
“socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other
business majors with respect to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making, which is
consistent with other studies (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009).
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Figure 1: A Temporal Explanation of “Want” versus “Should-self” Conflict
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Figure 2: The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior
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Figure 3: The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (adopted from Chapter 2)
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Figure 4: Chapter 3 Experimental Procedure

214

Figure 5: Chapter 3 Moderating Effect of Risk Preference on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
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Figure 6: Chapter 4 Experimental Procedure
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Table 1: Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics (First Analysis)

Gender
Female
Male
Undergraduate Major
Accounting
Business Administration
Economics
Entrepreneurial Management
Finance
General Business
Global Business Management
Marketing
Non-business
Supply-chain Management
Unidentified
GPA
4.0 - 3.5
3.4 - 3.0
2.9 - 2.5
2.4 - 2.0
Below 2.0

Number of Accounting Courses
N = 75
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Number

Percent

27
48

36.0%
64.0%

21
1
4
3
9
4
3
15
7
6
2

28.0%
1.3%
5.3%
4.0%
12.0%
5.3%
4.0%
20.0%
9.3%
8.0%
2.7%

23
34
16
2
0

30.7%
45.3%
21.3%
2.7%
0.0%

Mean
3.25

Standard Deviation
2.14

Table 2: Chapter 3 ANCOVA Test of H1 (First Analysis)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Group
Mean
Std. Deviation
2.4474
.82642
High-pay group
2.6081
.73253
Low-pay group
Total
2.5267
.78043
Group = Randomly Assigned Condition (High-pay group = 0, low-pay group =1 )

N
38
37
75

Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Type III Sum
Mean
Partial Eta
Source
of Squares
df
Square
F
Sig.
Squared
Corrected
1.245
2
.623
1.023
.365
.028
Model
187.021
1
187.021 247.529
.000
.810
Intercept
Predictor:
.714
1
.714
5.113
.282
.016
Group
Covariate:
.761
1
.761
.613
.267
.017
Gender
43.826
72
.609
Error
523.875
75
Total
Corrected Total
45.072
74
R Squared = .028 (Adjusted R Squared = .001)
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)
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Table 3: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (First Analysis, with EFQ)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Perceived Unfairness (PU) on Episodic Envy (EE)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
1.2054
.2760
4.3668
. 0000
.7453
Predictor:
PU
.3067
.0945
3.2463
.0018
.1492
Covariate:
-.0020
.1544
-.0128
.9898
-.2593
Gender
Panel B: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
3.3836
.3687
9.1780
.0000
2.7691
Predictor:
EE
.0263
.1407
.1871
.8521
-.2083
Covariate:
Gender
-.0494
.1831
-.2697
.7882
-.3546
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FCL5)
coeff
se
t
p
(constant)
-1.2011
0.9208
-1.3044
.1964
Predictor:
EFQ
.2516
.2011
1.2508
.2152
Covariate:
Gender
.8064
.3083
2.6160
.0109
Model 6 Variables (N = 75):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic Envy
Mediator 3 = EFQ (Ethical fading questions)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

220

ULCI
1.6654
.4642
.2554

ULCI
3.9982
.2609
.2558

LLCI
-2.7363

ULCI
.3341

-.0838

.5869

.2925

1.3203

Table 4: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (First Analysis, with EFW)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFW)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
.8217
.2712
3.0300
.0034
.3697
Predictor:
EE
-.0600
.1035
-.5794
.5642
-.2325
Covariate:
Gender
-.1126
.1347
-.8363
.4058
-.3372
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FCL5)
coeff
se
t
p
(constant)
-.4282
.6666
-.6423
.5228
Predictor:
EFW
.0953
.2762
.3448
.7313
Covariate:
Gender
.8047
.3129
2.5721
.0123
Model 6 Variables (N = 75):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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ULCI
1.2738
.1126
.1119

LLCI
-1.5396

ULCI
.6832

-.3653

.5558

.2831

1.3263

Table 5: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, & H7 (First Analysis, with EFQ)
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness
Mediator

Effect

Perceived
Unfairness
(PU)

.0504

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0715

-.0096

.2515

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy
Mediator

Effect

Episodic Envy
(EE)

.0151

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.1142

-.1555

.2222

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading
Mediator

Effect

Ethical Fading
(EFQ)

.0648

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0856

-.0126

.2921

LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval
Model 6 Variables (N = 75):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 6: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, and H7 (First Analysis, with EFW)
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness
Mediator

Effect

Perceived
Unfairness
(PU)

.0490

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0742

-.0122

.2485

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy
Mediator

Effect

Episodic Envy
(EE)

.0079

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0477

-.0619

.0974

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading
Mediator

Effect

Ethical Fading
(EFW)

-.0086

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0226

-.0567

.0182

LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval
Model 6 Variables (N = 75):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy)
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 7: Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics (Second Analysis)

Gender
Female
Male
Undergraduate Major
Business Administration
Economics
Entrepreneurial Management
Finance
General Business
Global Business Management
Marketing
Non-business
Supply-chain Management
Unidentified
GPA
4.0 - 3.5
3.4 - 3.0
2.9 - 2.5
2.4 - 2.0
Below 2.0

Number of Accounting Courses
N = 54
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Number

Percent

18
36

33.3%
66.7%

1
4
3
9
4
3
15
7
6
2

1.9%
7.4%
5.6%
16.7%
7.4%
5.6%
27.8%
13.0%
11.1%
3.7%

12
27
13
2
0

22.2%
50.0%
24.1%
3.7%
0.0%

Mean
2.43

Standard Deviation
0.96

Table 8: Chapter 3 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Second Analysis)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Group
Mean
Std. Deviation
2.3796
.80375
High-pay group
2.8056
.62532
Low-pay group
Total
2.5926
.74495
Group = Randomly Assigned Condition (High-pay group = 0, low-pay group =1 )

N
27
27
54

Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Type III Sum
Mean
Partial Eta
Source
of Squares
df
Square
F
Sig.
Squared
Corrected
2.769
2
1.385
2.650
.080
.094
Model
129.312
1
129.312 247.529
.000
.829
Intercept
Predictor:
2.671
1
2.671
5.113
.028
.091
Group
Covariate:
.320
1
.320
.613
.437
.012
Gender
26.643
51
.522
Error
392.375
54
Total
Corrected Total
29.412
53
R Squared = .094 (Adjusted R Squared = .059)
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)
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Table 9: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Second Analysis, with EFQ)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Perceived Unfairness (PU) on Episodic Envy (EE)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
1.1497
.3655
3.1455
.0028
.5371
Predictor:
PU
.3409
.1298
2.6254
.0115
.1233
Covariate:
Gender
.0125
.1971
.0635
.9496
-.3178
Panel B: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
3.7527
.4236
8.8594
.0000
3.0426
Predictor:
EE
.1568
.1497
1.0470
.3003
-.0943
Covariate:
Gender
-.1730
.2087
-.8290
.4111
-.5229
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FCL5)
coeff
se
t
p
(constant)
-2.3589
1.1539
-2.0443
.0464
Predictor:
EFQ
.5614
.2413
2.3268
.0242
Covariate:
Gender
.9955
.3549
2.805
.0072
Model 6 Variables (N = 54):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic Envy
Mediator 3 = EFQ (Ethical fading questions)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

226

ULCI
1.7622
.5585
.3428

ULCI
4.4629
.4078
.1769

LLCI
-4.2942

ULCI
-.4235

.1567

.9660

.4002

1.5907

Table 10: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Second Analysis, with EFW)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFW)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
.2984
.2970
1.0046
.3200
-.1996
Predictor:
EE
-.0640
.1050
-.6091
.5453
-.2400
Covariate:
.0130
.1463
.0887
.9297
-.2324
Gender
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FCL5)
coeff
se
t
p
(constant)
-.2628
.7623
-.3448
.7318
Predictor:
EFW
.0356
.3629
.0982
.9222
Covariate:
Gender
.8979
.3718
2.4152
.0196
Model 6 Variables (N = 54):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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ULCI
.7964
.1121
.2583

LLCI
-1.5413

ULCI
1.0157

-.5730

.6443

.2744

1.5214

Table 11: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, & H7 (Second Analysis, with EFQ)
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness
Mediator

Effect

Perceived
Unfairness
(PU)

.2348

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.2652

.0280

.8793

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy
Mediator

Effect

Episodic Envy
(EE)

-.0412

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0998

-.3328

.0414

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading
Mediator

Effect

Ethical Fading
(EFQ)

.2286

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.1934

.0127

.6696

LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval
Model 6 Variables (N = 54):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 12: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, and H7 (Second Analysis, with EFW)
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness
Mediator

Effect

Perceived
Unfairness
(PU)

.1550

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.1845

-.0201

.5535

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy
Mediator

Effect

Episodic Envy
(EE)

-.0205

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.0975

-.2814

.0694

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading
Mediator

Effect

Ethical Fading
(EFW)

-.0125

Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
.1208

-.1840

.2182

LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval
Model 6 Variables (N = 54):
Y = FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18)
X = Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1)
Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness)
Mediator 2 = EE (Episodic envy)
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical fading words)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 13: Chapter 3 Moderating Effect of Risk Preference on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
(constant)
Predictor(s):
RP
EE
RP * EE
Covariate:
Gender

coeff
5.8201

se
1.3868

t
4.1968

p
.0001

LLCI
3.495

ULCI
8.1451

-.6990
-1.1451
.3419

.3587
.6652
.1790

-1.9488
-1.7214
1.9102

.0571
.0915
.0620

-1.3004
-2.2603
.0418

-.0977
-.0298
.6419

-.1388

.2154

-.6446

.5222

-.5000

.2223

Model 1 Variables (N = 54):
Y = EFQ (Ethical fading questions)
X = EE (Episodic envy)
Moderator 1 = RP (Risk preference)
Control 1 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 14: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 1, First Analysis)

Gender
Female
Male
Undergraduate Major
Accounting
Business Administration
Economics
Entrepreneurial Management
Finance
General Business
Global Business Management
Marketing
Non-business
Supply-chain Management
Unidentified
GPA
4.0 - 3.5
3.4 - 3.0
2.9 - 2.5
2.4 - 2.0
Below 2.0

Number

Percent

23
45

33.8%
66.2%

11
3
4
1
13
7
2
4
12
10
1

16.2%
4.4%
5.9%
1.5%
19.1%
10.3%
2.9%
5.9%
17.6%
14.7%
1.5%

26
30
8
4
0

38.2%
44.1%
11.8%
5.9%
0.0%
Standard
Deviation
1.67

Mean
2.81

Number of Accounting Courses
N = 60
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Table 15: Chapter 4 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Experiment 1, First Analysis)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness)
Group
Mean
Std. Deviation
N
1.07
0.856
34
Above Target
0.68
0.878
34
Below Target
Total
0.87
0.883
68
Group = Performance through 24 rounds (Above Target = 0, Below Target =1 )

Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Egocentric Perceptions of
Fairness)
Type III Sum
Mean
Partial Eta
Source
of Squares
df
Square
F
Sig.
Squared
Corrected
7.903
3
2.634
3.804
.014
.151
Model
31.271
1
31.271
45.151
.000
.414
Intercept
Predictor:
0.303
1
0.303
0.437
.511
.007
Group
Covariate:
3.397
1
3.397
4.905
.030
.071
Aud0124
1.367
1
1.367
1.973
.165
.030
Gender
44.325
64
0.841
Error
104.000
68
Total
Corrected Total
52.229
67
R Squared = .151 (Adjusted R Squared = .112)
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)
Aud0124 = Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds
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Table 16: Table 16: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Experiment 1, First
Analysis, with EFW)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness (EPF) on Negative Affect (NA)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
ULCI
(constant)
1.2512
.2054
6.0918
.0000
.9083
1.5941
Predictor:
EPF
.033
.1017
.3249
.7464
-.1367
.2028
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.0223
.201
-.1109
.9121
-.3256
.3133
Gender
-.0284
.178
-.1597
.8736
-.3256
.2687
Panel B: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFW)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
.4532
.2333
1.9421
.0567
.0635
Predictor:
NA
-.1429
.1135
-1.2585
.2129
-.3325
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.2194
.1812
-1.211
.2305
-.5220
-.0683
.1604
-.4254
.6720
-.3361
Gender
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FLR)
coeff
se
z
p
(constant)
-1.5352
1.1363
-1.351
.1767
Predictor:
EFW
-1.4409
1.0175
-1.4161
.1568
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.2832
.8074
-.3508
.7258
Gender
-1.4705
.8341
-1.763
.0779

ULCI
.8428
.0467
.0831
.1996

LLCI
-3.4043

ULCI
.3339

-3.1146

.2328

-1.6112
-2.8425

1.0448
-.0986

Model 6 Variables (N = 68):
Y = FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round)
X = Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1)
Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness)
Mediator 2 = NA (Negative Affect)
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical Fading Words)
Control 1 = Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24
rounds)
Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 17: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Experiment 1, First Analysis, with EFQ)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
3.9183
.3062
12.7966
.0000
3.407
Predictor:
NA
-.0268
.149
-.1796
.8580
-.2756
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.1289
.2378
-.5419
.5898
-.5259
Gender
-.0138
.2105
-.0656
.9479
-.3654
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FLR)
coeff
se
z
p
(constant)
.0888
2.2148
.0401
.9680
Predictor:
EFQ
-.5360
.4857
-1.1036
.2698
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.1209
.7845
-.1542
.8775
Gender
-1.2582
.7998
-1.5731
.1157

ULCI
4.4296
.2220
.2682
.3378

LLCI
-3.5543

ULCI
3.7319

-1.335

.2629

-1.4113
-2.5737

1.1694
.0574

Model 6 Variables (N = 68):
Y = FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round)
X = Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1)
Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness)
Mediator 2 = NA (Negative Affect)
Mediator 3 = EFQ (Ethical Fading Questions)
Control 1 = Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24
rounds)
Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 18: Table 18: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H5 (Experiment 1, First
Analysis)
Group * Fraud Last Round Cross-tabulation

Group

Above Target

Below Target

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Group
% within Fraud Last Round
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Group
% within Fraud Last Round
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Group
% within Fraud Last Round
% of Total

Fraud Last Round
0
1
32
2
29.0
5.0
94.1%
5.9%
55.2%
20.0%
47.1%
2.9%
.6
-1.3
26
8
29.0
5.0
76.5%
23.5%
44.8%
80.0%
38.2%
11.8%
-.6
1.3
58
10
58.0
10.0
85.3%
14.7%
100.0%
100.0%
85.3%
14.7%

Total
34
34.0
100.0%
50.0%
50.0%
34
34.0
100.0%
50.0%
50.0%
68
68.0
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
4.221a
2.931
4.477

Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2- Exact Sig. (1(2-sided)
sided)
sided)
.040
.087
.034
.083
.042

df

Pearson Chi-Square
1
Continuity Correctionb
1
Likelihood Ratio
1
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
4.159
1
.041
N of Valid Cases
68
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Table 19: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 1, Second Analysis)

Gender
Female
Male
Undergraduate Major
Business Administration
Economics
Entrepreneurial Management
Finance
General Business
Global Business Management
Marketing
Non-business
Supply-chain Management
Unidentified
GPA
4.0 - 3.5
3.4 - 3.0
2.9 - 2.5
2.4 - 2.0
Below 2.0

Number

Percent

23
37

38.3%
61.7%

3
4
3
13
9
2
3
12
10
1

5.0%
6.7%
5.0%
21.7%
15.0%
3.3%
5.0%
20.0%
16.7%
1.7%

23
23
9
5
0

38.3%
38.3%
15.0%
8.3%
0.0%
Standard
Deviation
1.2

Mean
2.37

Number of Accounting Courses
N = 60
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Table 20: Chapter 4 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Group
Mean
Std. Deviation
1.01
0.795
Above Target
0.51
1.082
Below Target
Total
0.76
0.974
Group = Performance through 24 rounds (Above Target = 0, Below Target =1 )

N
30
30
60

Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness)
Type III Sum
Mean
Partial Eta
Source
of Squares
df
Square
F
Sig.
Squared
Corrected
8.933
3
2.978
3.541
.020
.159
Model
21.774
1
21.774
25.895
.000
.316
Intercept
Predictor:
0.336
1
0.336
0.399
.530
.007
Group
Covariate:
4.773
1
4.773
5.676
.021
.092
Aud0124
0.376
1
0.376
0.447
.507
.008
Gender
47.087
56
0.841
Error
90.778
60
Total
Corrected Total
56.020
59
R Squared = .159 (Adjusted R Squared = .114)
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)
Aud0124 = Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds
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Table 21: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis,
with EFW)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness (EPF) on Negative Affect (NA)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
ULCI
(constant)
1.2177
.2050
5.9397
. 0000
.8747
1.5607
Predictor:
EPF
.1226
.1001
1.2250
. 2258
-.0449
.2901
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.0814
.2053
-.3967
.6931
-.4249
.2620
Gender
-.0669
.1833
-.3649
.7166
-.3735
.2397
Panel B: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFW)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
.5262
.2408
2.1852
.0332
.1232
Predictor:
NA
-.1962
.1236
-1.5871
.1183
-.4031
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.1785
.1885
-.9468
.3480
-.4939
Gender
-.0916
.1682
-.5443
.5885
-.3731
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FLR)
coeff
se
z
p
(constant)
-.8153
1.4147
-.5763
.5644
Predictor:
EFW
-1.5425
.9044
-1.7056
.0881
Covariate:
Aud0124
-2.074
1.1188
-1.8538
.0638
Gender
-1.6607
.9468
-1.754
.0794

ULCI
.9293
.0107
.1370
.1900

LLCI
-3.1423

ULCI
1.5117

-3.0300

-.0550

-3.9142
-3.218

-.2338
-.1034

Model 6 Variables (N = 60):
Y = FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round)
X = Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1)
Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness)
Mediator 2 = NA (Negative Affect)
Mediator 3 = EFW (Ethical Fading Words)
Control 1 = Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24
rounds)
Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 22: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis, with
EFQ)
Panel A: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFQ)
coeff
se
t
p
LLCI
(constant)
4.1799
.3082
13.5637
.0000
3.6641
Predictor:
NA
-.2180
. 1582
-1.3779
.1739
-.4827
Covariate:
Aud0124
-.4071
.2412
-1.6876
.0973
-.8108
Gender
-.1158
.2153
-.5381
.5927
-.4761
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FLR)
coeff
se
z
p
(constant)
-.2778
2.7402
-.1014
.9193
Predictor:
EFQ
-.3042
.5493
-.5539
.5797
Covariate:
Aud0124
-1.6242
.9939
-1.6341
.1022
Gender
-1.3804
.8690
-1.5885
.1122

ULCI
4.6956
.0468
-.0034
. 2444

LLCI
-4.7849

ULCI
4.2294

-1.2077

.5992

-3.2590
-2.8098

.0107
.0489

Model 6 Variables (N = 60):
Y = FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round)
X = Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1)
Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness)
Mediator 2 = NA (Negative Affect)
Mediator 3 = EFQ (Ethical Fading Questions)
Control 1 = Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24
rounds)
Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)
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Table 23: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H5 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis)
Group * Fraud Last Round Cross-tabulation
Fraud Last Round
0
1
Group
Above Target Count
29a
1b
Expected Count
25.0
5.0
% within Group
96.7%
3.3%
% within Fraud Last Round
58.0%
10.0%
% of Total
48.3%
1.7%
Std. Residual
.8
-1.8
Below Target Count
21a
9b
Expected Count
25.0
5.0
% within Group
70.0%
30.0%
% within Fraud Last Round
42.0%
90.0%
% of Total
35.0%
15.0%
Std. Residual
-.8
1.8
Total
Count
50
10
Expected Count
50.0
10.0
% within Group
83.3%
16.7%
% within Fraud Last Round
100.0%
100.0%
% of Total
83.3%
16.7%
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Fraud Last Round categories whose column
proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Total
30
30.0
100.0%
50.0%
50.0%
30
30.0
100.0%
50.0%
50.0%
60
60.0
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
7.680a
5.880
8.647

Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2- Exact Sig. (1(2-sided)
sided)
sided)
.006
.015
.003
.012
.006

df

Pearson Chi-Square
1
Continuity Correctionb
1
Likelihood Ratio
1
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
7.552
1
.006
Association
N of Valid Cases
60
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Table 24: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 2)

Gender
Female
Male
Undergraduate Major
Business Administration
Economics
Entrepreneurial Management
Finance
General Business
Global Business Management
Marketing
Non-business
Supply-chain Management
Unidentified
GPA
4.0 - 3.5
3.4 - 3.0
2.9 - 2.5
2.4 - 2.0
Below 2.0

Number

Percent

31
32

49.2%
50.8%

2
1
1
7
5
6
14
11
16
0

3.2%
1.6%
1.6%
11.1%
7.9%
9.5%
22.2%
17.5%
25.4%
0.0%

13
38
11
1
0

20.6.3%
60.3.%
17.5%
1.6%
0.0%
Standard
Deviation
1.0

Mean
2.19

Number of Accounting Courses
N = 60
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Table 25: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H6 (Experiment 2)
Group * Fraud Cross-tabulation
Fraud
0
Group

1

Total

Reached Goal

Count
18a
3a
21
Expected Count
16.0
5.0
21.0
% within Group
85.7%
14.3%
100.0%
% within Fraud
37.5%
20.0%
33.3%
% of Total
28.6%
4.8%
33.3%
Std. Residual
.5
-.9
Far from Goal Count
18a
3a
21
Expected Count
16.0
5.0
21.0
% within Group
85.7%
14.3%
100.0%
% within Fraud
37.5%
20.0%
33.3%
% of Total
28.6%
4.8%
33.3%
Std. Residual
.5
-.9
Close to Goal
Count
12a
9b
21
Expected Count
16.0
5.0
21.0
% within Group
57.1%
42.9%
100.0%
% within Fraud
25.0%
60.0%
33.3%
% of Total
19.0%
14.3%
33.3%
Std. Residual
-1.0
1.8
Total
Count
48
15
63
Expected Count
48.0
15.0
63.0
% within Group
76.2%
23.8%
100.0%
% within Fraud
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
% of Total
76.2%
23.8%
100.0%
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Fraud categories whose column proportions do not
differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
6.300
2
.043
Likelihood Ratio
6.026
2
.049
Linear-by-Linear Association
4.650
1
.031
N of Valid Cases
63
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00.
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 3 TASK INSTRUCTIONS
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Your task is to sell assets in an online marketplace. You will earn Credits for each successful
sale, which will be translated into US dollars and paid to you upon completion of the study.
Before starting this task, please read these important instructions:

If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a
clear understanding of the instructions.

1. If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a
clear understanding of the instructions.
2. For each of 25 rounds, you will be given information regarding an asset’s name,
quality, and value-range. For example, you may be provided with an “Epsilon”
asset of average quality that is valued between 400 to 500 Credits. Please note
that estimating the value of these assets is highly subjective. Thus, some
assets may be valued incorrectly.
3. Your task, for each round, is to sell the asset in an online marketplace. Before
attempting to sell each asset, however, you must determine both the price of the
asset and how to disclose its quality. If you think the value of the asset is
incorrect, then it is possible to select another quality level. This will also adjust
the price level on-screen. For example, if you rate an Epsilon asset at average
quality, then it will have an assessed value between 400 to 500 Credits. However,
selecting a rating of “above average” automatically moves the value-range to 450
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to 550 Credits. Finally, you must determine a price, within the value-range, at
which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits). Please note that the other participants do
not have access to any information regarding the pricing and disclosure of quality
decisions you make for any asset.
4. You will then enter the marketplace to sell your asset. Please note that your
offer may be declined.
5. You can earn more Credits by selling assets that have higher values.
6. The possibility of an audit exists after each transaction. Misrepresenting the
quality of the asset can result in a fine of 1,000 Credits if an audit (1) is
conducted and (2) reveals that the asset was improperly disclosed at a level
higher than initially provided. In addition, you will forfeit any Credits earned
from the transaction. The success rate of detecting a misrepresentation can be
anywhere from 20 to 80 percent if an audit does occur.
7. Before you begin the task of selling assets, you will be asked a question
wherein your answer may determine your rate of pay for the study.
8. After the 13th round, you will be updated regarding your Credit earnings so far. In
addition, you will be asked to complete a brief survey. Further instructions will be
provided for that survey later in the study.
9. You will be asked to complete a brief word completion exercise at the end of the
last round (25th) of selling assets. You may earn additional Credits during this
task. Further instructions will be provided later in the study.
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10. After the word completion task, you will be prompted that the study is over and
that you should please bring the card located at your station to the administrator
so you may be paid. The study administrator will translate your Credits earned
from selling assets and the word completion task into US Dollars. The exchange
rate between US Dollars and Credits is positive. Any negative Credit balance will
be rounded to zero. In addition to the money earned from selling assets and the
word completion task, you will be paid a fee for participating in the study.
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APPENDIX D: CHAPTER 3 ZODIAC AND PERSONALITY SURVEY
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After 13 rounds, you are in the top (bottom) tier of earners.
The following survey includes a variety of questions that ask about your personality, preferences,
emotions, and zodiac. Answering these questions accurately requires proper reflection on how
you really think, feel, and act in general. Please answer each question as best as you can. The
Zodiac is made up of 12 different sun signs. Your date of birth determines which one you are.
Previous research has shown that people’s zodiac sign is related to the type of judgments they
make. Please indicate your Zodiac sign below and then answer the personality questionnaire.26
What is your zodiac sign?
o Aries (March 21 to April 19)
o Taurus (April 20 to May 20)
o Gemini (May 21 to June 20)
o Cancer (June 21 to July 22)
o Leo (July 23to August 22)
o Virgo (August 23 to September 22)
o Libra (September 23 to October 22)
o Scorpio (October 23 to November 21)
o Sagittarius (November 22 to December 21)
o Capricorn (December 22 to January 19)
o Aquarius (January 20 to February 18)
o Pisces (February 19 to March 20)

26

The wording of these instructions is taken from Gino and Pierce (2009, p., 147).
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Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements27:
1. I am usually talkative.
2. I feel envious now.
3. I tend to find fault with others.
4. Anyone would agree that the people in the higher tier of earnings had an advantage that
was unfairly obtained.
5. I usually do a thorough job.
6. I am frequently depressed.
7. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their
price in this task are primarily business decisions.
8. An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the higher tier of
earnings do not deserve those earnings.
9. I am usually reserved.
10. I am helpful and unselfish with others.
11. I can be somewhat careless at times.
12. I feel bitter now.
13. The people in the higher tier of earnings achieved their advantage through unjust actions
or unjust procedures.
14. I lack some things others here have.
15. I handle stress well.
27

The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the situation, with the scale

ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
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16. I am generally a curious person.
17. I am full of energy.
18. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their
price in this task are primarily economic decisions.
19. I am irritated now.
20. I am a reliable worker.
21. I can be tense at times.
22. Others here have more things going better for him/her than I do.
23. I generate a lot of enthusiasm.
24. I have a forgiving nature.
25. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their
price in this task are primarily business decisions.
26. I worry a lot.
27. I feel resentful now.
28. I feel resentment toward those here who have more than I do.
29. I enjoy taking risks.
30. An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the higher tier of
earnings are there mostly due to luck.

250

APPENDIX E: WORD COMPLETION TASK
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Complete the following word fragments using the first real word (i.e., a word that can be found
in the dictionary) that comes to your mind. There is no one correct answer for each fragment. For
example, if given the fragment “B A _ _,” you can complete it using any of the words “base,”
“baby,” or “ball” (note that capital letters can be used, but they are not necessary).

You will earn an additional 250 Credits for each completed word fragment. You will have 45
seconds to finish each fragment.
1. “M O _ _ _”
2. “V I _ _ _ _”
3. “E T _ _ _ _ _”
4. “H O _ _ _ _”
5. “T R _ _ _”
6. “R A _ _ _”
7. “C H _ _ _ _”
8. “B I _ _ _”
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APPENDIX F: DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE
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Instructions
Please complete the following questions below.
1. Your gender:
o Male
o Female
2. Your undergraduate major:
3. Your GPA at the start of the current semester (round if necessary):
o 4.0- 3.5
o 3.4- 3.0
o 2.9 - 2.5
o 2.4 - 2.0
o Below 2.0
4. How many accounting-related courses you have taken (include the current semester):
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APPENDIX G: CHAPTER 4 TASK INSTRUCTIONS
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Instructions for Seller Task
Your task is to sell assets in an online marketplace. You will earn Credits for each successful
sale, which will be translated into US dollars and paid to you upon completion of the study.
Before starting this task, please read these important instructions:

1. If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a
clear understanding of the instructions.
2. For each of 25 rounds, you will be given information regarding an asset’s name, quality,
and value-range. For example, you may be provided with an “Epsilon” asset of average
quality that is valued between 400 to 500 Credits. Please note that estimating the value
of these assets is highly subjective. Thus, some assets may be valued incorrectly.
3. Your task, for each round, is to sell the asset in an online marketplace. Before attempting
to sell each asset, however, you must determine both the price of the asset and how to
disclose its quality. If you think the value of the asset is incorrect, then it is possible to
select another quality level. This will also adjust the price level on-screen. For example,
if you rate an Epsilon asset at average quality, then it will have an assessed value between
400 to 500 Credits. However, selecting a rating of “above average” automatically moves
the value-range to 450 to 550 Credits. Finally, you must determine a price, within the
value-range, at which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits). Please note that the other
participants do not have access to any information regarding the pricing and disclosure of
quality decisions you make for any asset.
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4. You will then enter the marketplace to sell your asset. Please note that your offer may
be declined.
5. You can earn more Credits by selling assets that have higher values.
6. The possibility of an audit exists after each transaction. Misrepresenting the quality of
the asset can result in a fine of 2,000 Credits if an audit (1) is conducted and (2)
reveals that the asset was improperly disclosed at a level higher than initially
provided. In addition, you will forfeit any Credits earned from the transaction. The
success rate of detecting a misrepresentation can be anywhere from 20 to 80 percent if an
audit does occur.
7. In addition to the money earned from the sale of assets, you may be awarded a 3,000Credit bonus if you reach a certain number of earned Credits. This number is
believed to be reasonable and has been derived so that most individuals are awarded the
bonus. The number of earned-Credits required to receive the bonus will be provided
during the experiment.
8. After the 24th round, you will be updated regarding your progress toward receiving the
bonus. In addition, you will be asked to complete a brief survey. Further instructions will
be provided for that survey later in the study.
9. You will be asked to complete a brief word completion exercise at the end of the last
round (25th) of selling assets. You may earn additional Credits during this task. Further
instructions will be provided later in the study.
10. After the word completion task, you will be prompted that the study is over and that you
should please bring the card located at your station to the administrator so you may be
257

paid. The study administrator will translate your Credits earned from selling assets and
the word completion task into US Dollars. The exchange rate between US Dollars and
Credits is positive. Any negative Credit balance will be rounded to zero. In addition to
the money earned from selling assets and the word completion task, you will be paid a
fee for participating in the study.
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APPENDIX H: CHAPTER 4 ZODIAC AND PERSONALITY SURVEY
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The following survey includes a variety of questions that ask about your personality, preferences,
emotions, and zodiac. Answering these questions accurately requires proper reflection on how
you really think, feel, and act in general. Please answer each question as best as you can. The
Zodiac is made up of 12 different sun signs. Your date of birth determines which one you are.
Previous research has shown that people’s zodiac sign is related to the type of judgments they
make. Please indicate your Zodiac sign below and then answer the personality questionnaire.28
1. What is your zodiac sign?
o Aries (March 21 to April 19)
o Taurus (April 20 to May 20)
o Gemini (May 21 to June 20)
o Cancer (June 21 to July 22)
o Leo (July 23to August 22)
o Virgo (August 23 to September 22)
o

Libra (September 23 to October 22)

o Scorpio (October 23 to November 21)
o Sagittarius (November 22 to December 21)
o Capricorn (December 22 to January 19)
o Aquarius (January 20 to February 18)
o Pisces (February 19 to March 20)
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:

28

The wording of these instructions is taken from Gino and Pierce (2009, p., 147).
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Very Unfair

Somewhat Unfair

Neither Unfair or Fair

Somewhat fair

Very fair

1.

Overall, I would rate the fairness of
my actions in the marketplace as…

1

2

3

4

5

2.

Overall, I would rate the fairness of
other’s actions in the marketplace as…

1

2

3

4

5

Neither Untrustworthy or
Trustworthy

Somewhat Trustworthy

Very Trustworthy

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Somewhat
Dishonest

Neither Honest of
Dishonest

Somewhat Honest

Very Honest

6.

1

Overall, I would rate the
trustworthiness of my actions in the
marketplace as…
Overall, I would rate the
trustworthiness of other’s actions in
the marketplace as…

Very Dishonest

5.

Somewhat
Untrustworthy

4.

Very Untrustworthy

3.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Overall, I would rate the honesty of
my actions in the marketplace as…
Overall, I would rate the honesty of
other’s actions in the marketplace
as…
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Strongly Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Disagree or
Agree

Somewhat Agree

Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Because of my performance, I feel
shame now
The decisions regarding how to
represent the quality of the
15.
assets and determine their price
in this task are primarily
financial decisions.
16.
I am helpful and unselfish with others.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

17.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

I am usually talkative.
Because of my performance, I feel
angry now.
Because of my performance, I feel
frustrated now.
I tend to find fault with others.
I usually do a thorough job.
Because of my performance, I feel
guilt now.
I usually come up with new ideas.

14.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

I can be somewhat careless at times.
Because of my performance, I feel sad
now.
Because of my performance, I feel
disappointed now.
Because of my performance, I feel
depressed now.
I handle stress well.
I am generally a curious person.
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28.
29.

30.

Strongly Disagree

27.

Somewhat Agree

26.

Neither Disagree or
Agree

25.

Somewhat
Disagree

24.

Strongly Disagree

23.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

I am full of energy.
The decisions regarding how to
represent the quality of the assets and
determine their price in this task are
primarily economic decisions.
Because of my performance, I feel
worried now.
I am a reliable worker.
I can be tense at times.
Because of my performance, I feel
uncomfortable now.
Because of my performance, I feel
fearful now.
The decisions regarding how to
represent the quality of the assets and
determine their price in this task are
primarily business decisions.

263

APPENDIX I: IRB APPROVAL LETTER

264

265

266

